December 21, 2024

Today’s Economist: Uwe E. Reinhardt: What Hospitals Charge the Uninsured

DESCRIPTION

Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton. He has some financial interests in the health care field.

Steven Brill’s exposé on hospital pricing in Time magazine predictably provoked from the American Hospital Association a statement seeking to correct the impression left by Mr. Brill that the United States hospital industry is hugely profitable.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

In this regard, the association can cite not only its own regularly published data, but also data from the independent and authoritative Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, or Medpac, established by Congress to advise it on paying the providers of health care for treating Medicare patients.

As shown by Chart 6-19 of Medpac’s report from June 2012, “Health Care Spending and the Medicare Program,” the average profit margin (defined as net profit divided by total revenue) for the hospital industry over all is not extraordinarily high, although for a largely nonprofit sector I would rate it more than adequate.

Medicare Payment Advisory Commission

But in each year there is a large variance about that year’s average shown in Chart 6-19, with about 25 to 30 percent of hospitals reportedly operating in the red and many others earning margins below the averages.

The hospital association also correctly points out that under the pervasive price discrimination that is the hallmark of American health care, the profit margin a hospital earns is the product of a complicated financial juggling act among its mix of payers.

Payers with market muscle — for example, the federal Medicare and state Medicaid programs — can get away with paying prices below what it costs to treat patients (see, for example, Figure 3-5 and Table 3-4 in Chapter 3 of Medpac’s March 2012 report).

With few exceptions, private insurers tend to be relatively weak when bargaining with hospitals, so that hospitals can extract from them prices substantially in excess of the full cost of treating privately insured patients, with profit margins sometimes in excess of 20 percent.

Finally, uninsured patients — also called “self-pay” patients — have effectively no market power at all vis-à-vis hospitals, especially when they are seriously ill and in acute need of care. Therefore, in principle, they can be charged the highly inflated list prices in the hospitals’ chargemasters, an industry term for the large list of all charges for services and materials. These prices tend to be more than twice as high as those paid by private insurers.

To be sure, if uninsured patients are poor in income and assets, they usually are granted steep discounts off the list prices in the chargemaster. On the other hand, if uninsured patients are suspected of having good incomes and assets, then some hospitals bill them the full list prices in the chargemaster and hound them for these prices, often through bill collectors and even the courts.

It is noteworthy that in its critique of Mr. Brill’s work, the association statement is completely silent on this central issue of his report. A fair question one may ask leaders of the industry is this:

Even if one grants that American hospitals must juggle their financing in the midst of a sea of price discrimination, should uninsured, sick, middle-class Americans serve as the proper tax base from which to recoup the negative margins imposed on them by some payers, notably by public payers?

My answer is “No,” and I am proud to say that when luck put in my way an opportunity to act on that view, I did.

In the fall of 2007, Gov. Jon Corzine of New Jersey appointed me as chairman of his New Jersey Commission on Rationalizing Health Care Resources. On a ride to the airport at that time I learned that the driver and his family did not have health insurance. The driver’s 3-year-old boy had had pus coming out of a swollen eye the week before, and the bill for one test and the prescription of a cream at the emergency room of the local hospital came to more than $1,000.

By circuitous routes I managed to get that bill reduced to $80; but I did not leave it at that. As chairman of the commission, I put hospital pricing for the uninsured on the commission’s agenda.

After some deliberation, the commission recommended initially that the New Jersey government limit the maximum prices that hospitals can charge an uninsured state resident to what private insurers pay for the services in question. But because the price of any given service paid hospitals or doctors by a private insurer in New Jersey can vary by a factor of three or more across the state (see Chapter 6 of the commission’s final report), the commission eventually recommended as a more practical approach to peg the maximum allowable prices charged uninsured state residents to what Medicare pays (see Chapter 11 of the report).

Five months after the commission filed its final report, Governor Corzine introduced and New Jersey’s State Assembly passed Assembly Bill No. 2609. It limits the maximum allowable price that can be charged to uninsured New Jersey residents with incomes up to 500 percent of the federal poverty level to what Medicare pays plus 15 percent, terms the governor’s office had negotiated with New Jersey’s hospital industry.

