April 25, 2024

Political Economy: Finest Hour for Mario Draghi and Europe

Who is Europe’s most powerful man? If one phrased the question differently — who is Europe’s most powerful person? — the answer might well be Angela Merkel. But the deliberate use of the masculine excludes the German chancellor, leaving the field open to Mario Draghi.

This answer can, of course, be disputed. How can one compare power in economics with power in, say, religion? Is it possible to rank the technocratic European Central Bank boss on the same scale, for example, as the pope?

The best place to start is with an attempt to understand what power is. The British philosopher Bertrand Russell said it was the production of intended effects. By contrast, Steven Lukes, one of the top contemporary power theorists, said in an interview last week that power was the capacity to make a difference in a manner that is significant.

What’s appealing about the way that Mr. Lukes, a professor of sociology at New York University, puts things is his use of the word “significant.” Whereas Mr. Russell just looks at whether people can get their way, the introduction of significance allows us, as observers, to take a view about whether powerful people are affecting things in a manner that matters to us.

That, in turn, allows us to rank individuals’ power. We can decide that right now in Europe, what matters most is navigating the current euro crisis and pick our ranking with that in mind. That, indeed, is my view — which, of course, is somewhat subjective.

Let us return to Mr. Draghi, whom I have known since the mid-1990s. To see why he is so powerful, it is worth considering the three P’s of power: position, personality and pivot points. Having a position that enjoys authority; possessing a personality that is astute enough to maximize the use of that authority; and operating at a point in history where one’s actions have the chance to be pivotal — all these are important ingredients in the power mix. Mr. Draghi scores highly on all three.

Look, first, at position. The E.C.B. has the sole authority to print money for the 17 member countries of the euro monetary union. Mr. Draghi has used this power to huge effect since he took over as president in November 2011. First, the E.C.B. lent banks €1 trillion, or about $1.3 trillion, helping to avert a banking crisis.

Then, in July, during a particularly hot phase of the crisis, Mr. Draghi uttered his famous phrase about doing within the E.C.B.’s mandate “whatever it takes to preserve the euro,” adding, “and believe me, it will be enough.” The E.C.B. later spelled out its willingness to spend potentially unlimited sums of money buying sovereign bonds. The markets calmed down.

The E.C.B.’s power does not just come from its money-printing authority, but also from its independence — which is enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty that established the European Union. Although its president is appointed by politicians, he gets an eight-year term. Once he is in place, he can only be removed in the event of incapacity or serious misconduct. Unlike prime ministers and presidents, he does not have to face the electorate. Mr. Draghi is in an especially strong position because his term has seven more years to run; he is not remotely a lame duck.

The Italian central banker, though, has not just relied on this strong position. His personality is particularly well suited to wielding power. For many years, he survived and thrived while playing Rome’s power games. This is partly because, like a chess grandmaster, he always thinks several moves ahead. That gives him a good understanding of the dynamics of a situation.

Mr. Draghi also gives huge importance to credibility. Through his orthodox central banking rhetoric, he convinced the German people that he was really not from Southern Europe at all. If he had been considered to be more Italian, he would not have gotten the E.C.B. job in the first place. Bild, the influential German tabloid, even celebrated his nomination as E.C.B. president by running a doctored photo of him wearing a Prussian spiked helmet.

Bild did turn on Mr. Draghi after his promise to buy potentially unlimited quantities of sovereign bonds. But, critically, Ms. Merkel — whose approval was not required but whose tacit support gave him valuable cover — did not.

Mr. Draghi’s credibility with the markets has also magnified his influence. So much so that he has not yet even needed to buy a single sovereign bond.

Position and personality, though, are not the only ingredients of Mr. Draghi’s power. He has taken the role of E.C.B. boss at a pivotal moment, when the power to print money is crucial. In a financial crisis, the ability to supply liquidity is of paramount importance.

