November 15, 2024

The Trade: Pruning Hedge Fund Regulation Without Cultivating Better Rules

John Paulson is famous for having shorted the housing bubble, making billions. Then his returns nose-dived.Eduardo Munoz/ReutersJohn Paulson is famous for having shorted the housing bubble, making billions. Then his returns nose-dived.

Fresh from having declined to constrain money market funds, the Securities and Exchange Commission has moved to loosen marketing constraints on hedge funds.

Two weeks ago, the agency threw up its hands and said it would not be able to defend millions of investors from money market funds that do things like invest in dodgy European bank bonds yet proclaim themselves to be perfectly safe.

Instead, the S.E.C. — mandated by Congress through its misnamed and harmful JOBS Act — proposed rules last week to lift advertising restrictions for hedge funds and other kinds of private investment offerings. The rules haven’t been completed, but we can look forward to an ad featuring a wizened couple in matching tubs overlooking a sunset, holding hands and talking about how they just put money with the next George Soros.

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The old rules for hedge funds make little sense. Surely, hedge funds should be able to promote themselves to investors with data about their returns and methods. But there’s a problem: The S.E.C. does not have any new resources and has not put in place any policies to police these promotions.

Letting slip the dogs of advertising comes as some professional investors and academics doubt that the industry can continue to produce outsize investment returns — if, in fact, it ever did. As they get bigger, hedge funds struggle to score good results. As investments have become increasingly correlated and interrelated, it gets harder to execute safer and unique strategies.

In a perfect world, hedge fund advertising would improve the world of investing. Hedge funds, after all, are wildly misunderstood. A good hedge fund seeks steady returns in good markets and bad. Many of the best-managed funds aren’t actually trying to beat the market in its best years. And many of the good funds seek uncorrelated results, so that the returns don’t move in lock step with the stock market.

And, honestly, few things could be worse than mutual funds, which in aggregate underperform the stock market and charge too much to do it.

The problem is that the way this loosening looks on paper and the way it will play out in the real world are a tad different.

If Groucho Marx were alive today, he’d say that he would never want to invest in a hedge fund that would have him as a limited partner. One doesn’t see Le Bernardin and Château Lafite filling the airwaves during N.F.L. games. The ban on law firm advertising was lifted in the 1970s. Today, Jacoby Meyers advertises on television; Sullivan Cromwell does not. Drug ads have wrought a parade of patients demanding new (high margin) medicines from their doctors that often offer few benefits over the old (off patent) ones.

Even professionals have a problem in evaluating hedge fund performance, because distinguishing skill from luck and excessive risk-taking is extremely difficult. For instance, funds often don’t even let their own employees know how much leverage they are taking.

Take the case of John Paulson, who is famous for having shorted the housing bubble, making billions. The result is that many, surely including Mr. Paulson, were convinced of his brilliance.

Before his world-renowned score, he was a grinder, eking out decent returns with a relatively small fund. Afterward, his fund grew exponentially to tens of billions under management.

Then his returns nose-dived. His main fund plunged 36 percent last year and has dropped another 13 percent this year, according to The Wall Street Journal.

Last week, after Citigroup’s private bank pulled out of his fund, Mr. Paulson convened a conference call with Bank of America investment advisers and their clients to explain what was going so horribly wrong with his funds.

It turns out that Mr. Paulson was like the Old Man in the Hemingway novel: He happened to be the guy, through some skill and some luck, to land the biggest fish in the world. How much of each did he have? No one can know.

Another lesson from Mr. Paulson’s experience is that even if a fund manager is smart, people who put their money into them are dumb. Citigroup and Bank of America look as if they were typical. Average investors chase performance, putting in money after the great years. Then they panic, pulling their money out at the bottom.

Look for this to be replicated frequently when hedge funds start advertising. Simon Lack, in an important recent book “The Hedge Fund Mirage” (Wiley), argues that hedge funds have been great for hedge fund managers and not so great for their investors. The managers get huge fees. Investors would have been better off investing in Treasury securities, he says.