I wouldn’t be surprised if the New Jersey hospital industry was cross at me and the commission for our role in the passage of Assembly Bill 2609. The commission took the view that it helped protect the industry’s image from some of its members’ worst instincts.

In that spirit, I invite the American Hospital Association to join me in urging federal lawmakers to pass a similar law for the nation. Evidently the mere guidelines on hospital pricing that the association published in 2004 have not been enough.

Indeed, in 2009 I had urged the designers of the Affordable Care Act to include such a provision in their bill — alas, to no avail. Courage to impose it on the industry had long been depleted.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/what-hospitals-charge-the-uninsured/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix Blog: Uwe E. Reinhardt: What Hospitals Charge the Uninsured

DESCRIPTION

Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton. He has some financial interests in the health care field.

Steven Brill’s exposé on hospital pricing in Time magazine predictably provoked from the American Hospital Association a statement seeking to correct the impression left by Mr. Brill that the United States hospital industry is hugely profitable.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

In this regard, the association can cite not only its own regularly published data, but also data from the independent and authoritative Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, or Medpac, established by Congress to advise it on paying the providers of health care for treating Medicare patients.

As shown by Chart 6-19 of Medpac’s report from June 2012, “Health Care Spending and the Medicare Program,” the average profit margin (defined as net profit divided by total revenue) for the hospital industry over all is not extraordinarily high, although for a largely nonprofit sector I would rate it more than adequate.

Medicare Payment Advisory Commission

But in each year there is a large variance about that year’s average shown in Chart 6-19, with about 25 to 30 percent of hospitals reportedly operating in the red and many others earning margins below the averages.

The hospital association also correctly points out that under the pervasive price discrimination that is the hallmark of American health care, the profit margin a hospital earns is the product of a complicated financial juggling act among its mix of payers.

Payers with market muscle — for example, the federal Medicare and state Medicaid programs — can get away with paying prices below what it costs to treat patients (see, for example, Figure 3-5 and Table 3-4 in Chapter 3 of Medpac’s March 2012 report).

With few exceptions, private insurers tend to be relatively weak when bargaining with hospitals, so that hospitals can extract from them prices substantially in excess of the full cost of treating privately insured patients, with profit margins sometimes in excess of 20 percent.

Finally, uninsured patients — also called “self-pay” patients — have effectively no market power at all vis-à-vis hospitals, especially when they are seriously ill and in acute need of care. Therefore, in principle, they can be charged the highly inflated list prices in the hospitals’ chargemasters, an industry term for the large list of all charges for services and materials. These prices tend to be more than twice as high as those paid by private insurers.

To be sure, if uninsured patients are poor in income and assets, they usually are granted steep discounts off the list prices in the chargemaster. On the other hand, if uninsured patients are suspected of having good incomes and assets, then some hospitals bill them the full list prices in the chargemaster and hound them for these prices, often through bill collectors and even the courts.

It is noteworthy that in its critique of Mr. Brill’s work, the association statement is completely silent on this central issue of his report. A fair question one may ask leaders of the industry is this:

Even if one grants that American hospitals must juggle their financing in the midst of a sea of price discrimination, should uninsured, sick, middle-class Americans serve as the proper tax base from which to recoup the negative margins imposed on them by some payers, notably by public payers?

My answer is “No,” and I am proud to say that when luck put in my way an opportunity to act on that view, I did.

In the fall of 2007, Gov. Jon Corzine of New Jersey appointed me as chairman of his New Jersey Commission on Rationalizing Health Care Resources. On a ride to the airport at that time I learned that the driver and his family did not have health insurance. The driver’s 3-year-old boy had had pus coming out of a swollen eye the week before, and the bill for one test and the prescription of a cream at the emergency room of the local hospital came to more than $1,000.

By circuitous routes I managed to get that bill reduced to $80; but I did not leave it at that. As chairman of the commission, I put hospital pricing for the uninsured on the commission’s agenda.

After some deliberation, the commission recommended initially that the New Jersey government limit the maximum prices that hospitals can charge an uninsured state resident to what private insurers pay for the services in question. But because the price of any given service paid hospitals or doctors by a private insurer in New Jersey can vary by a factor of three or more across the state (see Chapter 6 of the commission’s final report), the commission eventually recommended as a more practical approach to peg the maximum allowable prices charged uninsured state residents to what Medicare pays (see Chapter 11 of the report).

