April 26, 2024

News Analysis: Big Depositors May Become Big, Angry Shareholders in Cyprus

That conceivably could happen under the terms by which big depositors in the Bank of Cyprus, the country’s biggest, will be forced to help pay for the international bailout of the Cypriot banking industry.

Even as European and Cypriot officials put controls in place to keep depositors from sending their money abroad, one fact has become clear: when the bank does resume trading on the local stock exchange, it will be the bank’s largest depositors who will receive commanding stakes in the revamped Bank of Cyprus. For each euro seized from them, they are supposed to get a corresponding amount of stock.

By Wednesday evening it was not known how much of a loss, or haircut, would be demanded from depositors on their amounts exceeding €100,000, or $128,000. The figure of 40 percent was commonly cited by people involved in the assessment, but that number could go higher as government number crunchers try to predict the impact of Cyprus’s troubles on the value of the bank’s assets.

Making the haircut calculations all the harder to calculate is that for the first time in the euro currency union’s short history a member country will be forced to curtail the free movement of capital — one of the core precepts that underpins the ideal of monetary union in Europe. Those restrictions will have a further negative economic impact on Cyprus, a small trading nation that is deeply reliant on cross-border capital flows.

Bankers involved in the discussions say that, with companies closing down by the day and money disappearing under mattresses, the previous assumption that Cyprus’s economy might contract by only 3 percent this year has been discarded. A contraction of 10 percent or more is not out of the question.

And, oh yes, there will be at least one more factor in the equation: Besides its own deteriorating loan book, Bank of Cyprus will also be getting a chunk of problematic loans from the recently shut down Laiki Bank — as well as €9 billion in liabilities that Laiki owed to the central bank of Cyprus.

“To be safe I think you need a haircut of 60 percent,” said one person involved in the discussions. “But that is very hard for the Cypriots to accept.”

No one knows who the single largest depositor is among the €14 billion in deposits at the Bank of Cyprus that will be subjected to haircuts. So that angry Russian oligarch is purely theoretical at this point. What is clear is that, once the smoke and ashes from this meltdown begin to settle, the country’s bank will be owned largely by individuals and entities that have just had significant amounts of their wealth wiped out. If nothing else, it should make for some interesting shareholder meetings.

But at least that new class of stockholders will be better off than the bank’s shareholders before the overhaul and bailout — some 118,000 individuals, who had invested in the country’s biggest bank either directly or through retirement funds. Their shares are now virtually worthless, and they will receive nothing in compensation.

“These people were not speculative investors; they were told to act like Germans and to save for retirement which they did,” said George Vasiliou, who was president of Cyprus from 1988 to 1993 and who later played a key role in negotiating the country’s entry to the European Union in 2004. “Now their savings are wiped out.”

It is, in many respects, for this very reason that institutions like the International Monetary Fund have been so adamant that the new and improved version of Bank of Cyprus be adequately capitalized — that is, having enough of a cash cushion to avoid future collapses. Even if that means big depositors are now being asked to pay for that cushion by giving up a more sizable share of their savings.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/business/global/big-depositors-stand-to-gain-most-in-cypriot-bailout.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Ex-Porsche Officials Charged With Market Manipulation

The company’s former chief executive, Wendelin Wiedeking, was charged with making false public statements in 2008 about its plan to acquire Volkswagen.

Also charged was Holger Härter, Porsche’s former chief financial officer, who was thought to be the mastermind of the takeover plan, which involved the use of complex financial derivatives.

Prosecutors said they dropped charges of breach of trust against both men. In a joint statement Wednesday, lawyers for Mr. Wiedeking and Mr. Härter said that “after several years of investigation prosecutors have themselves recognized” that those accusations “are to the largest possible extent unfounded.”

In a statement Wednesday, prosecutors in Stuttgart, where Porsche is based, said that in at least five public declarations from March to October 2008, the company denied that it intended to raise its stake in Volkswagen. According to prosecutors, though, Mr. Wiedeking and Mr. Härter were already working to do exactly that.

When Porsche subsequently disclosed that it had raised its stake to about 75 percent of the voting shares of Volkswagen, VW’s stock soared, briefly making it the world’s most valuable company.

Investors who had bet that VW shares would fall were caught in what is called a short squeeze and lost billions of dollars.

“Despite all the risks involved in the stock market, a company is required to tell the truth,” said Claudia Krauth, a prosecutor in Stuttgart. “An untruth that impacts the stock price, leading to a manipulation of the market, is not among the normal risks that are to be expected on the stock exchange.”

The lawyers for Mr. Wiedeking and Mr. Härter said they were “astonished” that prosecutors had taken the side of investors who made “highly speculative and irrational wagers against the course of VW shares.”

Several New York hedge funds, including Elliott Associates and Black Diamond Offshore, had some of the worst losses. But their attempt to sue Porsche for $2 billion in damages was dismissed by a New York judge in 2010. Similar civil cases are still pending in Germany and Britain.

A Stuttgart state court must now determine whether to proceed to trial. If the two former executives were to be tried and found guilty, they could face up to five years in prison or a fine, the size of which would be determined by the court.

The takeover attempt was intended to bring together two German automakers whose histories had long been linked.

In 2005, the Porsche family controlled all of the voting shares in the company. That was when Porsche first acquired an 18.53 percent stake in Volkswagen and expressed its intention to further expand its acquisitions.

But after a series of bitter legal and political battles that rocked Germany’s staid business community, the tale quickly turned from David and Goliath — with Mr. Wiedeking as the scrappy underdog — into Icarus, the boy who flew too close to the sun.

Although Mr. Wiedeking is still credited for bringing Porsche back from the brink in the mid-1990s and turning it into one of the world’s best-known and most profitable sports car companies, his risky endeavor to borrow billions in an effort to take over the much larger Volkswagen nearly pushed the company into bankruptcy.

In 2009, Porsche’s supervisory board dismissed Mr. Wiedeking and Mr. Härter, months after announcing that it was abandoning its takeover plan.

Before the year was out, Volkswagen turned the tables, acquiring 49.9 percent of Porsche. In July, Volkswagen acquired the remaining 50.1 percent.

Victor Homola contributed reporting.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/global/2-former-porsche-executives-charged-with-market-manipulation.html?partner=rss&emc=rss