May 2, 2024

High & Low Finance: Gold, Currency to Some, Is Acting Like a Speculative Commodity

The gold market, circa 2013.

In the more than four decades since President Richard M. Nixon severed the dollar’s last ties to gold, there have been two bull markets in gold — markets that peaked not that far apart, when adjusted for inflation. To a believer, gold is different from any other commodity. The others are expected to rise and fall with supply and demand. A supply shock, perhaps caused by a drought in Brazil or a confrontation in the Persian Gulf, may send the price of orange juice or oil soaring. A fall in economic activity may depress the value of any industrial commodity. A commodity, like any other investment, can become overvalued or undervalued.

But to the faithful, that doesn’t include gold. Sure, it has uses in the real economy, like jewelry and dentistry. But that is not the important issue. To them, it is money. It cannot be overvalued.

There was a time when gold really was money, when the gold standard reigned supreme. Its record was not an especially good one. There was the minor issue of supply shocks — as when gold from the New World caused drastic inflation in Spain — and there were repeated panics and depressions in the 19th century. A determination to stick to the gold standard helped worsen the Great Depression.

But to those who revere gold, such problems are minor compared to the sins of fiat money, which is defined as money not anchored in gold but instead determined by central bankers, who can — and eventually will — surrender to political pressures to devalue the currency. Discretion will be abused.

Those who back the gold standard think “you can design a rule that will tell you what to do, no matter what the circumstances,” says Robert J. Barbera, the co-director of the Center for Financial Economics at Johns Hopkins University. “But there is no one-size-fits-all rule for monetary policy. Ultimately, you need discretion.” Central bankers go in and out of fashion. Back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as inflation grew and grew in the United States and other developed economies, their credibility was challenged as never before. Gold, and its sort-of sibling, silver, soared, but then crashed back to earth well before Paul A. Volcker, then the chairman of the Federal Reserve, proved he could and would tame inflation, even if doing so sent the American economy into back-to-back recessions.

During January 1980, as the first of those recessions was beginning, gold went from a little over $500 an ounce to $850 and then back under $700.

By early 1999, when Time Magazine put the Federal Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan, on its cover as the head of “the Committee to Save the World,” central bankers had become geniuses. (The other members of that committee were the former Treasury secretary, Robert E. Rubin, and his deputy at the time, Lawrence H. Summers, who later succeeded Mr. Rubin.) The stock market was booming, recessions were distant memories and gold was under $300 an ounce.

After 1980, gold never got close to $800 an ounce until, once again, the central bankers began to look imperfect. In 2007, as the American economy struggled to deal with what was then seen as the subprime housing crisis, gold climbed back above $800 and then set a new high, in nominal dollars, early in 2008, early in the American recession.

This time around, the sin of central banks appeared to be one of inadequate regulation, and of allowing a credit boom to get out of hand. If William McChesney Martin Jr., a former Fed chairman, once said the Fed’s job was “to take away the punch bowl just when the party gets going,” Mr. Greenspan was spiking the punch during his final years.

The hostility to the Fed since then has been largely based on worries that, Ben S. Bernanke, Mr. Greenspan’s successor, was going to destroy the dollar. Having lowered short-term rates to virtually zero, the Fed and other central banks have purchased huge quantities of government bonds. That is not printing money in the sense that no printing press is involved, but in every other sense it is.

Surely, said those who believe in gold, burdensome inflation was just around the corner. The Republican platform in 2012 did not use the phrase “gold standard,” but said “as we face the task of cleaning up the wreckage of the current administration’s policies,” a Republican administration would appoint a “commission to investigate possible ways to set a fixed value for the dollar.”

By the time of the Republican convention, it turned out, gold had peaked at a little more than $1,900 an ounce. This week, in what looked like panic selling, the metal fell back below $1,400.

Floyd Norris comments on finance and the economy at nytimes.com/economix.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/business/gold-currency-to-some-is-acting-like-a-speculative-commodity.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Azerbaijan Is Rich. Now It Wants to Be Famous.

Once he arrived in Baku, Ibrahimov went straight to his architects and said, “Draw this exactly the way I did.” Avesta Concern, the company that governs his various business interests, subsequently commissioned the blueprints for Ibrahimov’s vision. The result will be a sprawling, lobster-shaped development called Khazar Islands — an archipelago of 55 artificial islands in the Caspian Sea with thousands of apartments, at least eight hotels, a Formula One racetrack, a yacht club, an airport and the tallest building on earth, Azerbaijan Tower, which will rise 3,445 feet.

When the whole project is complete, according to Avesta, 800,000 people will live at Khazar Islands, and there will be hotel rooms for another 200,000, totaling nearly half the population of Baku. It will cost about $100 billion, which is more than the gross domestic product of most countries, including Azerbaijan. “It will cost $3 billion just to build Azerbaijan Tower,” Ibrahimov said. “Some people may object. I don’t care. I will build it alone. I work with my feelings.”

