April 26, 2024

Fair Game: Paying the Price in Settlements, but Often Deducting It

But there’s more than meets the eye to the big legal settlements you’ve been reading about involving some of the nation’s biggest banks.

Actually, there’s less than meets the eye.

The dollar signs are big, but they aren’t as big as they look, at least for the banks. That’s because some or all of these payments will probably be tax-deductible. The banks can claim them as business expenses. Taxpayers, therefore, will likely lighten the banks’ loads.

There is nothing new about corporations reaping tax benefits from payments made to remedy wrongdoing. Every so often, though, the topic stirs outrage. After the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, for example, BP received a $10 billion tax windfall by writing off $37.2 billion in cleanup expenses.

With multibillion-dollar mortgage settlements making headlines this year and last, the question has come to the fore again. Why should taxpayers subsidize corporations that are paying to right sometimes egregious wrongs? That is a particularly weighty question, given the urgent need for tax revenue to offset the ballooning federal budget deficit.

Under federal law, money paid to settle a company’s actual or potential liability for a civil or criminal penalty is not deductible. But, this being taxes, the issue is complicated. As Robert W. Wood, a tax lawyer, said in a 2009 Tax Notes article, “The tax deduction for business expenses is broad enough to include most settlements and judgments.”

In an interview last week, Mr. Wood, who is also the author of “Taxation of Damage Awards and Settlement Payments,” said the test for deductibility boils down to whether the payment is a penalty or is meant to be remedial. “I don’t know the specifics on these mortgage settlements,” he said, “but if any of the lenders are putting a bunch of money into a pot that goes to help people, yes, I would assume that everybody will deduct that.”

Nevertheless, the deductibility test is not always clear. And companies naturally push hard for these tax benefits when they negotiate settlements with the government.

Unfortunately, the government rarely specifies what the tax treatment of a settlement should be, leaving enforcement to the Internal Revenue Service. One exception is the Securities and Exchange Commission. Since 2003, it has barred companies from deducting settlement costs as a business expense.

Senator Charles Grassley, the Iowa Republican who is a senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, has been critical of favorable tax treatments of settlements. I asked him last week about the issue as it relates to mortgage settlements.

“You can be sure the Wall Street banks consider tax consequences in negotiations and the government should, too,” he said.  “Any portion of a settlement that’s intended to be a penalty should include language clarifying it isn’t deductible. Otherwise, the government’s punishment will have less sting than intended.”

IT is to be expected that corporations, like any taxpayers, will do what they can to reduce their tax bills. And a 2005 report from the Government Accountability Office suggests that tax benefits in settlements are prevalent. Examining more than $1 billion in settlements made by 34 companies, the G.A.O. found that 20 had deducted some or all of the money from their tax bills.

But as Mr. Grassley suggested, the government can take deductibility off the table as an option. And occasionally it does. For example, a Justice Department spokesman said that there would be no deductibility of the $500 million penalty and fine portion of the settlement reached with UBS last month in regards to manipulation of interest rates.

Certainly, a settlement’s punitive effect is lessened by any tax sweeteners it generates. Perhaps that’s why it is rarely clear from the public announcements that some or all of the settlement amounts will be deductible.

Consider last week’s settlement between the government and large mortgage servicers over foreclosure abuses. Wells Fargo said in its news release that the bank would pay $766 million in cash and contribute $1.2 billion to foreclosure-prevention activities. But are those after-tax or pretax numbers? No mention was made, and a spokeswoman declined to comment other than to say that Wells Fargo “is a compliant taxpayer” that fulfills all its tax obligations.

Or consider the recent settlements over soured mortgages reached by Bank of America and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These are almost certainly tax-deductible, Mr. Wood said, because these are probably considered deals between private parties, even though taxpayers own Fannie and Freddie.

So the deal announced last week by Bank of America to pay Fannie Mae $10.3 billion for a mortgage-related settlement, as well as the $2.62 billion in cash paid by the bank to Fannie and Freddie Mac in late 2010, probably generated, or will generate, significant tax benefits through deductions for the bank. A Bank of America spokesman declined to comment.

Phineas Baxandall, senior analyst for tax and budget policy at the United States Public Interest Research Group, a consumer-oriented nonprofit, and Ryan Pierannunzi, a tax and budget associate there, explored this issue in a report published last week.

The report, titled “Subsidizing Bad Behavior,” details the history of the practice and suggests that government agencies should follow the S.E.C.’s lead and disallow deductibility in settlements. Barring that, the authors said, regulators should disclose only the after-tax amounts of settlements, so that people understand how much money is really being paid.

In an interview last week, Mr. Baxandall noted that government agencies might not want to do that. “From the agencies’ point of view, unless the public or someone is pressuring them to do otherwise, they want a big number to tout,” he said. “Tax deductibility allows them to come out with a bigger number.”

CONGRESS has tried to change this setup. In 2003, Mr. Grassley and two other senators introduced the Government Settlement Transparency Act.

It would have required that payments made by companies acknowledging actual or potential violations of a law would not be tax-deductible. The legislation never passed.

Bills have also been introduced in Congress that would bar deductibility on punitive damage awards arranged among private parties. Those have died, too. Past administrations have supported this idea, and the Obama administration has a proposal in its 2013 budget stating that no deduction would be allowed in such a circumstance. That proposal also states that when an existing insurance policy covered the payment of punitive damages, the amount paid would be considered income to the insured person.

Not a bad idea.

As settlements for corporate misdeeds pile up, perhaps it will get some traction.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/business/paying-the-price-in-settlements-but-often-deducting-it.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

DealBook: Bank of America Faces a $50 Billion Shareholder Lawsuit

Harry Campbell

Bank of America’s potential liability for bad mortgages — in the tens of billions of dollars — is well known. But Bank of America is haunted by other demons from the financial crisis, the most significant one being a lawsuit arising from its troubled Merrill Lynch acquisition.

