May 6, 2024

Economix Blog: Simon Johnson: What Would It Take to Save Europe?

Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of “13 Bankers.”

Official Washington was gripped last weekend by euphoria, at least briefly, as people attending the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund began to talk about how much money it would take to stabilize the situation in Europe. At least one éminence grise suggested that 1.5 trillion euros should do the trick; others were more inclined to err on the side of caution, and their estimates ran as high as four trillion euros.

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This is a lot of money. Germany’s annual gross domestic product is only about 2.5 trillion euros, and the combined G.D.P. of the entire euro zone is about 9.5 trillion euros. The idea is that providing a huge package of financial support would awe the markets into submission –- meaning that people would stop selling their holdings of Italian or Spanish debt, and thus stop pushing up interest rates.

Ideally, investors would also give Greece and Portugal some time to find their way to back to growth.

But this is the wrong way to think about the problem. The issue is not money in the form of external financial support, whether provided by the I.M.F. or other countries to parts of the European Union. The real questions are whether Italy will get complete and unfettered access to the European Central Bank, and when we will know.

The big-package approach to economic stabilization was most famously demonstrated in the 1994-95 Mexican crisis. With Mexico’s currency under great pressure, President Ernesto Zedillo and Finance Minister Guillermo Ortiz arranged a $45 billion loan, a large part of which came from the United States.

This may look small today, but it was then seen as a large amount of support. President Zedillo famously remarked that when markets overreact, policy should in turn overreact — meaning, in this context, put more money on the table than is needed. When the financial firepower made available is overwhelming, as it was in the Mexican case, it does not have to be used — in fact, the Mexican loan was repaid in about a year.

But this version of Mexican events skips an important detail. While the external financial support helped prevent the complete collapse of the currency, the Mexican peso did depreciate significantly, which helped immensely. Before the crisis, Mexico had a large current account deficit: it was importing more than it was exporting, and the difference was covered by capital inflows (mostly foreigners willing to lend to the Mexican government).

When the peso fell in value, exporting from Mexico became much more attractive; an export boom of this kind always helps close the current account deficit and stimulate the economy in a sensible manner.

Important parts of the euro zone, like Portugal, Greece and perhaps Italy, badly need a reduction in their real costs of production. If their currencies were independent, this could be achieved by a depreciation of their market value. But this is not an option within the euro zone, and it is within the zone that they need to become more competitive.

These countries could cut nominal wages — a course of action being pursued, for example, in Latvia. But Latvia is a special case for many reasons, including its desire to become much closer with the euro zone, which it aspires to join. It is unlikely that any Western European government making such a proposal would last long.

Unable to move the exchange rate and unwilling to cut wages, the Portuguese government is embarked on an innovative course of “fiscal devaluation,” meaning it will cut payroll taxes, to reduce the cost of labor, while increasing the value added tax, or VAT (a tax on consumption), as a way to maintain fiscal revenues.

Unfortunately, “innovative” in the context of stabilization policies often means “unlikely to succeed” — and the precise implementation of this plan, with some very complex details, seems fraught with danger.

Europe needs a new fiscal governance mechanism, to be sure. Why would Germany — or anyone else — trust Italy under Silvio Berlusconi with a big loan or unlimited access to credit at the European Central Bank?

Greece and some other countries have serious budget difficulties. Most of the European periphery also faces a current account crisis, and something must be done to increase exports or reduce imports, or both.

If the exchange rate can’t depreciate, wages won’t be cut and “fiscal devaluation” proves unworkable, activity in these economies will need to slow a great deal in order to reduce imports and bring the current account closer to balance – unless you (or the Germans) are willing to extend these countries large amounts of unconditional credit for the indefinite future.

And if these economies slow, their ability to pay their government debts will increasingly be called into question. Last week the I.M.F. cut the growth forecast for Italy in 2012 to 0.3 percent. With interest rates rising toward 6 percent, it is easy to imagine Italy’s debt relative to G.D.P. climbing even further than in the still-benign official projections.

If Italy or any other euro-zone country were in good shape and could pay its debts, the European Central Bank could provide ample short-term support, through buying up bonds to prevent interest rates from reaching unreasonable levels.

