May 19, 2024

Higher Reserves Proposed for ‘Too Big to Fail’ Banks

After nearly two years of political jousting, a panel of global regulators said on Saturday that banks deemed too big to fail would have to set aside an additional cushion of capital reserves in what is the centerpiece of their efforts to avoid a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis.

The chief oversight group of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed that the world’s largest and most complex banks would need to hold a reserve of high-quality capital of between 1 and 2.5 percent of their assets to cope with any unforeseen losses. That would be on top of their proposed minimum capital levels for all banks, currently set at 7 percent of assets.

Regulators plan to impose the surcharge on a sliding scale, based on several factors including the bank’s size, complexity and the closeness of its ties to other large trading partners around the world.

And in what appears to be a nod to regulators pressing for even higher requirements, the committee proposed an additional surcharge on banks who grow larger or engage in risky activities that would “increase materially” the threat they pose to the financial system. The surcharge could raise the requirement to 3.5 percent of assets.

The process is only just beginning. The Basel committee will put out a more detailed proposal in late July, giving banks and policymakers a final chance to weigh in on the new rules before formally approving them. Then, regulators must begin the process of identifying these so-called “systemically important” global banks. The banks, meanwhile, will not have to fully comply with the new rules until January 2019.

The proposed capital requirements are perhaps the most important banking reform since the crisis erupted three years ago and are being followed closely in the world’s financial and political capitals. If banks are forced to hold bigger cushions of capital, they can more easily absorb financial shocks and avoid the need for taxpayer bailouts. But setting aside more capital means that banks also have less money available to lend out — a move that could dampen economic growth and potentially hinder an already anemic global recovery.

Amid aggressive lobbying by some of the largest banks for weaker capital requirements, international financial regulators have spent the last two years trying to strike the right balance. They also are trying to bridge different national standards, which might give countries with more favorable requirements a competitive advantage.

In a statement Saturday, the panel of regulators said the new measures would create strong incentives for large banks to curb risky behavior that could endanger the financial system. “This will contribute to enhancing the resiliency of the banking system and help mitigate the wider spill-over risks,” said Nout Wellink, a central banker from the Netherlands who is chairman of the Basel Committee.

American regulators pushed for a higher surcharge and better loss-absorbing capital, while European regulators, especially those in Germany and France, preferred a lower surcharge and broader definition of capital.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=38c7297c598e62d0e1cfd3ac59b55387

Madoff Trustee Seeking Billions More From JPMorgan

Mr. Picard had sought $5.4 billion in damages previously in addition to $1 billion in transfers and claims.

JPMorgan “was an active enabler of the Madoff Ponzi scheme,” David Sheehan, Mr. Picard’s lawyer, said in a statement. JPMorgan officials “not only should have known that a fraud was being perpetrated, they did know,” he said.

Mr. Picard, who has filed 1,000 lawsuits, claiming $90 billion for Madoff investors, first sued JPMorgan in bankruptcy court in December, contending it ignored signs of fraud as billions of dollars flowed from Mr. Madoff’s account at the bank to investors. JPMorgan was Mr. Madoff’s primary banker.

The lawsuit sought $1 billion in fees and transfers, and $5.4 billion in damages, contending that JPMorgan defrauded federal regulators and violated banking law.

The amended complaint makes additional allegations, including that two former employees of an unidentified financial institution observed “nearly daily circular transactions” between an account that Mr. Madoff controlled at their employer and his account at JPMorgan.

After raising questions about the transactions, the financial institution closed the account because it saw no legitimate business purpose for the transactions, according to the complaint.

The amended complaint also includes a request for a jury trial.

A JPMorgan spokesman, Joseph Evangelisti, has said the bank complied fully with all laws and regulations.

JPMorgan has sought dismissal of the case, arguing that Mr. Picard was hired to liquidate the Madoff firm and has no legal right to mount a class action and claim damages for the Ponzi scheme’s investors.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=55ea52b7becb16196915377afcbcdba9

Contracts Cloud Who Has Exposure in Greek Crisis

No one seems to be sure, in large part because the world of derivatives is so murky, but the possibility that some company out there may have insured billions of dollars of European debt has added a new wrinkle to the sovereign default debate.

In years past, when financial crises in Argentina and Russia left those countries unable to make good on their government debts, they simply defaulted. But this time around, swaps and other sorts of contracts have become so common and so intertwined in the financial markets that there are fears among regulators and financial players about how a Greek default would play out among derivatives holders.