The hedge fund trade group says that Mr. Lack has it all wrong. Their logic, however, hasn’t been persuasive. Felix Salmon, a blogger for Reuters, wrote that the hedge fund group’s complaints had “convinced me of the deep truth of Lack’s book in a way that the book itself never could.”

At least hedge funds specialize in separating people from their money through excessive fees. Other types of offerings prefer to do so through less savory means. The opening of hedge fund advertising has garnered much of the attention, because of the tantalizing idea that we will all soon be able to invest with the best minds on the planet. But the S.E.C. is also lifting rules on other kinds of securities offerings from small companies. Many of these will require less disclosure and will be particularly ripe for fraud.

So the best case from the agency’s move is a bunch of Paulsons, while the worst case is a bunch of Madoffs. It doesn’t seem like a great bargain.

The S.E.C. declares in a fact sheet that it will keep the rules about who can invest. Yet the victims of Bernard L. Madoff, who orchestrated the largest Ponzi scheme in history, were accredited investors. The agency does not plan to mandate any new process to ensure that investors are accredited, or whether their investments are appropriate for them.

This is all harks back to a precrisis specialty: get rid of supposedly outdated regulation, but create no new limits or powers to keep things from blowing up.


Jesse Eisinger is a reporter for ProPublica, an independent, nonprofit newsroom that produces investigative journalism in the public interest. Email: jesse@propublica.org. Follow him on Twitter (@Eisingerj).

Article source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/pruning-hedge-fund-regulation-without-cultivating-better-rules/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Setback for Bank of America in MBIA Lawsuit

Justice Eileen Bransten of the New York State Supreme Court ruled that to show fraud, MBIA need only show that Countrywide had misled it about the $20 billion of securities that it insured, not that the misrepresentations caused its losses.

MBIA accused Countrywide of misrepresenting the quality of underwriting for about 368,000 loans that backed 15 financings from 2005 to 2007, while the housing market was booming. It said it would not have insured the securities on the agreed-upon terms had it known how the loans were made.

“No basis in law exists to mandate that MBIA establish a direct causal link between the misrepresentations allegedly made by Countrywide and claims made under the policy,” Justice Bransten wrote, citing New York common law and insurance law.

While not ruling on the merits of the case, the judge lowered the burden of proof on MBIA to show Countrywide had committed fraud and breached the insurance contracts.

She also said MBIA could seek damages for its losses, rejecting Countrywide’s argument that the insurer’s only remedy was to void its insurance policies. MBIA had said that would be unfair to investors.

Manal Mehta, a partner at Branch Hill Capital, a hedge fund in San Francisco, said Bank of America had lost “one of its key defenses in the ongoing litigation over mortgage putbacks by the monoline insurers.”

Neither Bank of America nor MBIA officials were immediately available to comment.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=df53286b491f8aa03bc14a632772427b

DealBook: Zvi Goffer Found Guilty in Insider Trading Case

Zvi Goffer

A federal jury in Manhattan on Monday found Zvi Goffer and two co-conspirators guilty of insider trading, the latest development in the government’s investigation into insider trading at hedge funds.

Mr. Goffer, his brother Emanuel Goffer and Michael A. Kimelman were convicted of participating in an insider trading scheme that produced more than $20 million in illegal profits.

The case was connected to the prosecution of Raj Rajaratnam, the hedge fund tycoon and co-founder of the Galleon Group, who was found guilty last month in the largest insider trading case in a generation. Zvi Goffer, who sat in on much of Mr. Rajaratnam’s trial, was employed by Galleon.

Like the case against Mr. Rajaratnam, this trial had phone wiretaps playing a central role. The jury heard recordings of Mr. Goffer swapping secret corporate information with fellow traders.

