November 17, 2024

Todays Economist: Uwe E. Reinhardt: American Health Care as a Source of Humor

DESCRIPTION

Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton. He has some financial interests in the health care field.

From time to time I stand accused of injecting humor into my public presentations on health policy in the United States. As a German-born economist, I find it hurtful.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

Germans pride themselves on their lack of humor. Economists, for their part, pride themselves on being practitioners of the dismal science. We are the professional buzzkills who put caveats on any good news.

Now imagine both traits packaged into one human being: you have yours truly. It is not that I inject humor into our otherwise august debate on health policy. Rather, the health system in the United States is in many ways so risible that it comes across as droll even when a dour German-born economist describes it.

One of those risible moments occurred this week when the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the Department of Health and Human Services delivered a giant spreadsheet on hospital charges and payments.

The spreadsheet has data in 65,536 rows and 12 columns. It covers, for each of more than 3,000 hospitals, charges and payments for the 100 most frequently billed inpatient cases, along with the average covered charges hypothetically billed by those hospitals for those cases.

The distribution of this giant spreadsheet instantly brought headlines in major daily publications, telling the world that billing charges for a given case vary widely among hospitals even within one city.

Really?

Why was this news? That charges vary enormously among hospitals surely must have been known for many years. As early as 2004, for example, Lucette Lagnado of The Wall Street Journal reported that on the paper’s front page.

I recall producing from her data, for a 2006 paper, “The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy,” the following slide. More such wondrous charges can be found in Ms. Lagnado’s article.

Readers of this blog may recall several posts on the pricing of hospital services, commenting on such variations.

Perhaps the news in this case was that at long last the government had bestirred itself to publish data on which it had been sitting for decades. Indeed, why it had not done so eons ago is an intriguing question.

Part of the data in the government’s daunting spreadsheet could potentially be useful to prospective paying patients. The other part is useful mainly as a source of humor.

What Medicare Actually Pays: For each hospital listed in the spreadsheet, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services show in Column K the average case payments that Medicare actually made to that hospital in 2011 for the 100 most frequently billed cases in the government’s “medical severity-adjusted diagnosis-related grouping,” known as MS-DRG, a classification of inpatient cases. These actual payments are the total payments the hospital received for the case not only from Medicare itself but from patients in the form of co-payments, or from third parties, such as Medigap insurers that cover co-payments otherwise due from patients.

I described an excellent synopsis of Medicare’s MS-DRG classification system and how it sets the payment rate per MS-DRG case in an earlier post.

In principle, patients paying out of pocket could use the actual Medicare payment for an MS-DRG rate as benchmarks by which to gauge the reasonableness of whatever a hospital may charge them for that type of case.

For example, in Column K of Row 28,067 of the spreadsheet, readers learn that for MS-DRG 249 “Perc Cardiovasc Proc W Non-Drug-Eluting Stent w/o MCC” Medicare paid North Shore Medical Center in Miami an average case payment of $13,301 in 2011.

If a paying patient treated or to be treated at North Shore Medical Center can understand the sometimes arcane case descriptions listed in Column A of the spreadsheet, this information might be helpful in haggling with the hospital over its detailed bill before or even after the procedure.

From Column J, Row 28,067 of the spreadsheet, the patient also learns that North Shore Medical Center’s average covered charges for MS-DRG 249 came to $99,275, or 7.5 times what Medicare pays.

So what have we here? What are these charges?

In a handsome graphic comparing Medicare reimbursement (the actual Medicare payment) with average covered charges, a Washington Post blog post described the latter as “average cost.” But costs is exactly not what these “average charges” reflect.

“Average charges” in the United States hospital business are pure fiction — and a funny fiction, at that. They are simply list prices few patients ever pay. Indeed, if any hospital in the United States ever were paid its charges for every patient, its profits would be truly embarrassing.

To appreciate why, it may be helpful to say a word about the so-called chargemasters of hospitals.

Average Covered Charges: Under the tab “Documentation” in the Excel workbook, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services define “average covered charges” as “the provider’s average charge for services covered by Medicare for all discharges in the DRG. These will vary from hospital to hospital because of differences in hospital charge structures.”

In composing a bill for an inpatient case, a hospital’s computers find the charge for a particular service, procedure or manufactured good in the hospital’s huge chargemaster. The latter is a  detailed listing of the hospital’s list prices for myriad procedures and products.

