April 20, 2024

DealBook: Shares of Moleskine Fall Modestly in Trading Debut

Moleskine's leather-bound notebooks have been used by the likes of Picasso and van Gogh.Fred R. Conrad/The New York TimesMoleskine’s leather-bound notebooks have been used by the likes of Picasso and van Gogh.

12:52 p.m. | Updated LONDON – From Hemingway to the public markets, shares of the vintage notebook company Moleskine fell modestly on the first day of trading on Wednesday after the Italian company raised $314 million through an initial public offering.

Moleskine, whose leather-bound notebooks have been used by the likes of Picasso and van Gogh, is the latest European company to turn to the capital markets despite recent uncertainty caused by the bank crisis in Cyprus.

Backed by the private equity firm Syntegra Capital, the Italian notebook maker also is the first company to list on the Milan stock exchange since the luxury clothing designer Brunello Cucinelli raised just over $200 million in April 2012.

Faced with renewed investor interest in equities, European companies and their backers have been quick to take advantage.

The total value of I.P.O.’s across the Continent doubled in the first quarter of the year, to $7 billion, compared with the period a year earlier, according to the data provider Dealogic.

The new offerings have been spread across a number of industries, though real estate I.P.O.’s have garnered particularly attention. The German property company LEG Immobilien, which is owned by the Goldman Sachs investment fund Whitehall, pocketed 1.3 billion euros ($1.7 billion) in the Continent’s largest I.P.O. during the first quarter.

Moleskine, whose backers also include the European venture capital firm Index Ventures, said last week that it had priced its new offering at 2.30 euros a share, which was the midpoint of the expected price range.

In trading in Milan on Wednesday, its shares rose as much as 3.9 percent before falling back slightly by early afternoon. It closed at 2.28 euros a share, down .87 percent from its offering price.

Goldman Sachs, UBS and Mediobanca managed the offering for Moleskine.

Article source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/shares-of-moleskine-rise-in-trading-debut/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Europe Is Watching as France Weighs Options for Peugeot

On Friday, after more signs of financial stress at PSA Peugeot Citroën, Budget Minister Jérôme Cahuzac said the government was considering its options, including taking a stake in the carmaker through France’s strategic investment fund.

“Let’s be clear, the company cannot and must not disappear,” he told RMC radio and BFM television. “We have to do whatever is necessary to support it.”

But Mr. Cahuzac was later contradicted by officials who outrank him, including Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, who said that Peugeot was not seeking aid, and Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici, who said that intervention along those lines “is not on the agenda.”

Those hasty correctives may or may not assuage concerns elsewhere, but the issue is sensitive among Europe’s industrial leaders. Any attempt to prop up Peugeot could strain France’s relations with Germany, whose carmakers have not been hit nearly as hard by the downturn in the region’s economy and auto market. And any helping hand from the Élysée Palace could provoke workers in Italy to call for similar actions to help Fiat, the country’s largest employer, which is also under severe pressure.

The officials made their comments after Peugeot, the biggest automaker in Europe after Volkswagen, said late Thursday that it would mark down the value of its car plants and other automotive assets by more than one-fourth — by about €3.9 billion, or $5.2 billion — to reflect “the impact on the group of the deterioration of the European market.”

That charge, and an additional €243 million write-down for what the company called “onerous” contracts — which include a supply deal with Iran — will make a big dent in the bottom line when Peugeot reports its 2012 results Wednesday. But the company and government officials were at pains to note that the noncash charges would not affect its solvency.

Pierre-Olivier Salmon, a PSA Peugeot Citroën spokesman, declined to comment Friday.

Some of the problems facing Peugeot are shared by its competitors. The European Union’s car market shrank 8 percent last year, to just over 12 million units, according to the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, reducing demand for new cars to the lowest level since 1995.

But Peugeot did worse than the Union’s overall market, with deliveries falling 13 percent, hurt by its reliance on South European markets where the euro crisis and austerity hurt demand. Its profitability has suffered from its concentration on lower-price models with thinner profit margins, compared with Germany’s automakers.

As its woes have mounted, its market value has slipped to about €2.1 billion, compared with about €80 billion for Volkswagen.

German automakers like Audi and Mercedes-Benz, as well as Volkswagen, have been able to compensate for weakness in Europe by selling cars in the United States, where Peugeot is not present. What is more, the German domestic market has remained relatively stable, falling only 3 percent last year, compared with the 14 percent drop in France.