Mr. Draghi has understood the importance of pivotal points in history and used his position and personality to have a big impact. As such, he scores AAA on the three P’s of power — in a way that puts him ahead of, say, Mario Monti of Italy or François Hollande of France, neither of whom would get straight A’s.

The E.C.B. boss should not let the plaudits go to his head, however. Much of the euro zone is in deep recession. If growth does not return, the crisis could enter a new ugly phase, and his powers will be sorely tested.

Hugo Dixon is the founder and editor of Reuters Breakingviews.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/business/global/17iht-dixon17.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Inside Europe: Rebalancing the French-German Partnership

PARIS — A chill has settled over the Rhine seven months after the election of François Hollande as president of France, reshuffling the cards in Europe’s perpetual power game.

The cooling of traditionally close French-German relations is partly an intentional step by Mr. Hollande, a Socialist, to demonstrate that he is not in the pocket of the conservative German chancellor, Angela Merkel, but instead wants to change the policy direction of the European Union.

It also reflects a fraught process of rebalancing power to accommodate Germany’s greater political heft and economic clout.

Despite vows of ever-closer cooperation that are sure to mark the 50th anniversary next month of the treaty that sealed postwar French-German reconciliation, tension is likely to simmer at least until the next German general election, scheduled for September.

Mr. Hollande was eager to distance himself from the exclusive alliance his conservative predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, had with Ms. Merkel, a partnership that became known as Merkozy because of the dominant role the two played in steering the response to the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone.

Mr. Hollande and Ms. Merkel have differed publicly over the right mix of austerity and growth policies, the future of the euro zone, a European banking union and industrial policy. A series of disputes over common euro zone bonds, the E.U. budget and the aerospace industry have exposed mutual distrust between German and French officials and business leaders, despite entrenched habits of cooperation.

“It’s not an easy dialogue,” said Bruno Le Roux, head of Socialist lawmakers in the French Parliament. “It was on the wrong track for the last couple of years, and the fact that France was in an electoral cycle for a year, and now Germany is in an electoral cycle for a year, doesn’t help.”

Mr. Le Roux, who is close to Mr. Hollande, said that the president had set out to broaden the debate about changing the course of the euro zone by including countries like Italy and Spain that are closer to his approach of “integration with solidarity.”

That had led Ms. Merkel to build bridges with Britain on issues like the E.U. budget, at France’s expense. In the Union’s previous long-term budget, France and Germany cut a deal to preserve the level of E.U. agricultural subsidies — of which the French are the chief beneficiaries. This time around, Berlin gave the cold shoulder to approaches by Paris for a similar pact. In aborted negotiations last month on the 2014-20 budget, Ms. Merkel endorsed lower farm spending despite French pleas. She also backed Britain in its push for deeper cuts in total E.U. expenditure.

Ms. Merkel has expressed public concern about France’s loss of competitiveness. Her finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, last month asked a panel of advisers to make economic proposals for France.

In private, senior German officials worry about Mr. Hollande’s ability to secure support in the Socialist Party for the bold shake-up of labor markets, welfare financing and public spending that experts say France needs after the anti-business rhetoric of his election campaign.

Berlin has watched, aghast, a national drama in France over efforts to save 630 jobs at an ArcelorMittal steel plant, including threats to nationalize an aging plant that was shuttered because of chronic overcapacity in the sector. In German eyes, the furor over the Florange plant epitomizes a lack of economic realism and a reflex for state intervention that run counter to business culture in Germany.

Policy makers in Berlin see Mr. Hollande making a gradual turn toward economic reform, but they have yet to be convinced of his determination to stay the course if resistance grows from the left and trade unions.

French-German tensions over power sharing, industrial policy and the role of the state came to a head in the struggle over European Aeronautic Defense Space. Last month, Berlin prevented a merger between EADS, the parent of Airbus, and the British contractor BAE Systems, fearing that Germany would be overruled by French-British military interests.