Under the mantra that rules American health care, that “one size does not fit all” — this, in a country that invented one-size-fits-all franchising like McDonald’s and Holiday Inn — the structure and detail of chargemasters are hospital-specific and vary considerably among hospitals. In a detailed study in 2005, the consulting firm Lewin Group noted that hospital chargemasters may contain anywhere from 12,000 to 45,000 distinct items, depending on the hospital.

To see a live example of such a chargemaster and to appreciate how useless its contents would be to a lay person, readers may wish to consult the 2012 chargemaster of Dameron Hospital in Stockton, Calif. I chose it because it happened to pop up in a Google search.

Hospitals update their chargemasters continuously, under the overall supervision of the hospital’s chief financial officer and often with the help of outside consultants.

Here is how, in 2004, the chief financial officer of California’s UC Davis Health System, a 30-year veteran of hospital financing, described this process of updating to The Wall Street Journal:

There is no method to this madness. As we went through the years, we had these cockamamie formulas. We multiplied our costs to set our charges.

Even a German-born economist cannot suppress a smirk at this amazing feature of American health care, a feature whose production engages so many deadly serious adults, including an armada of deadly serious outside consultants.

Even funnier are the protestations by hospital executives that hardly anyone ever pays these fictional prices, which prompted me to offer the following technical definition: “ ‘Charges’ are the prices that a totally inebriated foreign billionaire would pay a U.S. hospital if his wife were not around to control the bloke.”

While it may be true that hardly anyone ever pays these hospital charges, Steven Brill reported not long ago that some and perhaps many hospitals actually bill uninsured American patients with some means and then hound them for payment. That, of course, is not funny.

In the end, though, it is not at all clear to me why anyone should care about the fictitious “average covered charge” figures reported by the Medicare agency. What exactly is a prospective patient to do with this metric?

Nor is it clear to me what all the excitement in the news media was about.

It just made this dour German-born economist laugh out loud once again.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/american-health-care-as-a-source-of-humor/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix Blog: Uwe E. Reinhardt: American Health Care as a Source of Humor

DESCRIPTION

Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton. He has some financial interests in the health care field.

From time to time I stand accused of injecting humor into my public presentations on health policy in the United States. As a German-born economist, I find it hurtful.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

Germans pride themselves on their lack of humor. Economists, for their part, pride themselves on being practitioners of the dismal science. We are the professional buzzkills who put caveats on any good news.

Now imagine both traits packaged into one human being: you have yours truly. It is not that I inject humor into our otherwise august debate on health policy. Rather, the health system in the United States is in many ways so risible that it comes across as droll even when a dour German-born economist describes it.

One of those risible moments occurred this week when the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the Department of Health and Human Services delivered a giant spreadsheet on hospital charges and payments.

The spreadsheet has data in 65,536 rows and 12 columns. It covers, for each of more than 3,000 hospitals, charges and payments for the 100 most frequently billed inpatient cases, along with the average covered charges hypothetically billed by those hospitals for those cases.

The distribution of this giant spreadsheet instantly brought headlines in major daily publications, telling the world that billing charges for a given case vary widely among hospitals even within one city.

Really?

Why was this news? That charges vary enormously among hospitals surely must have been known for many years. As early as 2004, for example, Lucette Lagnado of The Wall Street Journal reported that on the paper’s front page.

I recall producing from her data, for a 2006 paper, “The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy,” the following slide. More such wondrous charges can be found in Ms. Lagnado’s article.

Readers of this blog may recall several posts on the pricing of hospital services, commenting on such variations.

Perhaps the news in this case was that at long last the government had bestirred itself to publish data on which it had been sitting for decades. Indeed, why it had not done so eons ago is an intriguing question.

Part of the data in the government’s daunting spreadsheet could potentially be useful to prospective paying patients. The other part is useful mainly as a source of humor.

What Medicare Actually Pays: For each hospital listed in the spreadsheet, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services show in Column K the average case payments that Medicare actually made to that hospital in 2011 for the 100 most frequently billed cases in the government’s “medical severity-adjusted diagnosis-related grouping,” known as MS-DRG, a classification of inpatient cases. These actual payments are the total payments the hospital received for the case not only from Medicare itself but from patients in the form of co-payments, or from third parties, such as Medigap insurers that cover co-payments otherwise due from patients.