Much of the illegal trading featured in the Mr. Goffer trial was based on on illegal tips about mergers and acquisitions from two corporate lawyers at Ropes Gray in Manhattan. The two lawyers, Arthur Cutillo and Brien Santarlas, had previously pleaded guilty to providing Mr. Goffer and others with information about the secret deals. Mr. Santerlas testified during the trial.

Among the transactions the lawyers leaked to Mr. Goffer: TPG’s $1.3 billion acquisition of Axcan Pharam in November 2007 and Bain Capital’s agreement to pay $2.2 billion for 3Com in September of that year.

Zvi Goffer, 34, worked at a number of different trading shops before joining Galleon in 2008. After just nine months there he left to start his own hedge fund, Incremental Capital, with his brother and Mr. Kimelman.

A parallel civil complaint brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission said that Mr. Goffer’s nickname among his fellow traders was “Octopussy” — a reference to the James Bond movie — because his arms reached into so many sources of information.

During the trial, William Barzee, the lawyer for Mr. Goffer, described his client as a “gold miner” who panned for gold along the “river of gossip.”

Mr. Kimelman, who was tried as one of Mr. Goffer’s co-conspirators, practiced law at Sullivan Cromwell before becoming a Wall Street trader.

“We are enormously disappointed with the verdict as we believed the evidence clearly showed that Mr. Kimelman had not engaged in any insider trading,” said Michael Sommer, the lawyer for Mr. Kimelman. “We will of course pursue all avenues of appeal.”

Mr. Barzee and Michael Ross, the lawyer for Emanuel Goffer, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=de96ec101a70a0651d8db8f70ff07fb5

DealBook: SAC Capital Said to Face Insider Trading Inquiry

Steven A. Cohen, the head of SAC Capital Advisors.Steve Marcus/ReutersSteven A. Cohen’s firm, SAC Capital Advisors, is under scrutiny.

The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating whether trades in health care stocks by the hedge fund SAC Capital Advisors as recently as last year were made using inside information, a person briefed on the matter said Wednesday.

The investigation comes as SAC, one of the most prominent hedge funds in the world with $12 billion in assets under management, has become something of a focal point for authorities. Two former SAC portfolio managers have pleaded guilty to criminal charges of using inside information to trade technology stocks.

And Senator Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, has questioned how the S.E.C. handled referrals from Wall Street’s self-regulator, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, regarding 20 stock trades by SAC.

But the S.E.C.’s investigation into trading by SAC appears to be much broader. In addition to the inquiry into trading in health care stocks — trades that took place from at least 2007 through 2010 — the agency is examining SAC’s use of expert network firms, companies that connect Wall Street investors with outside experts in various industries, the person briefed on the matter said.

Separately, the S.E.C. is looking into whether the hedge fund used inside information about the 2007 takeover of MedImmune, a biotechnology company, the person said. The Wall Street Journal earlier reported about the inquiry into MedImmune.

A spokesman for the S.E.C. declined to comment.

Neither SAC nor its billionaire founder, Steven A. Cohen, has been accused of wrongdoing by the S.E.C. or by any other authority. A spokesman for SAC declined to comment on Thursday.

The inquiries into the SAC trades are part of an accelerating effort by the S.E.C. and the United States attorney’s office in Manhattan to crack down on insider trading, with a particular focus on hedge funds. The criminal investigations by federal prosecutors have resulted in charges against 49 people, 39 of whom have pleaded guilty.

Two people who have pleaded guilty were the former SAC employees Noah Freeman and Donald Longueuil. Mr. Freeman is expected to testify Thursday at the trial of Winifred Jiau, a consultant for an expert network firm who is charged with leaking inside information. SAC has said that it is “outraged” by the conduct of the two former employees.

The cases against Mr. Freeman and Mr. Longueuil are part of the government’s examination of expert network firms, which developed over the last decade alongside the proliferation of hedge funds. The government has filed criminal charges against 13 people connected to the firms, eight of whom have pleaded guilty.