Germany then demanded a stake in EADS equal to that held by the French. The result was a shake-up at EADS in which Berlin paid more than $2 billion to buy a stake matching that of France, only to see the role of state shareholders greatly reduced by new governance arrangements at EADS.

The Germans are “obsessed with parity because they are convinced the French want to take over the company, just as the French are convinced the Germans want to take it over,” said a person involved in the negotiations, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Germany is no longer willing to sign the checks while letting France take the lead in Europe, as it did in the past to atone for World War II or to ease the way for German unification.

EADS is a paradigm for wider difficulties in relations, because of the mutual suspicion and because of Berlin’s determination to assert its increased power in a venture in which the French previously had the upper hand.

Mr. Hollande argues that each step toward integration in the euro zone should be preceded by an increase in “solidarity” — code for Germany’s doing more to support the weaker southern states. In contrast, Ms. Merkel insists that there must be greater central control of national budgetary and economic policies to ensure they respect E.U. rules before any sharing of liabilities.

Mr. Hollande advocates common euro zone bonds to help pay off those countries’ accumulated debts. He also wants joint deposit insurance in which German depositors and taxpayers would underwrite shaky banks in other euro zone states. Both ideas are anathema in Germany, at least this side of the election and probably for much longer.

Annoyed by Mr. Hollande’s perceived attempts to isolate her, Ms. Merkel has reached out to other partners to strengthen her hand in European negotiations. In an essay titled “After Merkozy, how France and Germany can make Europe work,” Ulrike Guérot and Thomas Klau of the European Council on Foreign Relations recount how Berlin lines up support from the Dutch and Finns — fellow north European AAA-rated nations — before dealing with the French.

“We call the French only once we have established a common position among our group of like-minded countries,” they quoted a German official involved in financial negotiations as saying. “Once we start speaking with the French, then the trouble starts.”

Paul Taylor is a Reuters correspondent.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/business/global/rebalancing-the-french-german-partnership.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Awakening in the Glow of a Bloomberg Terminal

Gone are the days when traders showed up to work just before the New York Stock Exchange opened at 9:30 a.m. Now, Wall Street has an unofficial opening bell: the 2:30 a.m. alarm clock.

“We have a new credo: carpe noctem — seize the night,” said Douglas A. Kass, a hedge fund manager who routinely sets his alarm for precisely that time to scan the headlines coming out of Europe. All last week, the musings of the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and other European leaders put the markets on edge. “You are almost forced to get up and watch the goings-on,” he added.

The nest of night owls is growing more crowded. Senior executives at the Pacific Investment Management Company, the giant bond-trading house, wake up at 1 a.m. in Southern California, to check their BlackBerrys for updates from colleagues in Europe.

“Your nerves are twitching,” said Christian Stracke, Pimco’s global head of credit research.

Michael Mayo, a longtime bank stock analyst, said he was working the lobster shift so often just to keep up with the latest International Monetary Fund rescue or Slovenian parliamentary vote that he might as well call himself a 24-hour-a-day research shop. “Who would have thought we would have to be looking at Italian sovereign debt yields to figure out what Morgan Stanley’s stock will do?” he said.

For traders, there is too much to lose if they sleep through history.

That’s why Craig Gorman, a partner at First New York Securities, routinely monitors his trading positions in the middle of the night. He turns on CNBC and fires up the Bloomberg terminal with six screens at the foot of his bed. “With the TV and all my monitors on, it gets a little bright in there,” he said. “My wife is not thrilled about it.”

The other downside? It is hard to fall back asleep once the adrenaline from trading starts pumping. Even so, Mr. Gorman said it was worth the price: “You can’t get the same feel for market psychology looking back at the charts in the morning as when you are up,” he added.

News organizations and brokerage firms see an uptick in early-morning activity, too. Bloomberg reports at least a 30 percent jump from a year ago in the use of its mobile applications, which allow customers to remotely log into the trading terminal at their office desk. The biggest spikes have occurred well before the New York markets open, between 5 and 7 a.m., when traders wake up and commute to work, as well as between midnight and 3 a.m., when trading in Asia winds down and the European markets open, according to company officials.