Five months after the commission filed its final report, Governor Corzine introduced and New Jersey’s State Assembly passed Assembly Bill No. 2609. It limits the maximum allowable price that can be charged to uninsured New Jersey residents with incomes up to 500 percent of the federal poverty level to what Medicare pays plus 15 percent, terms the governor’s office had negotiated with New Jersey’s hospital industry.

I wouldn’t be surprised if the New Jersey hospital industry was cross at me and the commission for our role in the passage of Assembly Bill 2609. The commission took the view that it helped protect the industry’s image from some of its members’ worst instincts.

In that spirit, I invite the American Hospital Association to join me in urging federal lawmakers to pass a similar law for the nation. Evidently the mere guidelines on hospital pricing that the association published in 2004 have not been enough.

Indeed, in 2009 I had urged the designers of the Affordable Care Act to include such a provision in their bill — alas, to no avail. Courage to impose it on the industry had long been depleted.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/what-hospitals-charge-the-uninsured/?partner=rss&emc=rss

DealBook Column: Occupy Wall Street: A Frenzy That Fizzled

Occupy Wall Street protesters gathered on Monday near Zuccotti Park in Lower Manhattan.Marcus Yam for The New York TimesOccupy Wall Street protesters gathered on Monday near Zuccotti Park in Lower Manhattan.

It will be an asterisk in the history books, if it gets a mention at all.

A year ago this week, the Occupy Wall Street movement got under way in Zuccotti Park in Lower Manhattan. The loose group of protesters, frustrated by the economic downturn, sought to blame Wall Street and corporate America for many of the nation’s ills.

While the movement’s first days did not receive much news coverage, it soon turned into a media frenzy, with some columnists comparing its importance to that of the Arab Spring, which led to the overthrow of leaders in several Middle Eastern and African countries, spurred by social media. Images of the Wall Street protesters getting arrested were looped on news channels and featured on the covers of newspapers. Big banks — and the famous Charging Bull statue that is an icon of Wall Street — were fortified with barricades. By the end of the year, Time magazine had named the protester its Person of the Year, perhaps rightly given the revolutions taking place around the world, but the magazine also lumped Occupy Wall Street in among the many meaningful movements taking place.

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But now, 12 months later, it can and should be said that Occupy Wall Street was — perhaps this is going to sound indelicate — a fad.

That is not to say that Occupy Wall Street had no impact. It created an important national conversation about economic inequality and upward mobility. The chant, “We are the 99 percent,” has become part of the lexicon. Its message has subtly been woven throughout the Obama administration’s re-election campaign, in the Democrats’ position on everything from taxes on the highest earners to the soaring levels of student debt.

But consider this: Has the debate over breaking up the banks that were too big to fail, save for a change of heart by the former chairman of Citigroup, Sanford I. Weill, really changed or picked up steam as a result of Occupy Wall Street? No. Have any new regulations for banks or businesses been enacted as a result of Occupy Wall Street? No. Has there been any new meaningful push to put Wall Street executives behind bars as a result of Occupy Wall Street? No.

And even on the issues of economic inequality and upward mobility — perhaps Occupy Wall Street’s strongest themes — has the movement changed the debate over executive compensation or education reform? It is not even a close call.

Is there still anger and angst over the horrible unemployment problem in the United States? Absolutely. But that sentiment, and whatever conversation has emerged as result, was going to happen with or without Occupy Wall Street.

The Wall Street banks themselves hardly felt the pinch of the protesters, beyond considering them a nuisance and an additional security cost. Despite campaigns for customers to move money to smaller, community banks, few customers did.

The biggest victory, perhaps, that the movement can claim was a decision by Bank of America and other big banks to scrap plans to charge additional fees for use of debit cards. The protesters also brought awareness to banks’ foreclosure practices, and even successfully petitioned to keep some struggling borrowers in their homes.

In the fall of 2011, questioning anything about the movement was not too popular. Doing so was an invitation for withering ridicule. (I experienced it firsthand after I filed what I thought was a relatively respectful column about the protests from Zuccotti Park.)

The problem with the movement, as many other columnists have pointed out before, was that its mission was always intentionally vague. It was deliberately leaderless. It never sought to become a political party or even a label like the Tea Party.

