May 7, 2024

Economix: Bruce Bartlett: When the Deficit Will Be Fixed

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Bruce Bartlett held senior policy roles in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and served on the staffs of Representatives Jack Kemp and Ron Paul. He is the author of “The Benefit and the Burden: Tax Reform – Why We Need It and What It Will Take.”

The Holy Grail for budget hawks is the “grand bargain” – some combination of tax increases and entitlement reforms that will get the deficit on a sustainable track, permanently. On paper, it always looks simple – relatively small adjustments to the growth path of revenues or big spending programs like Medicare or Social Security compound over time into big savings.

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The problem, of course, is getting Congress to act, because of what economists call a time-inconsistency problem. The Congress that raises taxes and cuts benefits will suffer politically, while the benefits of lower deficits will accrue to future Congresses.

Historically, what has moved Congress to enact big deficit-reduction packages was the prospect of quick improvement in terms of inflation, growth and interest rates. Given that deficit reduction today is very unlikely to improve any of these in the near term, deficit hawks lack any real payoff from a grand bargain.

The two problems most likely to result from budget deficits are inflation and high interest rates. Many economists believe that deficits are inherently inflationary; others believe that they inevitably put pressure on the Federal Reserve to “monetize” the debt by, in effect, printing money to pay for it.

High interest rates are even more easily blamed on the deficit. As Floyd
Norris of The New York Times recently recounted, so-called bond vigilantes terrorized Wall Street in the early 1980s. Economists including Henry Kaufman of Salomon Brothers and Albert Wojnilower of First Boston regularly issued apocalyptic warnings of doom unless drastic action was taken on the deficit immediately.

It was often said that the Treasury’s borrowing was crowding out private borrowers from the bond market, because the federal government is not constrained by the amount of interest it is willing to pay. It will pay whatever the market demands to sell all the bonds it has to sell that day. Private borrowers will pull back their borrowing if rates get too costly.

Economists worried that if private companies lacked access to the bond market they would reduce investment in new plants and equipment, which ultimately reduced productivity and economic growth. High interest rates also raised the “hurdle” rate of return, snuffing out investments that in the past would have been profitable.

Some economists disagreed on the mechanism by which deficits affected interest rates. They pointed out that expected inflation automatically raises market interest rates. Generally speaking, a rise of 1 percent in the expected rate of inflation will raise long-term rates by 1 percent.

Those of a more liberal persuasion often contended that the Fed was forced to run a tighter monetary policy when faced with large deficits in order to offset their inflationary effect.

The precise mechanism didn’t matter much for policy purposes, because each perspective came back to the idea that deficits had to be reduced to improve the economy. Lower deficits would simultaneously reduce crowding out and inflationary expectations and give the Fed room to ease monetary policy – a virtual trifecta of payoffs.

It’s worth remembering just how severe the problem was. According to Mr. Norris, the interest rate on the Treasury’s 30-year bond peaked at 15.21 percent on Oct. 26, 1981. That is a rate almost incomprehensibly high given that Treasury bonds are assumed to have zero risk of default. The rate on the 30-year bond today is about 2.8 percent, about half its historical rate.

Even taking into account the fact that inflation was a serious problem in 1981 – the consumer price index rose 8.9 percent for the year – the “real” component of interest rates was very high. The real interest rate is the market rate minus the expected inflation rate.

With the benefit of hindsight, buying bonds in 1981 was the profit-making opportunity of a lifetime. Just imagine being able to get better than 15 percent a year on an investment for 30 years at zero risk.

Of course, at the time bonds were toxic, which is precisely why rates were so high. But as time went by, the deficit improved, inflation collapsed and the Fed eased. But it didn’t happen all at once; the process was slow and painful, involving many budget deals that were extremely difficult, politically.

Perhaps the most difficult was the 1990 deal, in which President George H.W. Bush courageously bucked his own party and agreed to a small increase in the top tax rate in order to get spending cuts and tough budget controls that deserve much of the credit for the budget surpluses of the late 1990s.