German automotive companies regard their success as the payoff for years of investment in foreign markets, and would clearly resent any of their European competitors’ receiving government support. A spokesman for the German Association of the Automotive Industry declined on Friday to comment on Peugeot’s situation. But he referred to a speech last week by the president of the group, Matthias Wissmann, who implicitly criticized state aid for weak carmakers.

“It would be better if everyone were to improve their own competitiveness,” Mr. Wissmann said in Berlin. “The principle must apply, also in Europe, that we orient ourselves on the strong, not on the weak.”

German manufacturers sold nearly 1.3 million cars in the United States last year, a 21 percent increase over 2011. Although Fiat has also begun a renewed push into the U.S. market, thanks to its control of Chrysler, right now the German automakers are the only European manufacturers with a strong presence there.

Volvo Cars of Sweden also has a long tradition in the United States, but its sales of 68,000 vehicles last year were far behind the Germans.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/business/global/peugeot-citroen-takes-5-2-billion-writedown.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

French Government Considers Taking Stake in Peugeot Citroen

Speaking Friday morning on RMC radio and BFM television, Budget Minister Jérôme Cahuzac said the company “cannot and must not disappear, we have to do whatever is necessary to support it,” possibly with the government’s strategic investment fund.

The company, maker of the Peugeot and Citroën brands, said late Thursday that it was marking down those assets by about €3.9 billion, or $5.2 billion, to reflect “the impact on the group of the deterioration of the European market.” That, and an additional €243 million write-down for what the company called “onerous contracts, will have a direct impact on the bottom line when it reports 2012 results on Wednesday.

The company had valued the automotive assets on its books at €14.5 billion at the end of June. It said the write-downs would “not involve any cash-out, nor will it affect either the group’s liquidity or its solvency.” Nor is it related to goodwill, or the value of intangible assets such as the company’s brand.

Rather, the accounting measure reflects an acknowledgement of “the deterioration of the European market, which is likely to remain at 2012 levels for the foreseeable future.”

Shares of Peugeot Citroën were up 18 cents at €6.05 in early trading in Paris.

Even before the new write-offs announced Thursday, analysts surveyed by Reuters had been expecting a 2012 net loss of about €1.52 billion for the year.

The car market in the 27-nation European Union last year shrank by 8.2 percent from 2011, according to the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, bringing new car demand to just over 12 million units, the lowest since 1995.

PSA Peugeot Citroën did worse than the overall market, with deliveries declining 13 percent. The company, the second-largest E.U. carmaker after Volkswagen, is pressured more than many of its rivals by its dependence on European market.

It has already announced plans to close a plant in Aulnay-sous-Bois, near Paris, and hopes to cut 11,200 jobs from its French work force of roughly 97,000 people, mainly by offering early retirement and buyouts. Those restructuring plans were put on hold last week, when a French court ruled that the company had not adequately discussed its plans with workers at an affiliate.

Peugeot also sold a 7 percent stake to General Motors last year; it and the American automaker, which is struggling to turn around its own European unit, Adam Opel, have agreed to cooperate loosely on logistics and on some vehicle projects.

Libération, a French daily, reported Friday without identifying its source that the French government, which owns just over 15 percent of Peugeot’s French rival, Renault, was considering its options regarding Peugeot and might take a stake “as a last resort.” Last autumn, the state extended credit guarantees worth €7 billion to the company’s finance unit, to ensure that potential buyers could still get loans at competitive rates as the company’s own deteriorating balance sheet weighed on its ability to tap investors.

Asked Friday about the possibility that the government would become a shareholder, Pierre-Olivier Salmon, a company spokesman, declined to comment.

PSA Peugeot Citroën said the €3.9 billion depreciation charge included a write-off of about €3 billion on automotive division assets for 2012, as well as an €879 million markdown in the net value of deferred taxes.

The company said there would be another €855 million in write-downs for 2012, including €612 million it has already announced. Taken together, it emphasized, the charges will contribute to PSA Peugeot Citroën’s 2012 net loss “but do not affect its solvency nor its liquidity. The depreciation of these assets has no impact on cash.”

