May 3, 2024

In China’s Urbanization, Worries of a Housing Shortage

Cheap but crowded neighborhoods are being cleared across China as part of a stepped-up urbanization campaign by the country’s new leaders. China aims to spend an estimated 40 trillion renminbi, or $6 trillion, on infrastructure, including housing, as a projected 400 million people become urban residents over the next decade.

But the clearance of so-called villages within cities removes cheap housing stock for the very people chosen to fuel that migration without providing sufficient replacement units. The land is sold by municipalities to developers who generally erect expensive apartments.

That throws into question how the government can achieve its ambitious goal.

“On the one hand, the law doesn’t allow former farmers to expand housing for migrant workers; on the other hand, local governments don’t have the money to build affordable housing either,” said Li Ping, senior attorney for Landesa Rural Development Institute in Beijing.

About 130 million Chinese migrants live in tiny, subdivided rooms rented out by former farmers whose villages have been surrounded by sprawl, according to government surveys.

Policies to provide government-built housing while razing these villages within cities result in a net loss of housing units, according to urban planners and academics, while choking off the private rental market that for decades has enabled China’s massive urban migration.

The dilemma poses harsh choices for those who have made lives in the cities on the slimmest of margins, like the migrants in the converted shipping containers in Shanghai.

“They can’t just come and ask me to move. I have so many products here that I sell. So much stuff worth at least tens of thousands of yuan,” said Li Yanxin, a migrant from nearby Anhui Province who runs a small convenience store out of his container. His profits — and therefore his ability to pay for his teenager’s education — depend on the low rent he found in the container village.

Local officials put muscle behind a policy of clearing such sites, often declaring these dwellings illegal by noting nonagricultural land allocated to villagers cannot be used for commercial purposes. Land reclassified as “urban” can be sold at a huge profit.

“Not everyone can live in a high rise. Especially those of us who work in the recycling business,” said Zhang Baofa, who rents out used shipping containers. “This is zoned as village land. I borrowed the land. I bought the containers. I rented it out. I would know if it were illegal,” Mr. Zhang said.

Local officials, embarrassed by photos of the container village circulating on the Internet, have vowed to remove the site within days. On Thursday, after four years of operation, they declared Mr. Li’s store to be unregistered.

Chinese cities lack the visible slums of other developing countries, thanks in part to communities like Xinzhuang in Beijing that collectively house about 3.4 million migrants just within the capital.

A high, whitewashed wall and strip of green lawn hide Xinzhuang’s 10,000 residents from surrounding luxury apartment blocks. Three black chickens scratch along a filthy gutter of blue-grey water next to the public latrine. Rooms of about 12 square meters, or 130 square feet, each house families of three, for 500 renminbi a month.

“A regular apartment would be more comfortable, but it’s about 2,000 renminbi a month. That’s too much for the type of people who live here. They want to save what they can. We fill the lowest niche,” said the landlord Dong Gang, whose former farmhouse is now a two-story concrete structure divided into about 30 makeshift rooms.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/business/global/in-chinas-urbanization-worries-of-a-housing-shortage.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

The Education Revolution: As Graduates Rise in China, Office Jobs Fail to Keep Up

Wang Zengsong is desperate for a steady job. He has been unemployed for most of the three years since he graduated from a community college here after growing up on a rice farm. Mr. Wang, 25, has worked only several months at a time in low-paying jobs, once as a shopping mall guard, another time as a restaurant waiter and most recently as an office building security guard.

But he will not consider applying for a full-time factory job because Mr. Wang, as a college graduate, thinks that is beneath him. Instead, he searches every day for an office job, which would initially pay as little as a third of factory wages.

“I have never and will never consider a factory job — what’s the point of sitting there hour after hour, doing repetitive work?” he asked.

Millions of recent college graduates in China like Mr. Wang are asking the same question. A result is an anomaly: Jobs go begging in factories while many educated young workers are unemployed or underemployed. A national survey of urban residents, released this winter by a Chinese university, showed that among people in their early 20s, those with a college degree were four times as likely to be unemployed as those with only an elementary school education.

It is a problem that Chinese officials are acutely aware of.

“There is a structural mismatch — on the one hand, the factories cannot find skilled labor, and, on the other hand, the universities produce students who do not want the jobs available,” said Ye Zhihong, a deputy secretary general of China’s Education Ministry.

China’s swift expansion in education over the last decade, including a quadrupling of the number of college graduates each year, has created millions of engineers and scientists. The best can have their pick of jobs at Chinese companies that are aiming to become even more competitive globally.

But China is also churning out millions of graduates with few marketable skills, coupled with a conviction that they are entitled to office jobs with respectable salaries.

Part of the problem seems to be a proliferation of fairly narrow majors — Mr. Wang has a three-year associate degree in the design of offices and trade show booths. At the same time, business and economics majors are rapidly gaining favor on Chinese campuses at the expense of majors like engineering, contributing to the glut of graduates with little interest in soiling their hands on factory floors.

“This also has to do with the banking sector — they offer high-paying jobs, so their parents want their children to go in this direction,” Ms. Ye said.

Mr. Wang and other young, educated Chinese without steady jobs pose a potential long-term challenge to social stability. They spend long hours surfing the Internet, getting together with friends and complaining about the shortage of office jobs for which they believe they were trained.

China now has 11 times as many college students as it did at the time of the Tiananmen Square protests in the spring of 1989, and an economy that has been very slow to produce white-collar jobs. The younger generation has shown less interest in political activism, although that could change if the growing numbers of graduates cannot find satisfying work.

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao acknowledged last March that only 78 percent of the previous year’s college graduates had found jobs. But even that figure may overstate employment for the young and educated.

The government includes not just people in long-term jobs but also freelancers, temporary workers, graduate students and people who have signed job contracts but not started work yet, as well as many people in make-work jobs that state-controlled companies across China have been ordered to create for new graduates.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/business/as-graduates-rise-in-china-office-jobs-fail-to-keep-up.html?partner=rss&emc=rss