Mr. Bush’s own party basically turned its back on him, and it cemented for all time the now universally held Republican idea that taxes must never be increased at any time for any reason. Even those Republicans still sane enough to know this is nuts live in fear of a Tea Party challenger in the next primary, underwritten by the vast resources of the Club for Growth, which helped torpedo John Boehner’s “Plan B” effort at a “fiscal cliff” deal because it would raise the top tax rate on millionaires.

It is an article of faith to Grover Norquist, of tax pledge fame, that budget deals involving higher taxes are always bad for Republicans.

A new study from the European Central Bank confirms that significant deficit improvement is usually driven by rising interest rates. However, by the time budgetary action occurs the rising cost of interest on the debt tends to overwhelm the adjustment.

According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, none of the preconditions that historically are necessary for a significant budget deal are now present. Inflationary expectations continue to fall and real interest rates are very low. Hence, it is impossible for politicians to promise any benefit from large spending cuts or tax increases that would materially improve peoples’ lives. The benefits are purely abstract.

This suggests that we are a long way from meaningful legislative action on the deficit.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/01/when-the-deficit-will-be-fixed/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Haunted by ’20s Hyperinflation, Germans Balk at Euro Aid

Now, Mr. Schulze, a 56-year-old auto mechanic, says runaway inflation looms again, threatening to decimate his savings and turn his carefully planned retirement into abject poverty. It is not so much the ghost of the 1920s that he fears, but the vocal demands around Europe and abroad for a “big bazooka” of public money to reassure markets and help European countries in heavy debt.

“I’m worried about my pension and my savings and the problems we’re facing right now,” Mr. Schulze said.

Many economists say aggressive purchases of the sovereign bonds of heavily indebted states by the European Central Bank are the quickest and surest path to stabilizing the crisis. On Thursday, Mario Draghi, the bank’s president, laid the groundwork for bolder intervention in markets if certain conditions were met.

To German ears those bond purchases, or anything that smacks of printing money, sound like a recipe for skyrocketing prices. German leaders, including Chancellor Angela Merkel and her former economic adviser, Jens Weidmann, now head of the German Bundesbank, have strongly discouraged any such move by the European Central Bank, stalling the rescue of the euro zone in the view of critics.

The prospect of a dim historical memory — the antique photograph of the wheelbarrow full of nearly worthless bills — helping to drive the world off the economic precipice and into another deep recession may seem like the height of irrationality and even irresponsibility.

But the German obsession with inflation has been difficult to overcome because Germans perceive themselves as more vulnerable to inflation today than their neighbors are. It is a force they believe could reduce or wipe out the competitive and financial edge they have labored to build.

By robbing a currency of its value, inflation wipes the slate clean for debtors and savers alike. Germans say they like the slate the way it is because they are on the plus side of the ledger.

Consumer debt, whether credit cards or in many cases even home mortgages, is frowned upon here. According to figures of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the German savings rate was more than 10 percent every year between 2003 and 2009, while during the same period it bottomed out at 1.5 percent in the United States, and never rose above 6.2 percent. As a result German households had net savings of $4.3 trillion, according to the Bundesbank, in a country of fewer than 82 million people.

Germans own homes at a lower rate, 41.6 percent, than the 66.3 percent of Americans who do. And most people do not invest in the stock market here.

“For the average American, inflation means the home price is increasing and the value of debt is going down,” said Peter Bofinger, a prominent economist on Mrs. Merkel’s independent council of economic advisers, “whereas the German invested in life insurance and sitting in an apartment he rented is much more vulnerable to inflation.”

Fear of inflation is a deep and broad consensus in Germany, but one that Sebastian Dullien, an economist and senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said had worsened appreciably in recent years. “It is not about the 1920s,” Mr. Dullien said. “The fear of inflation went up when wages stopped going up.”

In an effort to regain lost competitiveness over the past decade, Germany went through a period of wage restraint and labor-market reforms that made the hiring and firing of workers easier and welfare benefits less generous. While countries on Europe’s southern edge, including Greece and Portugal, were enjoying the cheap money that came with membership in the euro, Germans were developing a newfound sense of economic insecurity, one that paired all too effectively with an old dread.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=de1e9c9c1a804d1cbaac4bd38cf3e999