The former SAC employees admitted to obtaining inside information about public companies and then using it to make profitable trades. The charges against the men detailed a cover-up straight from a television drama that involved destroying a hard drive with pliers and spreading the parts throughout the city.

Others with past ties to SAC have also been ensnared in the insider trading investigation. Earlier this year, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents raided two hedge funds founded by former SAC executives, Level Global Investors and Diamondback Capital Management. In 2009, Richard Choo-Beng Lee pleaded guilty to insider trading related to activity after he left SAC.

The S.E.C. has faced criticism that it failed to bring significant cases against prominent hedge funds as well as cases stemming from the financial crisis.

In April, Senator Grassley asked the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority in a letter to provide information on the “potential scope of suspicious trading activity” at SAC.

Last month, he followed up with a letter to the S.E.C. requesting to know how it handled past referrals about SAC’s trading activity.

MedImmune is not among those trades referred by Finra, according to people briefed on the matter.

SAC executives including Peter Nussbaum, the firm’s general counsel, and its outside lawyers met with staff members in Mr. Grassley’s office to discuss his inquiry.

Additionally, federal prosecutors are examining trades in an account overseen by Mr. Cohen.

Court filings related to the cases of the two former SAC portfolio managers who have pleaded guilty to insider trading, indicate that the government is reviewing trades made in Mr. Cohen’s account at the suggestion of the former employees.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=23f94130c234f3b23ff18bf6f9efc27e

DealBook: Prosecutors Hope for Deterrent Effect

Preet S. Bharara, the United States attorney in Manhattan.Ozier Muhammad/The New York TimesPreet S. Bharara, the United States attorney in Manhattan.

Will the conviction of Raj Rajaratnam, the founder of the hedge fund firm Galleon Group, change anything on Wall Street?

Federal prosecutors hailed Wednesday’s verdict as a powerful deterrent to investors trying to gain an unlawful advantage in the stock market.

“We will continue to pursue and prosecute those who believe they are both above the law and too smart to get caught,” Preet S. Bharara, the United States attorney in Manhattan, said in a statement after the verdict in the Rajaratnam case.

Mr. Bharara’s office, which has led the Justice Department’s pursuit of insider trading, has charged 47 individuals with insider trading crimes over the last 18 months — and secured 35 convictions.

While some question whether the rabid pursuit of insider trading has distracted the government from investigating senior executives at the center of the financial crisis, the success in the Galleon case vindicates the aggressive prosecutorial tactics and vast resources deployed in this area. For the first time in a securities case, the government used wiretaps to record traders’ telephone conversations — a tool traditionally used with drug traffickers and organized crime figures.

Prosecutors have readily employed hardball investigatory methods. Late last year, agents at the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted simultaneous raids of three large hedge funds, sending shock waves across Wall Street. Two of those funds have since closed.

Federal authorities have pressured traders and analysts to record their calls in order to build their cases. Last October, F.B.I. agents appeared unannounced at the Portland, Ore., home of an analyst and asked him to tape his calls with a hedge fund client.

The analyst, John Kinnucan, refused to work with the government and e-mailed his trading clients that he had “declined the young gentleman’s gracious offer to wear a wire and thus ensnare you in their devious web.”

As recently as January, the F.B.I. instructed a cooperating witness in the Galleon case to record a call with a former colleague to elicit incriminating evidence.

Government crackdowns on insider trading tend to run in cycles. The last one that received as much attention was the Wall Street sweep in the 1980s that resulted in the convictions of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken. Those prosecutions came during that era’s mergers-and-acquisitions boom, which was largely financed with the junk bonds popularized by Mr. Milken.

This time around, the insider trading scandals were borne out of the latest deal-making boom that occurred during the middle of last decade — a frenzied period in which some of America’s largest companies fall into private hands.

It coincided with the explosive growth of hedge funds, once-secretive investment partnerships that have emerged as a powerful force in the global economy — and minted more than two dozen billionaires, according to Forbes magazine. Among them: Mr. Rajaratnam, who at the peak managed $7 billion of investors’ money.