I described an excellent synopsis of Medicare’s MS-DRG classification system and how it sets the payment rate per MS-DRG case in an earlier post.

In principle, patients paying out of pocket could use the actual Medicare payment for an MS-DRG rate as benchmarks by which to gauge the reasonableness of whatever a hospital may charge them for that type of case.

For example, in Column K of Row 28,067 of the spreadsheet, readers learn that for MS-DRG 249 “Perc Cardiovasc Proc W Non-Drug-Eluting Stent w/o MCC” Medicare paid North Shore Medical Center in Miami an average case payment of $13,301 in 2011.

If a paying patient treated or to be treated at North Shore Medical Center can understand the sometimes arcane case descriptions listed in Column A of the spreadsheet, this information might be helpful in haggling with the hospital over its detailed bill before or even after the procedure.

From Column J, Row 28,067 of the spreadsheet, the patient also learns that North Shore Medical Center’s average covered charges for MS-DRG 249 came to $99,275, or 7.5 times what Medicare pays.

So what have we here? What are these charges?

In a handsome graphic comparing Medicare reimbursement (the actual Medicare payment) with average covered charges, a Washington Post blog post described the latter as “average cost.” But costs is exactly not what these “average charges” reflect.

“Average charges” in the United States hospital business are pure fiction — and a funny fiction, at that. They are simply list prices few patients ever pay. Indeed, if any hospital in the United States ever were paid its charges for every patient, its profits would be truly embarrassing.

To appreciate why, it may be helpful to say a word about the so-called chargemasters of hospitals.

Average Covered Charges: Under the tab “Documentation” in the Excel workbook, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services define “average covered charges” as “the provider’s average charge for services covered by Medicare for all discharges in the DRG. These will vary from hospital to hospital because of differences in hospital charge structures.”

In composing a bill for an inpatient case, a hospital’s computers find the charge for a particular service, procedure or manufactured good in the hospital’s huge chargemaster. The latter is a  detailed listing of the hospital’s list prices for myriad procedures and products.

Under the mantra that rules American health care, that “one size does not fit all” — this, in a country that invented one-size-fits-all franchising like McDonald’s and Holiday Inn — the structure and detail of chargemasters are hospital-specific and vary considerably among hospitals. In a detailed study in 2005, the consulting firm Lewin Group noted that hospital chargemasters may contain anywhere from 12,000 to 45,000 distinct items, depending on the hospital.

To see a live example of such a chargemaster and to appreciate how useless its contents would be to a lay person, readers may wish to consult the 2012 chargemaster of Dameron Hospital in Stockton, Calif. I chose it because it happened to pop up in a Google search.

Hospitals update their chargemasters continuously, under the overall supervision of the hospital’s chief financial officer and often with the help of outside consultants.

Here is how, in 2004, the chief financial officer of California’s UC Davis Health System, a 30-year veteran of hospital financing, described this process of updating to The Wall Street Journal:

There is no method to this madness. As we went through the years, we had these cockamamie formulas. We multiplied our costs to set our charges.

Even a German-born economist cannot suppress a smirk at this amazing feature of American health care, a feature whose production engages so many deadly serious adults, including an armada of deadly serious outside consultants.

Even funnier are the protestations by hospital executives that hardly anyone ever pays these fictional prices, which prompted me to offer the following technical definition: “ ‘Charges’ are the prices that a totally inebriated foreign billionaire would pay a U.S. hospital if his wife were not around to control the bloke.”

While it may be true that hardly anyone ever pays these hospital charges, Steven Brill reported not long ago that some and perhaps many hospitals actually bill uninsured American patients with some means and then hound them for payment. That, of course, is not funny.

In the end, though, it is not at all clear to me why anyone should care about the fictitious “average covered charge” figures reported by the Medicare agency. What exactly is a prospective patient to do with this metric?

Nor is it clear to me what all the excitement in the news media was about.

It just made this dour German-born economist laugh out loud once again.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/american-health-care-as-a-source-of-humor/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Today’s Economist: Uwe E. Reinhardt: The Mid-20th Century Infrastructure of the U.S.

An Amtrak train navigates a turn near Baltimore.Luke Sharrett for The New York Times An Amtrak train navigates a turn near Baltimore.
DESCRIPTION

Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton.

