December 22, 2024

Today’s Economist: Uwe E. Reinhardt: U.S. Health Care Prices Are the Elephant in the Room

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Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton. He has some financial interests in the health care field.

Traditionally, the theory driving discussions on the high cost of health care in the United States has been that there is enormous waste in the system, taking the form of excess utilization of care. From that theory it follows that methods of controlling the growth of health spending should focus on ways to reduce the use of unnecessary or only marginally beneficial health care.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

Largely overlooked in these discussions has been the elephant in the room: the extraordinarily high prices Americans pay for health care. However, as a group of us noted in a paper in 2004, “It’s the Prices, Stupid,” it is higher health spending coupled with lower – not higher — use of health services that adds up to much higher prices in the United States than in any other member nation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Aside from a few high-tech services, Americans actually use less health care and rely on fewer real health-care resources than do residents of other industrialized countries.

Readers who want to get a peek at this elephant in the room should peruse the set of slides published a few days ago by the International Federation of Health Plans, a global network of private health-insurance plans with 100 members in 31 countries. The federation annually surveys prices actually paid for selected health care goods and services in the different countries.

Shown below are three slides from the set:

International Federation of Health Plans
International Federation of Health Plans
International Federation of Health Plans

In most other countries, prices for health care goods and services are not negotiated between individual health insurers and individual physicians, hospitals or drug companies, as they are in the private insurance sector in United States.

Instead prices there either are set by government or negotiated between associations of insurers and providers of care, on a regional, state or national basis. The single prices for other countries shown in the chart therefore can be taken representative of prices actually paid there.

By contrast, as can be seen in the charts, in the United States there is quite a range of prices for the identical good or service.

Ideally, the federation should also have shown the median for prices in the United States. The median represents the midpoint of a frequency distribution; if the distribution of prices is skewed toward either low or high values, the average will be either above or below the midpoint and may not be representative.

Whatever the case may be with the distributions of American prices underlying the charts, it seems clear that the prices for health care in the United States are much higher than they are in other nations. As we noted in the paper cited above, it goes a long way toward explaining why, on average and in purchasing-power parity dollars per-capita, health spending in the United States is so much higher than it is elsewhere in the world.

My explanation for the relative high prices Americans pay for health care relative to other countries is that the payment side of the health care market in the private sector is fragmented, weakening the bargaining power of individual insurers, especially vis-à-vis the increasingly consolidated hospital sector, although other factors, including malpractice premiums, play a part as well.

To endow the payment side of health care with more market muscle, I have proposed an all-payer system based on the models used in Germany or Switzerland or in the state of Maryland. In these systems, government does not dictate prices. Instead, health care prices are negotiated at what Europeans call a “quasi market” level.

Average or median prices aside, however, the federation charts also show that the variation of prices for identical items within the United States – even within a single city – dwarfs the cross-national variation in prices for the same item. That phenomenon has begun to attract attention in the news media only lately.

As Consumer Reports noted in an illuminating article, “Health care prices are all over the map, even within your plan’s network.” The chart at the bottom of the article, based on the Healthcare Blue Book on prices, is especially revealing.

The high variance of health care prices in the United States can be explained in good part by the opacity of these prices. Both government and the private sector have done their best to maintain that opacity.

It is possible to find prices paid by Medicare on the Web, but they are written in code that means something to the providers of health care although little to patients.

Pretend to be a prospective patient searching the Web for Medicare fees. Google “Medicare fee schedules.” At the top of the list you will find this Web site. Try to find the fee for a screening colonoscopy in your area.

If you get frustrated, try this one.

Good luck on your hunt for Medicare fees.

Fees in the private health care sector have been jealously guarded trade secrets among insurers and providers of health care. True, some health insurers now provide their insured members with “cost estimates,” by provider and by major procedure, of what the procedures rendered by a particular providers might cost patients out of pocket, but not full prices. I have found the site for that purpose on my insurance policy very difficult and cumbersome to navigate.

For uninsured patients (also known as self-pay patients) full price information is hard to come by. I tried it again just the other day, calling up a New Jersey hospital and seeking a price for a colonoscopy. After a runaround of several telephone calls, I gave up. I have described the attempt more fully in response to a comment on the previous blog post.

It is truly remarkable that few state governments have made any effort to provide their residents with greater price transparency in health care, as well they could and should.

A report on March 18, “Report Card on State Price Transparency Laws” by the Catalyst for Payment Reform and the Health Care Incentives Improvement Institute gives 29 states the failing grade of F on this score, including New York and New Jersey. Another 6 earned a D, barely passing. Only Massachusetts and New Hampshire earned an A.

With so much carefully guarded and government-shielded opacity on health care prices, it should be no surprise that prices for health care vary as much as they do in the United States, even within small regions and for the same health insurer.

It will not change until citizens make it an issue in political campaigns.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/u-s-health-care-prices-are-the-elephant-in-the-room/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix Blog: Uwe E. Reinhardt: Social Insurance and Individual Freedom

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Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton. He has some financial interests in the health care field.

The continuing debate over the Affordable Care Act and the commentary on this blog have convinced me that nothing can ever unite Americans on their vision of an ideal health system.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

We need different health insurance systems for different Americans. I mean by this not Americans who differ by age or ability to pay but Americans with different notions of a just society.

This is where Germany’s approach to a health insurance system can serve as an inspiration.