The looming question is whether these contracts — which insure against possibilities like a Greek default — are concentrated in the hands of a few companies, and if these companies will be able to pay out billions of dollars to cover losses during a default. If there were a single company standing behind many of these contracts, that company would be akin to the American International Group of the euro crisis. The American insurer needed a $182 billion federal bailout during the financial crisis because it had insured the performance of mortgage bonds through derivatives and couldn’t pay on all of them.

Even regulators seem unsure of whether a Greek default would reveal such concentrated risk in the hands of just a few companies. Spokeswomen for the central banks of both Europe and the United States would not say whether their researchers had studied holdings of such contracts among nonbank entities like insurance companies and hedge funds — and they would not say what would occur among large players if Greece or another European country defaulted.

Derivatives traders and analysts are debating just how much money is involved in these derivatives and what sort of threat they pose to markets in Europe and the United States. On the one hand, just over $5 billion is tied up in credit-default swap contracts that will pay out if Greece defaults, according to Markit, a financial data firm based in London. That’s less than 1 percent the size of Greece’s economy, but that is a conservative calculation that counts protections banks have in place offsetting their positions, and is called the net exposure. The less conservative figure, the gross exposure, is $78.7 billion for Greece, according to Markit. And there are many other types of contracts, like about $44 billion in other guarantees tied to Greece, according to the Bank of International Settlements.

The gross exposure of the five most financially pressed European Union countries — Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain — is about $616 billion. And the broader figure on all derivatives from those countries is unknown.

The pervasiveness of these opaque contracts has complicated negotiations for European officials, and it underscores calls for more transparency in the derivatives market.

The uncertainty, financial analysts say, has led European officials to push for a “voluntary” bond financing solution that may sidestep a default, rather than the forced deals of other eras. “There’s not any clarity here because people don’t know,” said Christopher Whalen, editor of The Institutional Risk Analyst. “This is why the Europeans came up with this ridiculous deal, because they don’t know what’s out there. They are afraid of a default. The industry is still refusing to provide the disclosure needed to understand this. They’re holding us hostage. The Street doesn’t want you to see what they’ve written.”

Regulators are aware of this problem. Financial reform packages on both sides of the Atlantic mandated many changes to the derivatives market, and regulators around the globe are drafting new rules for these contracts that are meant to add transparency as well as security. But they are far from finished and could take years to put into effect.

Darrell Duffie, a professor who has studied derivatives at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, said that he was concerned that regulators may not have adequately studied what contagion might occur among swaps holders, in the case of a Greek default.

Regulators, he said, “have access to everything they need to have. Whether they’ve collected all the information and analyzed it is different question. I worry because many of those leaders have said there’s no way we’re going to let Greece default. Does that mean they haven’t had conversations about what happens if Greece defaults? Is their commitment so severe that they haven’t had real discussions about it in the backrooms?”

Regulators aren’t saying much. When asked what data the Federal Reserve had collected on American financial companies and their swaps tied to European debt, Barbara Hagenbaugh, a spokeswoman, referred to a speech made by the Federal Reserve chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, in May in which he did not mention derivatives tied to Greece. And she said in a statement that the Fed had researched the “full range of exposures” at the companies it supervises — the banks — and is “monitoring the situation more broadly.”

At the European Central Bank, Eszter Miltenyi, a spokeswoman, said : “This is much too sensitive I think for us to have a conversation on this.”

On Wall Street, traders are debating whether the industry’s process for unwinding credit-default swaps would run smoothly if Greece defaulted. The process is tightly controlled by a small group of bankers who meet in an industry group called the International Swaps and Derivatives Association. .

The process is fairly well developed, but it has been little tested on the debt of countries. For the most part, Wall Street has cashed in on credit-default swaps tied to corporations’ debt.

Only one country has defaulted on its debt in the last few years — Ecuador at the end of 2009 — and its debt was so small and its economy so isolated that it was hardly a notable event.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=fc513885a4cc6c244d9b077cbfa05007

Geithner Warns Against ‘Race to the Bottom’

Opinion »

Reining In For-Profit Colleges

Should regulators cut off student loans for ‘career’ colleges whose graduates can’t pay back their debt?

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=3bcfc7d10e8cad8847a32bb1cdc52cc0

DealBook: In I.P.O. Price Debate, an Investment Giant Weighs In

You might recall that about a week ago, my colleague Joe Nocera wrote an intriguing column about LinkedIn’s initial public offering, in which he said that the bankers who underwrote the deal “scammed” the social network company by pricing it too low, lining the pockets of its investor clients.

I countered two days later, arguing that the bankers, at worst, made a mistake, but that the I.P.O. price might actually have been correct given the outsized interest in social networking companies.