By the second or third time I went down to Zuccotti Park, it became clear to me that Occupy Wall Street, which began with a small band of passionate intellectuals, had been hijacked by misfits and vagabonds looking for food and shelter.

Given the way the organization — if it can be called that — was purposely open to taking all comers, the assembly lost its sense of purpose as various intramural squabbles emerged about the group’s end game.

I vividly remember watching one protester with a sign that read “Google = Jewish Billionaires.” Another protester ran over and ripped up the poster. The messages had become decidedly too mixed.

Eliot L. Spitzer, the former New York governor and former attorney general who has been a longtime supporter of Occupy Wall Street, recently reflected on the legacy of the movement.

“They are redefining and rebalancing our political discourse,” he wrote in Slate. “To all those who are dissatisfied because the Occupy movement did not grow into the complete political theory or social agenda that some wished, I say: Give credit where credit is due.”

Fair enough. But even Mr. Spitzer questioned, “We do have to ask, ‘Now what?’ ”

A version of this article appeared in print on 09/18/2012, on page B1 of the NewYork edition with the headline: Occupy Wall Street: A Frenzy That Fizzled.

Article source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/occupy-wall-street-a-frenzy-that-fizzled/?partner=rss&emc=rss

John R. Opel, Who Made I.B.M. a Colossus, Dies at 86

His death was confirmed by Jeff Wickham, a son-in-law, who declined to disclose the cause.

Mr. Opel (pronounced OH-pel) joined I.B.M. as a salesman in 1949, as the computer age was just dawning, and served as the company’s chief executive from January 1981 until January 1985.

A year after he took the top post, the Department of Justice dropped its 13-year-old antitrust lawsuit against I.B.M., freeing the company to compete more aggressively.

Compete it did. Revenue nearly doubled during Mr. Opel’s tenure, to the point that by the end of it, competitors were publicly complaining that I.B.M. was too powerful. In 1983, Time magazine featured Mr. Opel on its cover with the headline “The Colossus That Works.”

But things changed soon after Mr. Opel left office. In the late 1980s and early ’90s, I.B.M. went through a painful period of cutbacks as the computer business underwent huge changes. Small computers based on microprocessors and using standardized software increasingly took over from centralized machines using proprietary hardware and software, I.B.M.’s stock in trade.

I.B.M. itself helped spur the shift when it introduced its first personal computer in 1981, a project started under the previous chief executive, Frank T. Cary, but completed by Mr. Opel.

I.B.M. did not design everything itself. In an effort to make an inexpensive machine that could get to market quickly, it used a microprocessor from Intel and operating system software from Microsoft.

The machine was a hit, making desktop computing acceptable to corporate America and becoming the industry standard.

But competitors realized they could essentially make copies of the machine using Intel chips and Microsoft software. The power in the computer industry shifted to Intel and Microsoft, and hardware became a low-price commodity. I.B.M. eventually sold its PC business and some other hardware operations, and now focuses on software and services.

John Roberts Opel was born on Jan 5, 1925, in Kansas City, Mo., and grew up in Jefferson City, Mo., where his father ran a hardware store. He majored in English at Westminster College in Fulton, Mo., fought in the Philippines and in Okinawa in World War II and earned a master’s of business administration degree from the University of Chicago in 1949.

Mr. Opel then weighed two job offers — one to rewrite economics textbooks and the other to take over his father’s hardware business, according to an appreciation of Mr. Opel that I.B.M. posted on its Web site.

To mull things over, he took a fishing trip with his father and a family friend. The friend happened to work for I.B.M., and he offered Mr. Opel a job as a salesman in central Missouri. At the time, in 1949, I.B.M. was selling electric typewriters and accounting equipment and just starting to introduce electronic calculating machines.

In 1959, Mr. Opel became an executive assistant to Thomas J. Watson Jr., the company’s chief executive. He rose rapidly, taking positions in manufacturing and public relations, among other departments. He managed the introduction of the seminal System 360 mainframe computer in 1964.

Mr. Opel was often viewed as the quintessential I.B.M. man, adhering to the company’s deep traditions with his emphasis on the customer and impeccable dress and a certain reticence with outsiders.