Europeans visiting the Northeastern United States – and many parts of the East Coast — can show their children what Europe’s infrastructure looked like during the 1960s.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

In New York, they can take taxis bumping over streets marked by potholes. European children might find it funny. They can descend into a dingy and grimy underground world to ride New York City’s quaint and screeching subway system, if they can figure out where trains go.

They can take the children for a ride with Amtrak from New York to the nation’s capital, giggling as the train slowly heaves and rolls, often in fits and starts, along the rickety tracks. Passengers can be heard joking that the Navy trains its sailors on this railway system, because anyone who can make it through two or three cars without bumping into seated passengers or spilling food on them is fit to go to sea.

If they departed from Pennsylvania Station in New York, they would not have known until 5 to 10 minutes before departure from which track the train would leave. And it might not leave on time. In their home country, the children would have learned that the track from which a train departs is printed in the train schedule. It is the same every day.

At Pennsylvania Station, hundreds of passengers wait in suspense for the announcement of the track and dash to it in a mad rush, running along the train in a frantic search for a seat. In Europe, one would have booked a seat in a rail car that stops at a spot shown on a poster on the track.

Unlike Europe or Asia, where trains typically adhere to the minute to scheduled times, the departure times in Amtrak’s schedules merely represent a promise that the train will not leave before then. The actual getaway might be many minutes or even more than an hour after the scheduled departure time, with any of dozens of different excuses offered. Brakes on the train stuck. Signal switches malfunctioned. Electricity was not available to the train for some reason. A train ahead, on the same track, broke down. And so on.

Arriving at a destination on time, something Europeans take largely for granted, is relatively rare on Amtrak. Furthermore, the train in Europe or Asia is likely to have traveled at much higher speed. The tracks there are so smooth that one could easily carry an open cup of coffee along several cars or work on the computer.

Why and how Americans, who pride themselves on being fussy consumers, have put up with this mid-20th-century rail system is a mystery.

Even more wondrous than the archaic subway and rail system and the potholes in the streets is the system of distributing electric power to households and factories in large parts of the Northeastern United States. Power is often still carried on lines that hang in graceful catenaries of various depths from poles that lean left or right randomly but rarely stand straight. And which are vulnerable to powerful storms, like Hurricane Sandy.

When a German high-school classmate visited me, we came upon the intersection below, less than a mile from the center of Princeton, N.J. My friend burst out laughing at the abundance of wires in every direction, something he had seen only on his travels to the developing world.

Uwe E. Reinhardt

In my youth, electric power in Germany’s countryside, where I grew up, was carried on power lines strung from very tall and straight poles. But for decades now, power lines have been buried underground in Germany and most of the rest of Europe.

Malte Lehming, opinion-page editor of the Berlin newspaper Tagesspiegel, noted in his essay “Welcome to America. Take a Number” in The New York Times:

I spent half a day hunting for a store with flashlights in stock, because a storm had knocked out our power. In five decades in Germany I have never experienced a single power failure, because the power lines are usually underground and well maintained.

Imagine that – life without power failures! In much of the Northeastern United States – and perhaps in many other parts of the country as well – lengthy power disruptions are part of the American way of life. In Princeton, they occur somewhere in the township after almost every thunderstorm or snowstorm, as branches snap from trees and take down vulnerable power lines.

Last fall, for example, after a brief storm dumped wet snow on trees, many parts of New Jersey, Princeton included, were without power for about a week. Parts of Connecticut were without power for more than two weeks.

In 1958, the economist John Kenneth Galbraith drew attention to America’s neglect of its infrastructure in his famous book, “The Affluent Society.” Alas, his call for a better balance between private and public infrastructure has gone largely unheeded in this country in the ensuing half-century.

Our country reminds me of the old tale of a frog that allowed itself to be cooked to death after it was put in a pan of cold water that was very gradually heated to the boiling point. Although apparently there is no scientific basis for that tale — biologists say the frog would jump out — we do seem to act like that frog, as our infrastructure ever-so-gradually steadily decays around us.

Instead of setting about to bring our infrastructure up to 21st-century standards – which might, alas, involve more of the much detested public-sector investment — we angrily and yet meekly suffer for days or weeks without light, heat and transportation, verbally shaking our fists at the power companies but leaving it at that.

We are, at most, prepared to stock our households with flashlights and candles and, if we have the money, buy portable generators that can produce a modest amount of electricity, albeit at great expense. How can this be an efficient way of bringing electric power to households?