The euro is a reserve currency — meaning investors around the world hold it as part of their rainy-day funds — and all European debt is denominated in euros. In Mexico in 1994, for example, much of its debt was in dollars; in such a situation, a foreign loan can help stabilize a crisis, because it provides reserves to the central bank, and this removes the fear that the exchange rate will depreciate excessively. But even in such a case the right policies have to be put in place.”

If Italy cannot pay its debt, then the European Central Bank has no business lending to it. The Europeans have to decide for themselves: Is Italy’s fiscal policy reasonable and responsible? If yes, provide full support as needed — from within the euro zone. If not, then find another way forward.

But please get a move on with this decision.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=c655e8f6eede7d062a17642e6a4cb305

Economix Blog: Simon Johnson: Can the I.M.F. Save the World?

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Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of “13 Bankers.”

The finance ministers and central bank governors of the world gather this weekend in Washington for the annual meeting of countries that are shareholders in the International Monetary Fund. As financial turmoil continues unabated around the world and with the I.M.F.’s newly lowered growth forecasts to concentrate the mind, perhaps this is a good time for the fund – or someone – to save the world.

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Yet there are three problems with this way of thinking. At least in a short-term macroeconomic sense, the world does not really need saving. If the problems do escalate, the monetary fund does not have enough money to make a difference. And the big dangers are primarily European — the European Union and key euro zone members have to work out some difficult political issues, and their delays are hurting the global economy.

But very little can be done to push them in the right direction.

The world’s economy is slowing, without a doubt. The latest quantification was provided Tuesday in the I.M.F.’s World Economic Outlook (see Table 1.1), perhaps the most comprehensive forecast of global growth and its main components. (Disclosure: I helped produce and present these forecasts when I was chief economist at the I.M.F., a position I left in summer 2008.)

The fund has reduced its forecasts for both 2011 and 2012, and while the latter is a more notable change, we can see the gloomy 2011 picture all around us. Compared with its view in June, the fund now expects global growth in 2012 to be one-half of one percentage point lower than previously expected.

Part of the pessimism is about the United States – total growth of gross domestic product in 2012 is expected to be only 1.8 percent, anemic at best. (Remember that our population typically grows at just under 1 percent annually, so this level of growth would barely put a dent in unemployment.)

But the really stark message is for Europe. According to the I.M.F., the euro zone as a whole will expand only 1.1 percent in 2012, and hopes that troubled countries will grow out their debts seem increasingly like a stretch. Just to take one example, Italy’s forecast for 2012 has been marked down to just 0.3 percent — and even in the best case, credit availability in Italy will probably get tighter over the coming months, which may further slow growth.

A potential recession in the euro zone and a weak recovery in the United States does not make for a world crisis. So beware people who demand that the world be saved; usually they are making the case for a bailout of some kind.

Don’t get me wrong — a serious crisis could develop. Plenty of warning signs regarding the situation in Greece and its potentially broader impact abound.

According to the fund’s Fiscal Monitor, also released this week (see Page 79), Greece’s general gross government debt is now forecast to rise to nearly 190 percent of G.D.P. in 2012 before falling back toward 160 percent by the end of 2016. At this point, Greece needs a global growth miracle — and there is no sign of this on the horizon.

If Greece pays less on its debt than is currently expected, this will push down the market value of other sovereign debt in Europe. As The Economist asserted last week, the government debt of some large euro zone countries has unambiguously moved from the category of “risk-free” to “risky” in the minds of investors.

The numbers involved are big. Italy, for example, had public debt of more than 1.84 trillion euros at the end of 2010 (using the latest available Eurostat data, “general government gross debt,” annual series). The G.D.P. of Germany is around 2.5 trillion euros, and there is no way German taxpayers would be comfortable in any way guaranteeing a substantial part of Italy’s debt.

The entire euro zone has a G.D.P. of around 9.5 trillion euros, but no one is volunteering to take on debt issued by someone else’s government (again, I use end-of-2010 data from Eurostat).