It’s not surprising that Ibrahimov, who plans to live in the penthouse of Azerbaijan Tower, had his epiphany on a flight from Dubai. The vision behind Khazar Islands, after all, is not a vision so much as a simulacrum of a vision. The fake islands, the thousands of palm trees and the glass and steel towers — many of which resemble Dubai’s sail-shaped Burj Al Arab hotel — are all emblems of the modern Persian Gulf petro-dictatorship. And two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union — its final custodian during 23 centuries of near-constant occupation — Azerbaijan could be accused of having similar ambitions. The country, which is about the size of South Carolina, has 9.2 million people and is cut off from any oceans. It builds nothing that the rest of the world wants and has no internationally recognized universities. It does, however, have oil.

In 2006, Azerbaijan started pumping crude from its oil field under the Caspian Sea through the new Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Now, with the help of BP and other foreign energy companies, one million barrels of oil course through the pipeline daily, ending at a Turkish port on the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea. This makes Azerbaijan a legitimate energy power (the world’s leading oil producer, Saudi Arabia, produces 11 million barrels every day) with a great deal of potential. If the proposed Nabucco pipeline, running from Turkey to Austria, is built, Azerbaijan would become a conduit for gas reserves, linking Central Asia to Europe. This could strip Russia, which sells the European Union more than a third of the gas it consumes, of one of its most potent foreign-policy levers. It could also generate billions of dollars every year for Azerbaijan, which between 2006 and 2008 had the world’s fastest-growing economy, at an average pace of 28 percent annually.

Sitting on a couch in the temporary headquarters at the construction site of his future city, Ibrahimov mulled the possibilities. The headquarters, which looks like a very modern log cabin, features a big conference table, flat-screen televisions, a bar, pretty assistants and a dining table that is always set. There is a gargantuan portrait of the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, hanging from a wall, next to the bar. Spread out on the conference table were blueprints for Khazar Islands, which looked like battle plans. Men in leather jackets picked from crystal bowls filled with nuts and dried fruit and caramels in shiny wrappers.

Ibrahimov had slept five hours, he said, but was not tired. He started the day with an hourlong run, followed by a dip in the Caspian Sea, followed by a burst of phone calls over breakfast, followed by meetings with some people from the foreign ministry, then the Turks, then his engineers and architects. Now, while sipping tea, Ibrahimov’s attention was back on Khazar Islands, which he insisted was not modeled after Dubai. “Dubai is a desert,” he said. “The Arabs built an illusion of a country. The Palm” — a faux-island development in Dubai — “is not right. The water smells. Also, they built very deep in the sea. That’s dangerous. The Palm is beautiful to look at, but it’s not good to live in.”

Peter Savodnik is the author of “The Interloper,” a book about Lee Harvey Oswald in the Soviet Union, to be published in October.

Editor: Jon Kelly

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/magazine/azerbaijan-is-rich-now-it-wants-to-be-famous.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Chinese Firm Will Run Strategic Pakistani Port at Gwadar

The minister, Qamar Zaman Kaira, said that control of the port at Gwadar, near Pakistan’s border with Iran, would pass from the Port of Singapore Authority to a company he identified as China Overseas Port Holdings, in a move that had been anticipated for some time.

Mr. Kaira said the Chinese company would inject money into the Gwadar port, which has failed to meet the lofty goals set by the military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf on its completion in late 2006 and now lies largely unused.

“We hope that the Chinese company will invest to make the port operational,” Mr. Kaira said, according to Reuters.

A spokesman for the Singaporean company declined to comment, as did the Chinese government. However, at a news briefing in Beijing on Thursday, a Foreign Ministry spokesman noted that China would “actively support anything that is beneficial to the China-Pakistan friendship.”

The fate of Gwadar, once billed as Pakistan’s answer to the bustling port city of Dubai, United Arab Emirates, has been a focus of speculation about China’s military and economic ambitions in South Asia for the past decade. Some American strategists have described it as the westernmost link in the “string of pearls,” a line of China-friendly ports stretching from mainland China to the Persian Gulf, that could ultimately ease expansion by the Chinese Navy in the region. Gwadar is close to the Strait of Hormuz, an important oil-shipping lane.

But other analysts note that Gwadar is many years from reaching its potential, and they suggest that fears of creeping Chinese influence might be overblown. “There may be a strategic dimension to this, where the Chinese want to mark their presence in an important part of the world,” said Hasan Karrar, an assistant professor of Asian history at the Lahore University of Management Sciences, referring to the management transfer at Gwadar. “But I wouldn’t go so far as saying this implies a military projection in the region.”

The supply lines for the American-led coalition forces in Afghanistan mainly pass through ports farther east in Pakistan and do not involve Gwadar.

Of greater likely concern to Washington was another announcement Pakistan made on Wednesday, saying that it was pressing ahead with a joint energy project with Iran that the United States strongly opposes.

Mr. Kaira said the cabinet had approved an Iranian offer to partly finance the 490-mile-long Pakistan segment of a planned gas pipeline between the two countries. Last year, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton warned that the project could lead to possible sanctions against Pakistan.