This lawsuit, brought by Bank of America shareholders, claims that Bank of America and its executives, including its former chief executive, Kenneth D. Lewis, failed to disclose what would be a $15.31 billion loss at Merrill in the days before and after the acquisition. The plaintiffs contend that this staggering loss was hidden to ensure that Bank of America shareholders did not vote against the transaction.

Deal Professor
View all posts

Bank of America disclosed this loss after Merrill was acquired. At the same time, Bank of America also disclosed a $20 billion bailout by the government. The bank’s stock fell by more than 60 percent in a two-week period, a market value loss of more than $50 billion.

This episode also spawned a lawsuit from the Securities and Exchange Commission that Bank of America, Mr. Lewis and Joseph Price, the former chief financial officer, settled for $150 million. Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Federal District Court in Manhattan approved the deal but complained that it didn’t sufficiently penalize the individuals involved. The amount was paid by Bank of America with no liability for Mr. Lewis or Mr. Price. Judge Rakoff called the settlement “half-baked justice at best.”

Judge Rakoff may see his wish for greater penalties granted. The New York attorney general’s office has a lawsuit on the matter.

More significantly, a lawsuit seeking about $50 billion was brought by some of the largest class-action law firms and is quietly advancing in the Federal District Court in Manhattan.

The plaintiffs contend that Bank of America engaged in a deliberate effort to deceive the bank’s shareholders.

According to the plaintiffs, who include the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System and a Netherlands pension plan that is the second-largest in Europe, Bank of America’s senior management, including Mr. Lewis and Mr. Price, began to learn of large losses at Merrill Lynch in early November 2008, months before the deal closed.

Mr. Price met with the bank’s general counsel, Timothy J. Mayopoulos, to discuss whether to disclose the loss — at the time about $5 billion — to Bank of America shareholders. Mr. Mayopoulos testified to the New York attorney general’s office that while his initial reaction was that disclosure was warranted, he decided against it. Merrill had been losing $2.1 billion to $9.8 billion a quarter during the financial crisis, and so this loss would be expected by Merrill and Bank of America shareholders.

Plaintiffs in the private action and the New York attorney general’s complaint claim that after this meeting, Mr. Price and other senior executives at Bank of America sought to keep this loss quiet and that Mr. Price in particular misled Mr. Mayopoulos.

Mr. Mayopoulos has testified that on Dec. 3, 2008, Mr. Price told him that the estimated loss would be $7 billion.

Mr. Mayopoulos concluded again that no disclosure was necessary. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Price misled Mr. Mayopoulos as the forecasted loss at this time had now grown to more than $10 billion.

The Bank of America vote occurred on Dec. 5 without its shareholders knowing about this gigantic looming Merrill loss, which was now about $11 billion.

Mr. Mayopoulos has testified he was surprised at this higher number when he learned of it at a Dec. 9 board meeting. Mr. Mayopoulos sought to meet with Mr. Price about the new loss. The next day, Mr. Mayopoulos was fired and escorted out of the building.

The Merrill acquisition was completed on Jan. 1, 2009.

Two weeks later, Bank of America disclosed for the first time that Merrill had suffered an after-tax net loss of $15.31 billion.

Bank of America has argued in its defense that the exact amount of the loss was uncertain during this time. Moreover, this disclosure was not necessary because Merrill’s losses were within the range of previous losses and included a good will write-off of about $2 billion that was previously disclosed. The total loss was not material.

But if it is true that Mr. Price, with Mr. Lewis’s assent, kept this information from Mr. Mayopoulos in order to avoid disclosure, this is a prima facie case of securities fraud. Would Bank of America shareholders have voted to approve this transaction? If the answer is no, then it is hard to see this as anything other than material information.

Plaintiffs in this private case have the additional benefit that this claim is related to a shareholder vote. It is easier to prove securities fraud related to a shareholder vote than more typical securities fraud claims like accounting fraud. Shareholder vote claims do not require that the plaintiffs prove that the person committing securities fraud did so with awareness that the statement was wrong or otherwise recklessly made. You only need to show that the person should have acted with care.

This case is not only easier to establish, but the potential damages could also be enormous. Damages in a claim like this are calculated by looking at the amount lost as a result of the securities fraud. A court will most likely calculate this by referencing the amount that Bank of America stock dropped after the loss was announced; this is as much as $50 billion. It is a plaintiff’s lawyer’s dream.

Bank of America is facing a huge liability from this claim. It is also facing even more liability for those who bought and sold stock during this period up until Jan. 15. In a ruling on July 29, the judge in this case allowed these claims to proceed against Bank of America, Mr. Price and Mr. Lewis. The judge had already ruled that the disclosure claim related to the proxy vote could proceed.

This case is on a relatively fast track, with an October 2012 trial date.

Given the $50 billion claim looming over it, Bank of America will most likely try to settle this litigation. The settlement value appears to be in the billions. Firing your main witness — Mr. Mayopoulos — and escorting him out the door no doubt only increases the cost.

The case shows how regulators’ actions can be supplemented by private actions. And if the plaintiffs win, this case may be the exceedingly rare event of directors and officers, particularly Mr. Lewis and Mr. Price, actually having to pay money personally to settle a securities fraud claim. If so, the two men would join the relatively few executives from the financial crisis who have been personally penalized.

Whatever the outcome of this case, it appears that Bank of America shareholders were sacrificed in December 2008 so that the Merrill deal could be completed. The bill may now be coming due for Bank of America.


Steven M. Davidoff, writing as The Deal Professor, is a commentator for DealBook on the world of mergers and acquisitions.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=24a0f719c712e1b74f9b71ecc8497ba6