To put these issues in perspective, compare them with the International Monetary Fund’s ability to lend to countries in trouble. The technical term is the fund’s “one year forward commitment capacity,” which for “Q3 to date” is 246 billion special drawing rights, or S.D.R.’s, which exist only at the I.M.F. (see the Sept. 15 update).

On Sept. 20, one S.D.R. was worth 1.57154 United States dollars, so the fund could lend no more than $386 billion. With one euro worth about $1.37 this week, this is around 280 billion euros.

Or you could think of it as 15 percent of Italy’s outstanding debt. This is not the only way — and not a precise way — to think about what the fund could bring to the table, financially speaking. But it makes the right point. The European issue is way above the I.M.F.’s pay grade.

Germany, France, Italy and their neighbors need to sort out how to bring the situation under control – to decide who will definitely pay all their debts and who needs some kind of restructuring. About a quarter of the world’s economy therefore remains in limbo, beset by repeated waves of uncertainty. And financial market fears can spread to other places, including the United States.

Complaints may be heard this weekend, but no one at the I.M.F. meetings can persuade the key European players to move faster in their decision-making. The politicians will take their own time – prodded periodically, no doubt, by the financial markets.

Do not expect a fast resolution or a quick turnaround in the global economy.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=2d56e6b9fbdce45816c40ee25bb30f67

Economix Blog: A Second Great Depression, or Worse?

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Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of “13 Bankers.”

With the United States and European economies having slowed markedly according to the latest data, and with global growth continuing to disappoint, a reasonable question increasingly arises: Are we in another Great Depression?

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The easy answer is “no” — the main features of the Great Depression have not yet manifested themselves and still seem unlikely. But it is increasingly likely that we will find ourselves in the midst of something nearly as traumatic, a long slump of the kind seen with some regularity in the 19th century, particularly if presidential election-year politics continue to head in a dangerous direction.

The Great Depression had three main characteristics, seen in the United States and most other countries that were severely affected. None of these have been part of our collective experience since 2007.

First, output dropped sharply after 1929, by over 25 percent in real terms in the United States (using the Bureau of Economic Analysis data, from its Web site, for real gross domestic product, using chained 1937 dollars). In contrast, the United States had a relatively small decline in G.D.P. after the latest boom peaked. According to the bureau’s most recent online data, G.D.P. peaked in the second quarter of 2008 at $14.4155 trillion and bottomed out in the second quarter of 2009 at $13.8541 trillion, a decline of about 4 percent.

Second, unemployment rose above 20 percent in the United States during the 1930s and stayed there. In the latest downturn, we experienced record job losses for the postwar United States, with around eight million jobs lost. But unemployment only briefly touched 10 percent (in the fourth quarter of 2009; see the Bureau of Labor Statistics Web site).

Even by the highest estimates — which include people discouraged from looking for a job, thus not registered as unemployed — the jobless rate reached around 16 to 17 percent. It’s a jobs disaster, to be sure, but not the same scale as the Great Depression.

Third, in the 1930s the credit system shrank sharply. In large part this is because banks failed in an uncontrolled manner — largely in panics that led retail depositors to take out their funds. The creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation put an end to that kind of run and, despite everything, the agency has continued to play a calming role. (I’m on the F.D.I.C.’s newly created systemic resolution advisory committee, but I don’t have anything to do with how the agency handles small and medium-size banks.)

But the experience at the end of the 19th century was also quite different from the 1930s — not as horrendous, yet very traumatic for many Americans. The heavily leveraged sector more than 100 years ago was not housing but rather agriculture — a different play on real estate.

There were booming new technologies in that day, including the stories we know well about the rapid development of transportation, telephones, electricity and steel. But falling agricultural prices kept getting in the way for many Americans. With large debt burdens, farmers were vulnerable to deflation (a lower price level in general or just for their products). And before the big migration into cities, farmers were a mainstay of consumption.

According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, falling from peak to trough in each cycle took 11 months between 1945 and 2009 but twice that length of time between 1854 and 1919. The longest decline on record, according to this methodology, was not during the 1930s but rather from October 1873 to March 1879, more than five years of economic decline.

