April 24, 2024

In New Euro Boss, a Hard-Line Future

This was not Greece, after all. And though the financial press had been chronicling SNS Reaal’s troubled real estate portfolio, the adviser in Athens chose to accentuate the positive: The Netherlands has a strong economy, with a government that had always stood behind the country’s too-big-too fail financial institutions. And SNS, one of biggest Dutch banks, was offering a mouthwatering return of 6 percent a year.

“It seemed safe,” Mr. Zannakis recalled. “What could go wrong?”

Plenty, as it turned out. On Feb. 1, the Dutch government seized SNS to keep it from collapsing under the weight of those problem real estate loans. And in a drastic action, unprecedented in the five-year-saga of euro zone bank bailouts, the Dutch finance minister decreed: Bondholders like Mr. Zannakis would be wiped out.

This would be no mere “haircut” of the sort in which bond investors would take a partial loss, as has mostly happened since 2010 when euro zone governments have bailed out banks in Ireland, Greece and Spain. In such instances, taxpayers have taken the main financial hit.

In this case, Mr. Zannakis would lose the entire €50,000, or $65,000, he invested in SNS bonds only two weeks earlier, as part of a class of junior bondholders who saw a total of €1.8 billion disappear into the Dutch government’s ledger.

Suddenly, the rules seem to have changed — with potentially unpredictable implications for Europe’s banks and their investors.

What makes all of this much more than a Dutch novelty is the new clout of the country’s finance minister, Jeroen Dijsselbloem. Mr. Dijsselbloem has just been voted head of the Eurogroup, the powerful club of 17 national finance ministers who effectively set financial policy for the euro currency union.

There is a new financial sheriff in the euro zone, in other words. And his disciplinarian bent could hold tremendous sway as the euro zone continues to work through a to-do list of bank bailouts, including ones now pending in Italy and Cyprus. The Dijsselbloem doctrine could mean that bondholders of failing Italian banks or — even more radically, bank depositors in Cyprus — may end up absorbing steep losses if euro zone members are called upon to prop up the institutions.

“The direction of travel is clear: bailing in as opposed to bailing out is going to be the new normal in the euro area,” said Mujtaba Rahman, a European analyst at Eurasia, a research group based in New York.

In a positive light, this new rigor could make banks and their investors less willing to make risky bets — to the betterment of European banking. The downside is that it could become even harder for euro zone banks to tap skittish bond investors for new money as banks struggle to recover from the twin shocks of the global financial crisis and the subsequent European debt debacle.

That potential drawback is why Mr. Dijsselbloem, in a letter to the Dutch Parliament explaining his punishment of the SNS junior bondholders, said he had not also imposed losses on investors holding senior debt, even though he acknowledged he was tempted to do so. Those who hold senior bonds stand in line ahead of junior bondholders to get repaid if a bank fails, which is why those securities are deemed less risky and carry a lower interest rate. Dutch banks in particular rely on senior bonds to finance their operations.

Mr. Dijsselbloem’s office declined an interview request. But some government debt experts agree with him that making more of a bank’s investors share the pain of a collapse is the prudent way to proceed in any future bank bailouts in the euro zone.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/business/global/in-new-euro-boss-a-hard-line-future.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix Blog: Bruce Bartlett: When the Deficit Will Be Fixed

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Bruce Bartlett held senior policy roles in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and served on the staffs of Representatives Jack Kemp and Ron Paul. He is the author of “The Benefit and the Burden: Tax Reform – Why We Need It and What It Will Take.”

The Holy Grail for budget hawks is the “grand bargain” – some combination of tax increases and entitlement reforms that will get the deficit on a sustainable track, permanently. On paper, it always looks simple – relatively small adjustments to the growth path of revenues or big spending programs like Medicare or Social Security compound over time into big savings.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

The problem, of course, is getting Congress to act, because of what economists call a time-inconsistency problem. The Congress that raises taxes and cuts benefits will suffer politically, while the benefits of lower deficits will accrue to future Congresses.

Historically, what has moved Congress to enact big deficit-reduction packages was the prospect of quick improvement in terms of inflation, growth and interest rates. Given that deficit reduction today is very unlikely to improve any of these in the near term, deficit hawks lack any real payoff from a grand bargain.

The two problems most likely to result from budget deficits are inflation and high interest rates. Many economists believe that deficits are inherently inflationary; others believe that they inevitably put pressure on the Federal Reserve to “monetize” the debt by, in effect, printing money to pay for it.

High interest rates are even more easily blamed on the deficit. As Floyd
Norris of The New York Times recently recounted, so-called bond vigilantes terrorized Wall Street in the early 1980s. Economists including Henry Kaufman of Salomon Brothers and Albert Wojnilower of First Boston regularly issued apocalyptic warnings of doom unless drastic action was taken on the deficit immediately.

It was often said that the Treasury’s borrowing was crowding out private borrowers from the bond market, because the federal government is not constrained by the amount of interest it is willing to pay. It will pay whatever the market demands to sell all the bonds it has to sell that day. Private borrowers will pull back their borrowing if rates get too costly.