In so many ways the United States is a great country. The American people are innovative and hard-working, more so than most Europeans. It amazes me that they put up so fatalistically with this old-fashioned and decaying infrastructure.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/americas-mid-20th-century-infrastructure/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix Blog: Do Congress and the White House Deserve an AA+ Rating?

DESCRIPTION

Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton.

There now appears to be general agreement that the downgrade issued a week ago by Standard Poor’s on the “Political Risks and Rising Debt Burden” of long-term United States debt was not a statement on the probability of default on Treasury bonds at all. Instead, it appears to have been intended as a reminder that something has gone seriously wrong with the style of governance put in place by the Founding Fathers.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

Whether the current style of federal governance deserves the second highest grade S.P. assigns (AA+) can, of course, be debated. I would be more inclined toward a plain B rating, that is, the governance equivalent of a junk bond.

Be that as it may, one manifestation of the decay in the federal style of governance has been the discovery that American voters can be pleased by providing them with a growing array of government services and financial transfers and by underwriting these with deferred taxes — that is, current deficits. The deferred taxes are to be paid off by generations not yet born or still too young to vote.

In the words of Doug Elmendorf, current director of the Congressional Budget Office, in a presentation last year, “The United States faces a fundamental disconnect between the services that people expect the government to provide, particularly the benefits for older Americans, and the tax revenues that people are willing to send to the government to finance those services.”

To make politicians comfortable with this approach to governance, a theory was needed that “deficits don’t matter.” That theory reportedly was proposed by Vice President Dick Cheney to Paul O’Neill, then Treasury secretary, who in late 2002 had protested the Bush administration’s evident addiction to debt. A fascinating account of the debate surrounding this proposition can be found in Jonathan Weisman’s “Reagan Policies Gave Green Light to Red Ink” in The Washington Post, written in 2004.

The economics profession did not entirely endorse Mr. Cheney’s theory; neither, however, did it line up against it. Instead, as usual, it had a nice intra-professional, two-handed debate on the issue, accompanied by learned papers. Then, as now, the pronouncements of macroeconomists add up to confusion.

The footprints of this new style of federal governance can be seen in the following chart, which is featured in updated form year after year in the Congressional Budget Office’s well-written long-term budget outlook.

Source: Congressional Budget Office

It is instructive to reflect on this chart, along with the two charts shown below. The data for those charts can be found in Table B-79 of the Economic Report of the President, February 2011.

The first shows the gross federal debt as a percentage of gross domestic product from 1976 to 2011. It is the most inclusive measure of the Treasury’s obligations, which ultimately are, of course, the obligations of the American taxpayer. The colors of the bars indicate presidential terms.

Source: Economic Report of the President, February 2011

The gross federal debt includes debt owed to other government accounts — for example, the Social Security Trust Fund, the Medicare Trust Fund and other retirement or government trust funds. Cash surpluses accumulated in these funds are invested in Treasury securities.

Of the total gross federal debt of $13.6 trillion in 2010, $4.6 trillion was owed by the Treasury to these government trust funds and only $9 trillion to the public, which included international investors (47 percent), domestic private investors (36 percent), the Federal Reserve (9 percent) and state and local governments (8 percent).

The next chart shows how the fraction of publicly held debt as a percentage of total gross federal debt has fluctuated over time. Note again that purchases by the Federal Reserve of Treasury debt, of which there have been many in the past few years, are counted as debt held by the public rather than intra-governmental debt.

Source: Economic Report of the President, February 2011

Readers of this blog will draw their own inferences from these three charts. My own is that recklessness in United States fiscal policy is not a recent phenomenon, especially if one considers the devastating effect that the recession, starting in 2007-8, has had on federal tax revenues, now at a historical low as a percent of G.D.P., and on federal spending, now at a historical high. In fact, the federal deficit for 2009 had been projected by the Congressional Budget Office at $1.2 trillion even before the current administration moved into the White House.

The problem is much less the current budget deficits, which can be explained by the current recession, but that budget balance does not seem to be in sight long after the recession, we hope, is over.

It is that problem that the White House and the Congress must solve. We must hope that care for the nation’s future — evidently now taking a holiday — will return someday soon to their minds and souls. Perhaps then they will merit an AA+ rating.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=fbeaeae9c9545d7cc9e07563b671cdea