In this context, it is quite striking — and deeply alarming — to hear a prominent Republican presidential candidate attack Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, for his efforts to prevent deflation. Specifically, Gov. Rick Perry of Texas said earlier this week, referring to Mr. Bernanke: “If this guy prints more money between now and the election, I don’t know what y’all would do to him in Iowa but we would treat him pretty ugly down in Texas. Printing more money to play politics at this particular time in American history is almost treacherous — er, treasonous, in my opinion.”

In the 19th century the agricultural sector, particularly in the West, favored higher prices and effectively looser monetary policy. This was the background for William Jennings Bryan’s famous “Cross of Gold” speech in 1896; the “gold” to which he referred was the gold standard, the bastion of hard money — and tendency toward deflation — favored by the East Coast financial establishment.

Populism in the 19th century was, broadly speaking, from the left. But now the rising populists are from the right of the political spectrum, and they seem intent on intimidating monetary policy makers into inaction. We see this push both on the campaign trail and on Capitol Hill — for example, in interactions between the House Financial Services Committee, where Representative Ron Paul of Texas is chairman of the monetary policy subcommittee, and the Federal Reserve.

The relative decline of agriculture and the rise of industry and services over a century ago were long believed to have made the economy more stable, as it moved away from cycles based on the weather and global swings in supply and demand for commodities. But financial development creates its own vulnerability as more people have access to credit for their personal and business decisions. Add to that the rise of a financial sector that has proved brilliant at extracting subsidies that protect against downside risk, and hence encourage excessive risk-taking. The result is an economy that is at least as prone to big boom-bust cycles as what existed at the end of the 19th century.

The rise of the Tea Party has taken fiscal policy off the table as a potential countercyclical instrument; the next fiscal moves will be contractionary (probably more spending cuts), whether jobs start to come back or not. In this situation, monetary policy matters a great deal, and Mr. Bernanke’s focus on avoiding deflation and hence limiting the problems for debtors does not seem inappropriate (for more on Mr. Bernanke, his motivations and actions, see David Wessel’s book, “In Fed We Trust“).

Mr. Bernanke has his flaws, to be sure. Under his leadership, the Fed has been reluctant to take on regulatory issues, continuing to see the incentive distortions of “too big to fail” banks as somehow separate from monetary policy, its primary concern. And his team has consistently pushed for capital requirements that are too low relative to the shocks we now face.

And the Federal Reserve itself is to blame for some of the damage to its reputation, although it did get a major assist from Treasury in 2008-9. There were too many bailouts rushed over weekends, with terms that were too generous to incumbent management and not sufficiently advantageous to the public purse.

But to accuse Mr. Bernanke of treason for worrying about deflation is worse than dangerous politics. It risks returning us to the long slump of the late 1870s.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=73500819e37f339b4b4e30239c3f500f

Economix: Simon Johnson: The Big Banks Fight On

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Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of “13 Bankers.”

The bank lobbyists have a problem. Last week, they lost a major battle on Capitol Hill, when Congress was not persuaded to suspend implementation of the new cap on debit card fees. Despite the combined efforts of big and small banks, the proposal attracted only 54 votes of the 60 needed in the Senate.

On debit cards, the retail lobby proved a surprisingly effective counterweight to the financial sector. On the next big issue — capital standards — the bankers have a different problem: this highly technical issue is more within the purview of regulators than legislators and is harder to develop a crusade about, as it’s widely regarded as boring.

As the bankers busily rallied their forces to fight on debit cards and spent a great deal of time lobbying on Capitol Hill, they were doused with a bucket of cold water by Daniel K. Tarullo, a governor of the Federal Reserve.

In a speech on June 3, Mr. Tarullo implied capital requirements for systemically important financial institutions — a category specified in the sweeping overhaul of financial regulation last year — could be as high as 14 percent, or roughly double what is required for all banks under the Basel III agreement.

Whether the Federal Reserve will go that far is not certain; a capital requirement of an additional 3 percent of equity (on top of Basel’s 7 percent) may be more likely, but that is still 3 percent more than big banks were hoping for. (These percentages are relative to risk-weighted assets.)