Economists worried that if private companies lacked access to the bond market they would reduce investment in new plants and equipment, which ultimately reduced productivity and economic growth. High interest rates also raised the “hurdle” rate of return, snuffing out investments that in the past would have been profitable.

Some economists disagreed on the mechanism by which deficits affected interest rates. They pointed out that expected inflation automatically raises market interest rates. Generally speaking, a rise of 1 percent in the expected rate of inflation will raise long-term rates by 1 percent.

Those of a more liberal persuasion often contended that the Fed was forced to run a tighter monetary policy when faced with large deficits in order to offset their inflationary effect.

The precise mechanism didn’t matter much for policy purposes, because each perspective came back to the idea that deficits had to be reduced to improve the economy. Lower deficits would simultaneously reduce crowding out and inflationary expectations and give the Fed room to ease monetary policy – a virtual trifecta of payoffs.

It’s worth remembering just how severe the problem was. According to Mr. Norris, the interest rate on the Treasury’s 30-year bond peaked at 15.21 percent on Oct. 26, 1981. That is a rate almost incomprehensibly high given that Treasury bonds are assumed to have zero risk of default. The rate on the 30-year bond today is about 2.8 percent, about half its historical rate.

Even taking into account the fact that inflation was a serious problem in 1981 – the consumer price index rose 8.9 percent for the year – the “real” component of interest rates was very high. The real interest rate is the market rate minus the expected inflation rate.

With the benefit of hindsight, buying bonds in 1981 was the profit-making opportunity of a lifetime. Just imagine being able to get better than 15 percent a year on an investment for 30 years at zero risk.

Of course, at the time bonds were toxic, which is precisely why rates were so high. But as time went by, the deficit improved, inflation collapsed and the Fed eased. But it didn’t happen all at once; the process was slow and painful, involving many budget deals that were extremely difficult, politically.

Perhaps the most difficult was the 1990 deal, in which President George H.W. Bush courageously bucked his own party and agreed to a small increase in the top tax rate in order to get spending cuts and tough budget controls that deserve much of the credit for the budget surpluses of the late 1990s.

Mr. Bush’s own party basically turned its back on him, and it cemented for all time the now universally held Republican idea that taxes must never be increased at any time for any reason. Even those Republicans still sane enough to know this is nuts live in fear of a Tea Party challenger in the next primary, underwritten by the vast resources of the Club for Growth, which helped torpedo John Boehner’s “Plan B” effort at a “fiscal cliff” deal because it would raise the top tax rate on millionaires.

It is an article of faith to Grover Norquist, of tax pledge fame, that budget deals involving higher taxes are always bad for Republicans.

A new study from the European Central Bank confirms that significant deficit improvement is usually driven by rising interest rates. However, by the time budgetary action occurs the rising cost of interest on the debt tends to overwhelm the adjustment.

According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, none of the preconditions that historically are necessary for a significant budget deal are now present. Inflationary expectations continue to fall and real interest rates are very low. Hence, it is impossible for politicians to promise any benefit from large spending cuts or tax increases that would materially improve peoples’ lives. The benefits are purely abstract.

This suggests that we are a long way from meaningful legislative action on the deficit.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/01/when-the-deficit-will-be-fixed/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix Blog: Europe Disappoints. Again.

This week some smart people thought they knew what was going to happen in Europe.

FLOYD NORRIS

FLOYD NORRIS

Notions on high and low finance.

European and American officials thought there was a deal that would be worked out to provide the needed funding by printing money. There would be concessions to German demands for fiscal purity, but it would accept the need for drastic action.

Here’s the plan that some thought was all but a sure thing:

The central banks would find a way to pump in zillions of euros in liquidity. There would be more government bond purchases by the European Central Bank, but the more important part was to involve the International Monetary Fund. There was talk of a convoluted deal whereby the I.M.F. would get funding from European central banks and then lend money to European countries. The I.M.F. always attaches strings to loans, so this would not be free money for governments that could therefore abandon fiscal restraint, but it would solve the immediate problem.

Then Mario Draghi, the head of the E.C.B., threw cold water on I.M.F. involvement at his news conference today. And he said he had not meant to signal more bond purchases by the E.C.B. when he spoke to the European Parliament last week.

As he talked, stock and government bond markets went into reverse. The euro lost ground against the dollar.

On Wednesday, 10-year Italian bonds traded to yield about 6 percent. A day later the figure is 6.5 percent. Spanish yields went from 5.4 percent to 5.8 percent.

Those yields are not back to the highs before Mr. Draghi started the positive talk, but they are heading in that direction.

In an editorial today, The Financial Times wrote:

Time and time again over the past 18 months, European leaders have pledged to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the single currency. Just as often their subsequent actions, or lack of them, have belied these fine words.

The failure to fill in the gap between rhetoric and reality has taken the eurozone, and the world, to a perilous place. Fear about the ability of states to service their debts has become self-reinforcing. Absent a radical shift in market psychology, the very core of the eurozone is at risk. The break-up of the single currency, once dismissed as unthinkable, is now openly spoken of as a possibility.

It looks like this week’s summit meeting is going to produce more of the same.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=4d0f3976e04f65d5365432fcfa7e420e