But political analysts in Pakistan saw the announcement as part of Pakistani election politics, and there is wider skepticism that Pakistan can bring the $1.6 billion project to completion. At present Pakistan is suffering from a major energy crisis, including a severe gas shortage that has caused lengthy lines outside fuel stations.

The gas pipeline, which enjoys broad public support, represents positive news for the government of President Asif Ali Zardari before it dissolves in preparation for elections that are expected to take place in May. And although Iran has offered a $500 million finance deal to help Pakistan build its part of the pipeline, Western officials say the Zardari government will still struggle to meet its part of the deal.

Both the Gwadar port and the pipeline to Iran offer the potential of reducing Pakistan’s strategic dependence on the United States, but as yet have failed to deliver.

Commissioned by General Musharraf, the Gwadar port project initially set off a flurry of excited property speculation in what was once a quiet fishing village. Developers presented flashy plans for luxury apartment blocks amid talk the port could rival Dubai.

China paid for 75 percent of the $248 million construction costs, while the Port of Singapore Authority won a 40-year contract to manage the facility, which started in early 2007. General Musharraf assuaged critics of the Chinese involvement by saying the port would not be put to any military use.

But Pakistan has failed to build the port or transportation infrastructure needed to develop the port, the property bubble has burst and, according to the port management Web site, the last ship to dock there arrived in November. “The government never built the infrastructure that the port needed — roads, rail or storage depots,” said Khurram Husain, a freelance business journalist. “Why would any shipping company come to the port if it has no service to offer?”

According to reports in the Pakistani news media, the Port of Singapore Authority sought to withdraw from the management contract after the Pakistani government failed to hand over land needed to develop the facility.

Mr. Kaira said Wednesday that both the Singaporean and Chinese companies had agreed to transfer the contract for control of the port, but he did not give a timetable.

Bree Feng contributed research from Beijing.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/world/asia/chinese-firm-will-run-strategic-pakistani-port-at-gwadar.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

After Disclosures by WikiLeaks, Al Jazeera Replaces Its Top News Director

Al Jazeera is under intense scrutiny in the Middle East over its varying coverage of the Arab Spring revolts. Although the network is nominally independent — and its degree of autonomy was itself a revolution in the context of the region’s state-controlled news media when it began in 1996 — many people contend that its coverage of the region still reflects the views of its Qatari owners.

Al Jazeera played an early and influential role in covering — some would say encouraging — the unrest in Tunisia and Egypt last winter. It was even more aggressive in its focus on the regime of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi and the struggles of what it called “freedom fighters” in Libya, where Qatar came to play a major role in supporting the rebellion.

But some people now cite what they see as a double standard in the network’s sensational coverage of the unrest in Syria on the one hand, and its relatively negligible coverage of the strife in Bahrain, Qatar’s Persian Gulf neighbor.

United States diplomatic cables disclosed recently by WikiLeaks appear to open a new window into the network’s interactions with Qatar and other governments.

A cable sent by the American ambassador, Chase Untermeyer, and dated October 2005, describes an embassy official’s meeting with Al Jazeera’s news director, Wadah Khanfar. According to the cable, the official handed Mr. Khanfar copies of critical reports by the United States Defense Intelligence Agency on three months of Al Jazeera’s coverage of the Iraq war; Mr. Khanfar said that the Qatari Foreign Ministry had already provided him with two months of the American reports, according to the cable, suggesting a close three-way consultation involving the two governments and the network.

He also urged American officials to keep his behind-the-scenes collaboration a secret.

He objected to an intelligence report’s written reference to an “agreement” between the United States and Al Jazeera.

“The agreement was that it was a non-paper,” Mr. Khanfar said, according to the cable. “As a news organization, we cannot sign agreements of this nature, and to have it here like this in writing is of concern to us.”

Senior United States officials often charged publicly during the Iraq war that Al Jazeera’s coverage inflamed anti-American sentiment, but in the cable Mr. Khanfar appeared eager to convince the American official that Al Jazeera was trying to be fair. He said he was preparing a written response to the points raised in the intelligence reports, according to the cable.

In at least one instance, involving a report on the network’s Web site, Mr. Khanfar said in the cable that he had changed coverage at the American official’s request. He said he had removed two images depicting wounded children in a hospital and a woman with a badly wounded face.

When the official raised other complaints, Mr. Khanfar “appeared to repress a Sigh,” according to the cable, “but said he would have the piece removed.”

“Not immediately,” he reportedly said, “because that would be talked about, but over two or three days.”

Mr. Khanfar, a former correspondent in Iraq and elsewhere for Al Jazeera, had been director for eight years before he resigned on Tuesday. He offered no explanation for his departure, but said on his Twitter account, “Entertained by all the rumors of why I have resigned.” His successor is Sheik Ahmad bin Jasem bin Muhammad Al-Thani, a businessman and member of the royal family.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=7552f9fa4aae7f48f5a9fe5d4b528124