The insider trading investigation has spawned several arms of inquiry and has led to subpoenas of the world’s largest financial institutions and arrests in a number of states. Mr. Rajaratnam’s illegal stock tips came from all points of the globe. One witness testified that his chief source of confidential data about publicly traded technology companies came from a tipster in Taiwan. Another delivered secret information from Dublin about the investment activities of a Middle East sovereign wealth fund.

But some academics and Wall Street critics argue that prosecutors instead should have focused their efforts — and their resources — on ferreting out wrongdoing stemming from the crisis. The Justice Department has yet to bring criminal charges against any executive who ran a major financial-services firm leading up to the disaster, which was caused by aggressive risk taking and shoddy lending practices.

“The total amounts of money and the consequences in insider trading are trivial compared to the damage caused by the behavior that caused the financial crisis,” said Charles Ferguson, an academic and filmmaker whose movie about the financial crisis, “Inside Job,” won the 2011 Academy Award for best documentary.

“I’m not saying that insider trading isn’t a serious crime, but the government should be deploying more resources to investigate those cases,” Mr. Ferguson said.

Last week, Mr. Bharara filed a civil lawsuit against Deutsche Bank, accusing the firm of lying about the quality of mortgages it handled under a government program. At a news conference, he said there was not sufficient evidence to justify a criminal complaint.

Federal authorities have cited the loss of confidence in the stock market as a reason to pursue insider trading. In his closing argument in the Mr. Rajaratnam trial, Reed Brodsky, a prosecutor, belabored the point that such activities provided Wall Street professionals with an unfair advantage over the “average, ordinary investor.”

“The stock market is designed to make sure the investing public isn’t cheated,” Mr. Brodsky said. “Wall Street is supposed to be an even playing field.”

Whether the dozens of arrests and convictions will produce any meaningful change in the way professional investors trade stocks is unclear. Still, there has been a reaction as prosecutors’ tough talk and use of wiretaps spawn a culture of fear on Wall Street.

Security firms report an increase in hedge funds hiring them to conduct electronic sweeps of their offices to check for listening devices. Once lightly regulated, hedge funds have also stepped up their compliance procedures and increased their budget for legal services to ferret out illicit trading. Investors are also demanding a higher level of oversight at the funds and stepping up background checks on their managers.

“I probably get five or six requests every month seeking verification that we’re the auditor for a given fund,” said Alan Alzfan, a partner at accounting firm McGladrey and Pullen. “I used to get five or six a year.”

But for all the added scrutiny and negative publicity surrounding insider trading at hedge funds, investors — lured by the promise of outsize returns — continue to pour billions of dollars into them. Last month, the industry celebrated another milestone: the money under hedge fund control surpassed $2 trillion, an all-time high.

Article source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/prosecutors-hardball-tactics-produce-big-results-in-galleon-case/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Even Funds That Lagged Paid Richly

Last year, it took only one.

John Paulson, who rose to fame in 2007 with a prescient bet against subprime mortgages, earned a record $4.9 billion in 2010 as a result of a big wager that his fund, Paulson Company, made on gold. The metal soared last year, lifting the values of some hedge funds by more than 30 percent.

Last year was very lucrative for some of the biggest and best-performing hedge funds’ chiefs. Wealth was so concentrated that a mere 25 people pocketed a total of $22.07 billion, according to this year’s annual ranking by AR Magazine, which tracks the hedge fund industry. At $50,000 a year, it would take the salaries of 441,400 Americans to match that sum.

Hedge fund managers can still have huge paydays even in years when their funds do not perform well. That is because of the millions they earn in fees from charging state pension funds, college endowments and wealthy individuals to manage money. These fees are typically collected regardless of whether the firm has a profit or a loss.

“So many of these guys are killing it on the management fees,” said Bradley H. Alford, chief investment officer of Alpha Capital Management, which invests in hedge funds. “You can’t feel good giving 30 percent of your returns to some guy who was up single digits. That has to give you indigestion.”