“He was a very client-centric, client-focused person,” said Nicholas M. Donofrio, a former executive vice president at the company. “He would constantly remind us of that.”

But I.B.M. also began departing from tradition under Mr. Opel. In addition to introducing a personal computer, the company moved into telecommunications, in part through the acquisition of the equipment maker Rolm. It acquired a stake in Intel, mainly to shore up Intel against Japanese competition. And it revamped its own manufacturing to allow it to compete better against the Japanese.

Time magazine’s article in 1983 quoted an I.B.M. board member as describing Mr. Opel as “plain vanilla, but good plain vanilla.” He rarely granted interviews or spoke about his private life.

But insiders said he was thoughtful and well read. “He was as much at home in bird watching and poetry as he was in managing the boardroom,” said Patrick A. Toole, a former senior vice president.

After stepping down as I.B.M.’s chief executive, Mr. Opel remained chairman until May 1986 and a board member until 1993.

He is survived by his wife of 56 years, Carole; five children, Robert, Julie Conlee, John E., Nancy Wickham and Mary Porteus; and 15 grandchildren.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=a5c09768abe1d08a5b32c2473efa3b81

Abundance of News, but Mixed Sales, for News Magazines

But newsstand sales for the top weekly news magazines told two different stories. Time, the country’s best-selling news weekly, posted considerable gains. Newsweek, under the leadership of a prominent new editor, barely moved the needle despite creating provocative covers like one with a digitally altered and age-enhanced rendition of Princess Diana.

At Time, sales at the newsstand rose 16 percent from January through June, to 83,796 on average, a rate of increase far higher than others in the category. Total circulation at Time rose almost 2 percent to just under 3.4 million.

At Newsweek, which has undergone significant changes both cosmetic and cultural under Tina Brown, its new editor who revitalized Vanity Fair and The New Yorker in the 1990s, overall circulation fell 5 percent, to just over 1.5 million. Sales of single issues ticked up nearly 3 percent to an average of 46,561 an issue.

On Tuesday, Newsweek business executives defended their strategy as a work in progress and swiped at the competition.

“If you take a look at the last five or six issues of Newsweek, and you compare them to the last five or six issues of Time magazine, you can see the different directions we’re going in,” said Ray Chelstowski, Newsweek’s publisher, who characterized Time’s news judgment as lacking urgency.

Time’s managing editor, Richard Stengel, said the sales figures showed that Time had become the preference of more readers. “There’s a continuing flight to quality,” he said. “And in difficult economic times, that helps iconic brands like ours.”

By and large, circulation trends at weeklies were flat from January through June as sales across the magazine industry fell more than 9 percent over all. Subscription numbers can be manipulated by publishers cutting prices or deciding to cut back on unwanted circulation. For that reason, newsstand sales are often seen as a good proxy for the overall health of a magazine.

Bloomberg Businessweek, which has also switched ownership and editors recently, held steady at just under 922,000 total copies. Copies sold at newsstands dropped by more than a third, to a weekly average of just 14,260. The New Yorker held steady with an overall circulation of just over 1 million. Single-copy sales rose 1.2 percent.

The Week, a digest of opinion and news that has been making steady inroads into the weekly news magazine market, ended the six-month period with a circulation of just over 525,000, up 2 percent. Newsstand sales account for only a fraction of the magazine’s circulation.

Entertainment Weekly (1.8 million circulation), Sports Illustrated (3.2 million) and People (3.6 million) — all published by Time Inc. — had relatively unchanged circulation. But their newsstand sales all slipped, including 11 percent for People.

Sales of other gossip magazines fell as well. US Weekly’s newsstand sales fell 17 percent to over 646,685. Star’s fell 17 percent to 442,131.

Beyond the weeklies, newsstand sales at many women’s and fashion magazines suffered. Glamour was down almost 18 percent. Cosmopolitan declined nearly 3 percent. The outlier among fashion magazine’s was Vogue, which rose almost 13 percent at the newsstand.

With newsstand sales falling, there was some concern that advertising could be next.

“The big question if you’re an advertiser is, how do you look at this in combination with all that’s happening on Wall Street?” said Steven Cohn, editor of The Media Industry Newsletter. “Are you going to sit on your hands? We certainly saw that two and three years ago.”

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=71bd7b42d06fb603db61da370204662f