The big banks are likely to mount four main arguments as they press their case against the additional capital requirements, Reuters has reported:

1. “Holding capital hostage” will hurt the struggling economy because it will mean fewer loans at a time when lending is already depressed.

2. Establishing “huge” capital buffers is an admission by regulators that last year’s Dodd-Frank financial overhaul does not accomplish its goal of reducing risk.

3. If banks hold onto more capital and make fewer loans, borrowers will turn to the “shadow banking sector” – the so-called special purpose vehicles, for example — which has little or no oversight.

4. Tough standards in the United States would create a competitive disadvantage vis à vis other countries.

Each of the bankers’ arguments is wrong in interesting and informative ways.

First, capital requirements do not hold anyone or anything hostage — they merely require financial institutions to fund themselves more with equity relative to debt. Capital requirements are a restriction on the liability side of the balance sheet — they have nothing to do with the asset side (in what you invest or to whom you lend).

There is a great deal of confusion about this on Capitol Hill, and whenever bankers (or anyone else) talk about holding capital hostage, they reinforce this confusion. This is not about holding anything; it is about funding relatively less with debt and more with loss-absorbing equity. More equity means the banks can absorb more losses before they turn to the taxpayer for help. This is a good thing.

The idea that higher capital requirements will increase costs for banks or cause their balance sheets to shrink or otherwise contract credit is a hoax — and one that has been thoroughly debunked by Anat Admati and her colleagues (as this now-standard reference, which everyone in the banking debate has read, shows us).

Professor Admati is taken very seriously in top policy circles. (Let me note, too, that she is a member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee, an unpaid group of 18 experts that meets for the first time next week; I am also a member.)

In a recent public letter to the board of JPMorgan Chase, whose chief executive, Jamie Dimon, is an opponent of higher capital requirements, Professor Admati points out that these requirements would — on top of all the social benefits — be in the interests of his shareholders. The bankers cannot win this argument on its intellectual merits.

The second argument, that establishing “huge” capital buffers is an admission by regulators that last year’s Dodd-Frank financial overhaul does not accomplish its goal of reducing risk, is an attempt to rewrite history.

During the Dodd-Frank debates last year, the Treasury Department and leading voices on Capitol Hill — including bank lobbyists — said it would be a bad idea for Congress to legislate capital requirements and should leave them to be set by regulators after the Basel III negotiations were complete.

Now the time has come to do so, and Mr. Tarullo is the relevant official — he is in charge of this issue within the Federal Reserve and is one of the world’s leading experts on capital requirements.

But the banks now want to say that this is not his job as authorized by Dodd-Frank. This argument will impress only lawmakers looking for any excuse to help the big banks.

The third bankers’ argument, that borrowers will turn to the “shadow banking sector,” contains an important point — but not what the bankers want you to focus on.

The “shadow banking sector” — special purpose vehicles, for example — grew rapidly in large part because it was a popular way for very big banks to evade existing capital requirements before 2008, even though those standards were very low.

They created various kinds of off-balance-sheet entities financed with little equity and a great deal of debt, and they convinced rating agencies and regulators that these were safe structures. Many such funds collapsed in the face of losses on their housing-related assets, which turned out to be very risky — and there was not enough equity to absorb losses.

It would be a disaster if this were to happen again. It is also highly unlikely that Mr. Tarullo and his colleagues will allow these shadows to develop without significant capital requirements.

Sebastian Mallaby, who has carefully studied hedge funds and related entities, asserted correctly last week in The Financial Times that it would be straightforward to extend higher capital requirements to cover shadow banking.

The fourth bankers’ argument, that higher equity requirements in the United States would create a competitive disadvantage vis à vis other countries, is like arguing in favor of the status quo in an industry that emits a great deal of pollution, a point made by Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England.

If China, India or any other country wants to produce electricity using a technology that severely damages local health, why would the United States want to do the same? And if the financial pollution floats from others to the United States through cross-border connections, we should take steps to limit those connections.

The Basel III issues may be boring, but they are important. The incorrect, misleading and generally false arguments of bank lobbyists should be rejected by regulators and legislators alike.

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