It also said it expected to meet its 2012 target for net debt of roughly €3 billion.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/business/global/peugeot-citroen-takes-5-2-billion-writedown.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

In Ukraine, a Mystery Man Fakes a Natural Gas Deal

MOSCOW — For two months, Jordi Sarda Bonvehi negotiated with Ukrainian officials on behalf of a Spanish utility company about participating in a $1 billion investment fund to build a liquefied natural gas plant on the Black Sea.

On Monday, he took part in a signing ceremony for the deal overseen by the prime minister in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital.

The only problem is that the utility company, Gas Natural Fenosa, has never heard of him.

“Gas Natural has not signed any contract to invest in an L.N.G. plant project in Ukraine, nor is it leading any consortium whatsoever,” the company said in a statement soon after the ceremony. “Gas Natural Fenosa has nothing under study in this regard, nor does it have representatives working in Ukraine on this issue.”

Ukrainian officials have now conceded that Mr. Bonvehi, if that is indeed his real name, is certainly not a representative of Gas Natural.

The man’s motive for signing the agreement was still unclear Thursday, though it did not appear that he benefited financially.

“We never doubted he was authentic,” Vladislav Kaskiv, the director of the Ukrainian state investment agency, who signed the document with the man, said in a telephone interview. Mr. Kaskiv was reportedly initially shocked by Gas Natural’s denial.

The agency had harbored no suspicions, Mr. Kaskiv said, because Mr. Bonvehi, a bald man with a goatee, had been regularly showing up for talks over two months, once even traveling to the resort town of Yalta on the Black Sea, far from the capital, for a meeting about the investment fund.

At the signing ceremony in Kiev, however, the man had appeared nervous and spoke often on his cellphone. Soon afterward, the Spanish-speaking man brushed past journalists who tried to speak to him.

Mr. Kaskiv missed a cabinet meeting this week and said he was “disappointed” by the confusion. A phone number Mr. Kaskiv provided for Mr. Bonvehi was not answered Thursday.

Reuters reported a telephone conversation with a man in Barcelona who identified himself as Mr. Bonvehi and said he had signed the agreement, though he had no authorization from Gas Natural to do so.

“I thought I could sign it and then settle it with the company,” he said, according to Reuters, which added that it could not independently establish the man’s identity.

The development was a peculiar setback for a high-profile project, and one with geopolitical overtones. The Ukrainian state investment agency had been seeking financing to form an 850 million euro ($1.1 billion) investment fund to build the re-gasification terminal on the Black Sea.

The contract was a nonbinding memorandum of understanding; Ukrainian officials have said they will continue talks with other potential investors.

The terminal was intended as a first, significant step for Ukraine to diversify its energy supplies away from Russia’s Gazprom, which has shut off natural gas supplies twice in the last few years in politically charged price disputes.

The facility to import gas from the Persian Gulf or the Caspian region would give Ukraine leverage in these talks.

With so much at stake, Ukraine’s government announced the deal on Monday with Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and Yuriy Boyko, the energy minister, presiding over the ceremony.

Edward Scott, a vice president for Excelerate, a company based in Woodlands, Tex., that specializes in liquefied natural gas equipment, signed a separate contract to supply equipment for the terminal. His identity is not in question.

At one point during the event, a live video feed showed welders, sparks flying, at work on a pipeline ostensibly being built for the new gas terminal.

“We can call Nov. 26 energy independence day for Ukraine,” Mr. Kaskiv said at the event.

In a statement, the agency identified the man who signed the contract as a Gas Natural executive, Jordi Garcia Tabernero.

Gas Natural, though, denied in a statement having signed any agreement and said Mr. Tabernero was not in Ukraine on Monday. Mr. Tabernero, as a photograph on a company Web site shows, has a full head of hair.

Mr. Kaskiv said the initial statement had misidentified the man because of a clerical error. The agency had expected Mr. Tabernero to attend, he said, but when he did not, another Spanish speaker signed in his place.

That man, of course, is still something of a mystery.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/business/global/in-ukraine-a-mystery-man-fakes-a-natural-gas-deal.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

DealBook: In Brazil, No Room for Leverage at Buyout Firms

Arminio Fraga, a co-founder of Gávea, an investment fund bought by JPMorgan Chase.Mark Lennihan/Associated PressArminio Fraga, a co-founder of Gávea, an investment fund that was bought by JPMorgan Chase.

SÃO PAULO, Brazil — “We use zero leverage.”