In fact, the hedge fund industry as a whole did not do better than the stock market last year. The HedgeFund Intelligence Global Composite Index, which tracks nearly 4,000 hedge funds around the world, had a median gain of 8 percent in 2010, trailing the 11.7 percent rise in the MSCI World Index of stocks and the 12.7 percent rise in the Standard Poor’s 500-stock index.

And this year’s list of top hedge fund earners includes a number of managers who pocketed hundreds of millions of dollars in fees but produced only single-digit returns for their investors. AR Magazine arrives at the pay figures by estimating a money manager’s portion of fees along with the increase in value of personal stakes in the funds.

For instance, David Shaw of D. E. Shaw, a firm that uses complex algorithms to determine its investments, made the list with income of $275 million, even though his biggest fund returned a paltry 2.45 percent and over all the firm lost 40 percent of its assets, the magazine said.

AR Magazine said Mr. Shaw, who gave up day-to-day oversight of the funds in 2002, made the list because the firm charged a 3 percent management fee and took 30 percent of the investment gains. Mr. Shaw also has much of his own personal wealth tied up in the firm.

Other managers who collected big paychecks while their funds had mediocre returns included George Soros, who is retired but has most of his money in the $28 billion Quantum Endowment fund. The Quantum fund rose 2.63 percent last year, its worst performance since 2002.

Likewise, funds at Moore Capital Management had mostly single-digit returns, but the manager, Louis Bacon, pocketed $230 million based on the increase in value of his holdings in the funds as well as a portion of the firm’s 3 percent management fee and 25 percent performance fees, the magazine said.

To be sure, there were some managers from the 2009 list who did not make this year’s ranking because of subpar performance or even losses at their funds.

For the first time since opening Centaurus Advisors in 2002, the former Enron energy trader John Arnold had a losing year, ending down 3.27 percent. Under Alan Howard, Brevan Howard Asset Management struggled throughout 2010 and wound up with gains of 0.9 percent to 1 percent, the magazine said.

And Philip Falcone of Harbinger Capital Partners, who made $825 million in 2009 and has worried some investors with a huge bet on wireless broadband technology, did not make the list after his flagship fund tumbled 12 percent last year.

Still, there were plenty of bright spots for this year’s top earners.

Big gains late in the year helped Third Point Advisors’ Daniel Loeb make returns of 33.7 percent to 41.5 percent in his funds, giving him a payday of $210 million.

Likewise, David Tepper of Appaloosa Management, who topped the hedge fund rich list in 2009 with a payday of $4 billion, earned another $2.2 billion last year after his funds posted returns of 22 percent to nearly 28 percent, the magazine said.

And a return of 20 percent in his fund last year landed Leon Cooperman of Omega Advisors on the list for the first time since 2004.

Many of the managers on the list declined to comment or did not respond to calls seeking comment. But Mr. Cooperman was willing to discuss his history and his returns.

The son of a plumber, he attended New York City public schools in the Bronx. Mr. Cooperman earned an undergraduate degree at Hunter College at a time when it cost $24 a semester to attend, he recalled in a telephone interview.

When told he made the list with a payday of $240 million, Mr. Cooperman laughed.

“I have no idea how much I made last year. I don’t know until it’s tax time. Besides, I’m giving it all away anyway,” he said, noting that he has taken the Giving Pledge, an effort by Bill and Melinda Gates and Warren E. Buffett to prompt wealthy individuals to give away the majority of their wealth during their lifetimes or upon their deaths.

Mr. Cooperman, 67, explained that he had been giving money to several hospitals and charities, as well as Columbia, where he earned his business degree and immediately joined the ranks of Goldman Sachs after graduation.

“I’m very, very philanthropic toward Columbia, which opened the door to Wall Street for me,” said Mr. Cooperman. “I’m trying to give money away to the kinds of things that touched me during my lifetime.”