Over the weekend, a new entrant waded into the I.P.O. pricing debate: BlackRock, the giant money manager.

In a letter to British securities regulators, which was reported in the press over there, BlackRock said it was worried that investors, not companies, were getting the short end of the stick. While BlackRock’s letter was unrelated to LinkedIn’s offering, the investment firm suggested all the same that the I.P.O. process had grown unfair because banks have been intentionally overpricing companies to garner higher fees.

We are concerned that companies are appointing advisors based on indications of valuation that are unrealistic. …

We are concerned about the structure of incentive fees which maximise your returns for the price achieved on the first day of trading rather than at some, more distant date, e.g., six months after float. Such fees do not represent an alignment of interests between us and seem to drive increasingly aggressive behaviour from syndicates.

BlackRock’s view runs counter to Joe’s argument that investment bankers underprice I.P.O.’s so that “money could be diverted to favored investors.” In fact, it’s the opposite viewpoint.

Clearly, there are many ways to look at the process. As one retired banker e-mailed me, “We never make everyone happy. We are supposed to, at the conclusion, make sure all sides are equally UNhappy.”

Perhaps that’s unsatisfying. But it’s true.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=206c63f4c99e72dbb19bb032b4a66108

DealBook: Fresh Details on Berkshire’s Lubrizol Deal and Sokol

David L. SokolDaniel Acker/Bloomberg News David L. Sokol resigned from Berkshire Hathaway on March 30.

Whether regulators bring an insider trading case against David L. Sokol — a former top deputy of Warren E. Buffett who was central to Berkshire Hathaway’s decision to buy Lubrizol — will hinge in part on whether he bought stock based on nonpublic, material information.

Now, fresh details are emerging about what Mr. Sokol knew, and when.

A preliminary proxy filed on Monday by Lubrizol indicates that Mr. Sokol was aware in mid-December that Lubrizol’s chairman and chief executive, James L. Hambrick, planned to talk with his board about a possible acquisition by Berkshire. Mr. Sokol was informed about the discussions by Citigroup on Dec. 17. In early January, Mr. Sokol bought nearly 100,000 shares of Lubrizol, a manufacturer of specialty chemicals.

It was previously unknown whether Mr. Sokol, who abruptly resigned last month, knew that Lubrizol’s chief had discussed a potential deal with his board.

The revelation casts a new spotlight on Mr. Sokol’s decision to take the nearly $10 million stake in Lubrizol as he worked behind the scenes on a potential deal to acquire the company. Some legal experts have questioned whether Mr. Sokol traded on inside information unavailable to the public, namely that a possible bid for Lubrizol was in the works.

The Securities and Exchange Commission is looking into Mr. Sokol’s stock purchases, according to people close to the agency.

Mr. Sokol has said that he did nothing wrong, and Mr. Buffett has agreed.

“Neither Dave nor I feel his Lubrizol purchases were in any way unlawful,” Mr. Buffett said in a statement last month, noting that Mr. Sokol made the trades before pitching the Lubrizol deal to Berkshire.

Mr. Sokol first expressed interest in a Lubrizol deal in December, shortly after meeting with Citigroup bankers who recommended the industrial manufacturer as a possible takeover target.

On Dec. 17, a Citi banker called Mr. Hambrick to inform him of Berkshire’s possible interest in the company, the Lubrizol regulatory filing said. Mr. Hambrick told Citi that he would inform his board about Berkshire’s possible interest.

“Later on December 17, 2010, Citi informed Mr. Sokol that Mr. Hambrick had indicated that he would discuss Berkshire Hathaway’s possible interest with the Board,” the filing said.

Mr. Sokol bought more than 96,000 Lubrizol shares on Jan. 5, 6 and 7. On Jan. 6, the Lubrizol board held a “special meeting” to discuss Berkshire Hathaway’s possible interest in the company, according to the Lubrizol filing. The board agreed right away to hire lawyers to advise on a possible deal.

“On or about January 10, 2011, Mr. Hambrick requested that Citi contact Mr. Sokol to inform him that he should expect a call from Mr. Hambrick and thereafter Citi so informed Mr. Sokol,” according to another addition in the Lubrizol filing.

On Jan. 14, Mr. Sokol and Mr. Hambrick talked on the phone about the “corporate cultures and philosophies” at their respective companies, according to the filing. They agreed to meet in person later in the month.

Mr. Sokol first mentioned a possible Lubrizol deal to Mr. Buffett on Jan. 14 or 15, according to Mr. Buffett. Mr. Sokol made a “passing remark” to Mr. Buffett about his stake in Lubrizol, Mr. Buffett said.