Luiz Otávio Magalhães, the founding partner of one of the most successful private equity firms in Brazil, was trying to explain his business model to me. His leveraged buyout firm, Patria, easily garners more than 20 percent returns annually.

That kind of performance attracted the attention of Steven Schwarzman, whose Blackstone Group bought a 40 percent stake last year.

Yet this L.B.O. fund is, uniquely, missing the “L.”

“Zero,” he said again, as if to underscore the point.

Billions of dollars are rushing into Brazil’s economy. International private equity firms like Blackstone and the Carlyle Group are scrambling to capture of a piece of this emerging market before it has fully emerged. JPMorgan Chase recently bought 55 percent of Gávea, a seven-year-old investment fund with $6 billion under management co-founded by Arminio Fraga, the former president of the central bank of Brazil from 1999 to 2002.

But perhaps the most unusual aspect of the private equity industry here is that its success thus far has had nothing to do with burdening its acquisition targets with heaps of debt. Indeed, this version of the private equity business is exactly the opposite: improving a company’s operations instead of turning to financial engineering to squeeze out performance. It is a mantra that many private equity firms in the United States and Europe pay lip service to but do not follow in practice.

The reason that private equity firms in Brazil do not use debt is simple. In Brazil, money does not come cheap, Mr. Magalhães explained over coffee in the firm’s offices along one of the main sections of downtown São Paulo.

A private equity firm looking for a loan from a bank in Brazil might have to pay as much 20 percent interest annually. A loan in the United States, on the other hand, might pay only about 6 percent. The reason for the lack of leverage, at least for now, becomes obvious.

“That’s just the way we do it. This is not an environment where leverage plays a meaningful role,” Mr. Fraga said in an interview.

So how does Mr. Magalhães’s firm, with about $4.3 billion under management, make such huge profits? For starters, he does not pursue elephant-size deals that are popular in America.

“There is always room for improvements in smaller companies. Family-owned companies, as we usually say, ‘Their kitchen is a mess,’ ” he said. “Usually when you are talking about bigger companies, the room for improvements within the company are smaller because the company needs to be already better organized, otherwise they will not have survived.”

He also focuses almost exclusively on buying family-controlled businesses, which, are often more difficult negotiations than with public companies.

““We had dinner with the wife of this guy because he wanted her to know the guys with whom he would be associating,” Mr. Magalhães said about a recent acquisition target. “It’s fair that she wants to know us.”

He added, “These companies are still under the radar, they do not mandate JPMorgan or Goldman Sachs to find me.”

If his principles sound like what the fledgling private equity industry circa the 1970s in the United States pursued, that’s because they are. Mr. Magalhães isn’t bidding for companies in auctions or forming consortiums with other firms. He spends years developing relationships with small companies until they are willing to sell to him.

He bought a medical diagnosis company in 2000 that had 18 outlets with $90 million in revenue. By 2009, when Patria exited, the company had more than 300 shops with $1.6 billion in revenue.

Among his, other attributes, Mr. Magalhães is uncharacteristically casual for a private equity boss. Forget about pinstripes; he is dressed in jeans and a work shirt. To prepare for a meeting with Mr. Schwarzman in 2010, he hurriedly reminded his staff the day before to come in a dark suit.

Mr. Magalhães made a deal with Mr. Schwarzman after a courtship that is similar to the one he often has with his own acquisition targets, as it took almost decade before a deal was reached. For Blackstone, the deal allows the firm to tap into Brazil’s fast-growing market using local expertise. Patria’s $4.3 billion under management includes money allotted for traditional private equity, real estate, infrastructure, a small hedge fund and a small advisory business. It is, in other words, a mini-Blackstone.

The big question facing Mr. Magalhães and others in his industry is whether they can sustain their performance as bigger players enter the market, looking for even bigger prey.

For now, Mr. Magalhães says he is not worried. With the Brazilian economy growing at a rapid clip, the wind is at his back.

But he and Mr. Fraga acknowledge that the business is becoming more competitive. As the cost of debt comes down, they worry that Brazil’s private equity industry may resemble the buyout shops in the United States.

“There will be more leverage, for sure,” Mr. Fraga said. “Hopefully, we won’t do anything too stupid when the opportunity becomes real.”

Article source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/in-brazil-no-room-for-leverage-at-buyout-firms/?partner=rss&emc=rss