Germany’s population of close to 82 million is served by two distinct health insurance systems:

1. The Statutory Health Insurance System, founded in 1883 by Otto von Bismarck and constantly amended over the ensuing century.

2. A private commercial health insurance system.

Germany’s statutory health insurance system is the oldest in the world and has served as a model for many other countries in Europe, Latin America and Asia. In Germany the system consists of 154 (as of July 2011) autonomous, private, nonprofit sickness funds among which individuals can choose freely, which means that the funds compete with one another.

Unlike Americans, who often are limited to networks of providers, Germans have complete freedom of choice of provider under the statutory system.

The sickness funds now provide very comprehensive health insurance to more than 85 percent of the population. They are overseen by boards composed of employers and unions. Their management, however, is strictly regulated by the law, as amended.

Germany’s private insurance system is composed of 46 health companies that are operated on commercial principles, albeit under federal regulations, and provide comprehensive coverage to another 11 percent of the population, including all civil servants, although individuals and families in the statutory system often purchase supplementary coverage (for superior amenities or items not covered by the statutory system).

In 2009, these companies accounted for less than 10 percent of total national health spending in Germany, which amounted to $4,200 per capita in purchasing power parity, slightly more than half of American spending of $7,900, even though Germany’s population is much older on average than ours.

The remainder of Germany’s population (police officers, the military and others) have their own coverage.

Financing the Statutory System

The statutory system is financed on the principle of social solidarity, that is, strictly on the basis of ability to pay. The sketch below illustrates this flow of funds:

Employees covered by the statutory system must pay a nationally uniform contribution to the sickness fund of their choice of 8.2 percent of their gross wages (and pensioners 8.2 percent of their pensions), while employers (or pension funds) must contribute 7.3 percent, for a total contribution of 15.5 percent of gross wages up to a maximum gross wage (or pension) of 44,550 euros, about $59,700. Earnings above that threshold are not subject to this levy.

Unemployed people pay premiums in proportion to their unemployment compensation, unless they are long-term unemployed, in which case the federal government pays the sickness fund a fixed per-capita payment.

The total contribution paid to a sickness fund covers the employee (or pensioner) and any nonworking dependents, except children, for whom insurance coverage is tax-financed by the federal government.

To equalize actuarial risk among the competing sickness funds, Germany operates a national risk-equalization fund (the Gesundheitsfond). The premium contribution rates paid by employees and employers to a sickness fund are immediately transferred to this central fund.

If the employee (or pensioner) then chooses sickness fund A, the central fund pays the chosen sickness fund a capitation that is risk-adjusted for that employee (or pensioner) and the nonworking dependents. The risk-adjustment formula used for that purpose includes age, gender and about 80 indicators of morbidity.

Financing Commercial Insurers

Private insurers draw their financing from per-capita premiums that reflect a person’s age, gender and health status at the time of enrollment but thereafter can be raised only as a function of age, not changing health status. Separate per-capita premiums are levied on dependents in a family.

Recent federal legislation has forced private insurers to levy on younger people higher premiums than their actuarial risk can justify to build up an old-age reserve, thus preventing premiums from climbing too rapidly with age.

Recently the private system has come under a number of new regulations. For more detail on these, readers are referred to the links provided above.

Closing the Door to Statutory Insurance

By law, every German must have coverage for a prescribed benefit package. German employees and pensioners earning less than 49,500 euros ($66,350) per year (in 2011) are compulsorily insured under the statutory system.

Employees and pensioners above that threshold are free to opt out of the statutory system and purchase private, commercial coverage, but if they do, they cannot ever return to the statutory system unless they are paupers. The intent is to minimize gaming of the insurance system by individuals.

It is this feature that intrigues me, as it has my colleague Paul Starr, in his proposed alternative to an individual mandate to be insured.

What if Americans at, say, age 26 (beyond which they can no longer be included on their parents’ insurance policy) or even as late as age 30 were offered the choice of:

1. joining the community-rated health insurance offered through the insurance exchanges called for in the Affordable Care Act;

2. remaining in a private insurance system that is free to charge in any year “actuarially fair” premiums, that is, premiums that reflect the applicant’s projected health status and spending for that year and is free to refuse issuing a policy altogether;

3. simply self-insuring, by remaining uninsured?

For want of better terms, we might call the exchange system the “social insurance track” (because it leans heavily toward social insurance) and the second and third options the “rugged individualist tracks,” because they cater to Americans with individualist preferences.

For people choosing the rugged individualist tracks, Professor Starr proposes to shut the door to the social insurance track for only five years.

I believe his stricture is too weak and propose instead to follow the German example by shutting the door permanently to social insurance to any individual who chose one of the two rugged individualist tracks, unless such individuals were truly pauperized. A return then would have to be allowed, because, for better or for worse, our civic sentiments preclude letting anyone – even a myopic rugged individualist — die for want of critically needed health care.

Admittedly, this approach would confront young Americans with a serious life-cycle choice. But life-cycle choices are made all the time, and choices do have consequences that people in their mid-20s should be mature enough to think about. Adults must realize that individual freedom has its price.

The American health insurance system now is structured as a paradise for clever adolescents, inviting gaming of many sorts that makes sensible health policy almost impossible. It is time to move away from such a system.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=9a721a9eb5ca092fe1935c8b2dbaf360