“Dave’s purchases were made before he had discussed Lubrizol with me and with no knowledge of how I might react to his idea,” Mr. Buffett wrote in his letter announcing Mr. Sokol’s resignation. “In addition, of course, he did not know what Lubrizol’s reaction would be if I developed an interest.”

Although Mr. Buffett was originally skeptical of the deal, he later became convinced. Berkshire ultimately agreed on March 14 to acquire Lubrizol for $9 billion.

Mr. Sokol resigned on March 30 as disclosures emerged about his stake in Lubrizol. The company said in the filing on Monday that it “first learned” of Mr. Sokol’s share purchases at the time of his resignation.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=d41e17c9caaabe0156e3296449892324

Regulators to Set Rules on Mortgage Securities

Banks will be forced to retain some risk when they securitize all but the most conservative mortgages under rules that regulators are expected to vote on Tuesday. But the banks are likely to be given wide leeway in determining what risks to keep.

Major banks, hoping to revive the mortgage securitization market that crumbled when many securitizations proved to be anything but safe, had asked regulators to define almost any mortgage — except for the most extreme types no longer being written anyway — as a “qualified residential mortgage.” But a summary of the proposal, provided to The New York Times on Monday night by a person briefed on the decision, showed that the regulators rejected that advice and decided that only the most conservative mortgages would qualify. Securitizations of any other mortgages would require the banks to retain “skin in the game” of at least 5 percent of the risk.

The Dodd-Frank Act mandated that banks maintain at least a 5 percent threshold for risk on mortgage securities. But the law granted an exception for “qualified residential mortgages” while leaving regulators to decide what that meant. Bankers warned that without a broad definition many borrowers would be unable to get loans, while others argued that two mortgage markets could develop, with loans requiring banks to retain a stake presumably costing more.

“It is quite draconian,” said Ellen Marshall, a lawyer who represents banks as a partner in Manatt, Phelps Phillips and was reacting to the documents once they were posted on media Web sites.

“It is requiring the 5 percent of risk retention on a huge swath of the market. It is permitting securitization without the retention of 5 percent only in the case of very old-fashioned mortgages.”

Banks, however, did get regulators to agree to a broad definition of how that risk can be retained, as well as of who will have to retain it. In some cases they can retain risk by holding onto mortgages that are deemed identical to those being securitized. In others, they would be able to either take the first 5 percent of losses or to hold 5 percent of every class of security.

Before the credit crisis erupted, many mortgages were sold by banks in securitizations, and most of the securities were rated AAA because widespread defaults were deemed almost unthinkable. It turned out that many of the securitizations were stuffed with risky mortgages, sometimes made to people with no proof of income. Defaults rose sharply, and there have been substantial losses.

The law passed by Congress last year tried to assure that bankers would pay attention to quality of loans by forcing them to retain a stake.

Under the proposed rule, mortgages to buy homes will require buyers to put down at least 20 percent if banks want to securitize the loan without retaining a stake. Loans to refinance mortgages would not qualify unless the new loan was for no more than 75 percent of the value of the property, or 70 percent if the refinancing enabled the borrower to take out cash. It would also set standards for the minimum income that a borrower could have relative to the mortgage payments.

No borrower who fell two months behind on any loan within the previous two years could get a qualified mortgage.

Banks had asked regulators to allow borrowers with smaller down payments to receive qualified loans if they took out mortgage insurance. The regulators rejected that idea, according to the summary, saying that the law required them to consider not whether private insurance would reduce losses from defaults but whether it made defaults less likely to begin with, presumably because the insurers carefully weigh risks. Banks were told they could submit studies on that issue, and that it could be reconsidered.

The proposed rule also sets minimum standards for servicing of loans, something banks had opposed.

One issue where banks appear to get most of what they asked for was on the question of which institution had to retain risk. A loan could be made by one company, aggregated by another and securitized by a third, perhaps in a deal that included loans put together by other aggregators. Under the proposed rule, the institutions could split the risk among them, subject to some limits.

There had been much discussion of whether to require a “vertical” stake, in which the bank retains 5 percent of every class of the securitization, or a “horizontal” one, in which the bank would assume the first 5 percent of losses. The regulators said either would do, and added that they would take an “L-shaped interest,” combing the two, or would allow a bank to take a representative sample of the loans and keep all the risk for those loans.

The proposal was developed by staff members of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and is expected to be formally proposed by each of them, with the F.D.I.C. set to vote Tuesday.

The rule would be put out for comment and could be revised after comments are received.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=dc130eac05e7847b082d8b34ca2a191d