CNBC has recorded a 50 percent increase in the tiny audience watching “Worldwide Exchange,” which broadcasts between 4 and 6 a.m. Traffic on its Web site between 2 and 5 a.m. has risen about 30 percent compared with a year ago.

There are also signs that predawn trading by American retail investors has increased. TD Ameritrade, which caters to individual investors, said customer trading volume in S. P. futures — a bet on the coming day’s direction in the market — has more than doubled between 3 and 6 a.m. over the last year.

Wall Street has long been the land of the early riser, and plenty of fixations in high finance have come and gone. In the late 1970s and 1980s, traders obsessed over the state of the money supply; in the late 1990s, they focused on rapidly rising Web page views of the leading dot-com companies. Last year, traders acted like armchair engineers in deep-water drilling as they monitored images of the BP oil spill gushing into the Gulf of Mexico.

Whether or not Europe’s new plan struck on Friday to achieve budgetary discipline brings market stability, some suggest that the current middle-of-the-night frenzy heralds a lasting change for an industry that coined the term “bankers’ hours.”

“It is now making people aware that they can become a global trader,” said J. J. Kinahan, the chief derivatives strategist for TD Ameritrade. “They don’t have to rely on the hours of the New York Stock Exchange” between 9:30 a.m. and 4 p.m. Eastern time.

Several forces are at play. The convergence of mobile technology and financial information allows investors to trade on news — anywhere, anytime. The markets, meanwhile, have grown so interconnected that what happens with sovereign bonds can quickly affect equities.

Any whiff of trouble in Europe can send markets into a tailspin and easily overwhelm the hard-earned edge a trader might have gained by digging deep into the financials of an individual stock.

“The degree to which asset prices are connected is off the charts,” said Dean Curnutt, the president of Macro Risk Advisors and another early riser.

That is the main reason that Brad Alford, the chief investment officer of Alpha Capital in Atlanta, rolls over in bed, grabs his iPad and glances at the Bloomberg market feeds with one eye, sometimes two, before the sun comes up. Or why Mr. Kass trudges over to his poolside home office in Palm Beach, Fla., to e-mail hedge fund friends about the latest troubled country du jour. “There is a pretty active cabal in those early hours,” he said.

It is also why Al Moniz, a European bond fund manager at Fore Research and Management in New York, has been waking up at 2 a.m. at least several times a month, and expects even more bleary-eyed nights next year.

“It is probably going to get worse,” he said. “I don’t think there is any end in sight.”

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=674d7777421f78387b765cef72ddfeae

Economix Blog: Pay for Our Mistakes? Not Us

It is nice to have the power to never have to pay for your errors. To get that kind of clout, you have to have a credible threat to make the rest of the world miserable if you are inconvenienced.

FLOYD NORRIS

FLOYD NORRIS

Notions on high and low finance.

Financial markets have that power, as we learned in 2008. The decision to allow Lehman Brothers to fail stunned Wall Street, and a credit crisis took down the world economy. In the aftermath, lenders to other banks, even those that failed, were not forced to suffer losses.

The decision to allow Lehman to fail seems to have had at least some ideological component. It isn’t capitalism if you can’t fail. But practicality prevailed thereafter.

This year, the decision to force private lenders to take 50 percent haircuts on loans to Greece was promptly followed by plunging prices on Spanish and Italian bonds. It was Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, who led the charge for making the banks pay, for similar reasons to the ones heard when Lehman went down. Now Europe is contemplating huge capital shortfalls for its banks, and Ms. Merkel has backed down.

Bloomberg reports:

“As regards private-sector involvement, we have made a major change in our doctrine: from now on we will strictly adhere to the I.M.F. principles and doctrines,” EU President Herman Van Rompuy told reporters at a briefing. “Or, to put it more bluntly, our first approach to P.S.I., which had a very negative effect on debt markets, is now officially over.”