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=783e5ea6eba007ea412ca86340583e76

DealBook: Galleon Jurors Hear Tape Discussing Call of Goldman Director

Rajat K. Gupta, a former director of Goldman Sachs.Seokyong Lee/Bloomberg News Rajat K. Gupta, a former director of Goldman Sachs.

8:04 p.m. | Updated

In October 2008, with the global economy hemorrhaging and his hedge fund struggling, Raj Rajaratnam sounded calm during a lunchtime call with a colleague in Singapore.

“I heard yesterday from somebody who’s on the board of Goldman Sachs that they are going to lose $2 per share,” said Mr. Rajaratnam. “The Street has them making $2.50.”

The government played that secretly recorded telephone call on Wednesday during the trial of Mr. Rajaratnam, the co-founder of the hedge fund Galleon Group, who faces up to 25 years in prison if convicted on charges that he earned millions of dollars from insider trading.

The secretly recorded conversation came a day after Goldman held a board meeting informing directors that the bank was on track to report its first quarterly loss as a public company.


The Galleon networkAzam Ahmed and Guilbert Gates/The New York Times Click on the above graphic to get a visual overview of the Galleon information network.

The government says that Rajat K. Gupta, then a Goldman director, called Mr. Rajaratnam after the meeting and passed on the confidential information, allowing Mr. Rajaratnam to sell his Goldman position and avoid losses before its earnings announcement.

Federal prosecutors have named Mr. Gupta a co-conspirator of Mr. Rajaratnam but have not charged him criminally.

The Securities and Exchange Commission has filed a civil proceeding against Mr. Gupta accusing him of tipping Mr. Rajaratnam. Mr. Gupta’s lawyer has said his client had not done anything wrong.

When Mr. Rajaratnam told David Lau, his Singapore colleague, about Goldman’s poor performance, Mr. Lau seemed surprised.

“Really,” he said.

“So what he was telling me was that uh, Goldman, the quarter’s pretty bad. They have zero revenues because their trading revenues are offset by asset losses, and to date they have lost $2 per share,” Mr. Rajaratnam said. “I don’t think that’s built into Goldman Sachs stock price.”

The accusations against Mr. Gupta are being closely followed on Wall Street. Mr. Gupta, who ran McKinsey Company, the prestigious management consulting firm, was among the world’s most influential business executives.

Last week, Lloyd C. Blankfein, the chief executive of Goldman, took the witness stand at the trial and told the jury that it would be a breach of confidentiality for Mr. Gupta to divulge board discussions.

The Goldman call emerged during the testimony of Adam Smith, a former portfolio manager at the Galleon Group. Mr. Smith pleaded guilty to insider trading at Galleon and is testifying against his former boss as part of his cooperation agreement with the government.

During Mr. Smith’s cross-examination, Mr. Rajaratnam’s lawyers accused Mr. Smith of fabricating his illegal conduct at Galleon in order to secure a lesser sentence by helping them get “the big fish” — Mr. Rajaratnam. Mr. Smith testified that the government had caught him on a wiretap trading on inside information last year, after Galleon’s dissolution and while managing a different fund.

Defense lawyers also played a wiretapped call between Mr. Smith and Ian Horowitz, a former Galleon trader. During the call, made at the F.B.I.’s direction after Mr. Smith’s guilty plea, Mr. Smith tried unsuccessfully to gather more insider-trading evidence from Mr. Horowitz.

Mr. Smith, who testified that the F.B.I. had instructed him to lie in order to elicit incriminating information, said on the call that he believed Galleon’s trading was legitimate.

“You want the jury to believe you were lying then, but telling the truth now?” asked Terence J. Lynam, a lawyer for Mr. Rajaratnam.

“Yes,” Mr. Smith replied.

Sept. 24, 2008 transcript (U.S. vs. Rajaratnam)

Oct. 24, 2008 transcript (U.S. vs. Rajaratnam)

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=023d7cdf21ac8ff6ea95ea389ed31ca3