The I.M.F. — the International Monetary Fund — tells me that those policies and doctrines provide for no automatic losses for the private sector, but do not rule them out either. Instead, there is to be a case-by-case analysis. William Murray, the I.M.F. spokesman, says this 2010 program for Jamaica is the most recent one, other than Greece, where private lenders did take haircuts.

So you could say that there really is no promise to spare the banks. But I suspect the reality is that the recent experience has traumatized Europe enough that it will be a very long time before anyone suggests that banks should suffer for foolish lending to a member of the European Union.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=fb605f7c6e080c5d239647b8a6d21f46

Op-Ed Contributor: To Ease the Crisis, Tax Financial Transactions

IT has been three years since the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the start of a financial crisis that still casts a dark cloud over the global economy.

Governments, both rich and poor, urgently need a way to calm speculation in the financial markets and to raise revenue. On Wednesday, the European Commission president, José Manuel Barroso, proposed a tax on financial transactions. Such a measure, already supported by the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, is long overdue.

Indeed, a tax of just 0.05 percent levied on each stock, bond, derivative or currency transaction would be aimed at financial institutions’ casino-style trading, which helped precipitate the economic crisis. Because these markets are so vast, the tax could raise hundreds of billions of dollars a year globally for cash-strapped governments and could increase development aid. 

The global economic storm may have sprung from the high-pressure trading rooms and overheating economies of developed countries, but its effects have also been felt far away. Any additional revenue raised by a financial transaction tax should therefore be devoted not only to shoring up slumping economies in rich nations but also to helping the world’s poorest countries.

While the rich world remains preoccupied with its own economic problems, the World Bank estimated last year that 64 million people in low- and middle-income countries had been forced into extreme poverty — living on less than $1.25 a day — as a result of the food, fuel and financial crises. And poor countries have been hit by their own budgetary pressures. Cuts to life-saving health services, schools and support for poor farmers are already taking place. Research for Oxfam last year suggested that 56 low-income countries faced a combined budget shortfall of $65 billion as a result of lower domestic tax revenues, export earnings and aid. If the world economy dips for a second time, the consequences are likely to be devastating.

At the time when poor countries need outside assistance the most, aid budgets are shrinking, damaging progress toward the Millennium Development Goals of reducing avoidable deaths, hunger and poverty.

Traditional donors must stand by the poorest in bad times as well as good. And we must move beyond the old paradigm of aid to a 21st-century solution. A new architecture of development assistance should provide stable, reliable and robust revenue streams that can weather global economic storms and changing political landscapes.

The financial markets themselves can provide such solutions. In 2006, Unitaid, an international agency based at the World Health Organization in Geneva, introduced the world’s first innovative tax for development — a small levy on airline tickets, usually about $2, that in its first five years has raised around $2 billion to help save lives by providing treatment for H.I.V./AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.

There is an urgent need to expand such solutions. It is fair, given its role in precipitating the economic crisis, to look to the largest and most profitable industry in the world — the financial sector — to play its part.

Calls for an international F.T.T., or financial transactions tax, are now increasing in Europe. Germany, Spain, Portugal and Belgium publicly support it. And Mr. Sarkozy has made it a priority for France’s presidency of the Group of 20, ahead of its crucial November meeting.

Fears about the feasibility of an F.T.T. are overblown. Indeed, more than 40 such taxes have already been put in place around the globe. Britain, for example, has a very successful F.T.T. on shares — known as the stamp duty — which raises more than $6 billion a year and has not had a significant impact on the competitiveness of London’s finance sector. Other countries could likewise institute this tax without harming major financial firms.

If more countries introduce F.T.T.’s, it is essential that the tax be used not only to plug holes in European budgets. A financial crisis that began in the trading rooms of New York and London has pushed farmers in Nepal below the poverty line and cost young girls in Zambia their schooling. The problem is global, and our response must be global, too.

We must seize the opportunity to ensure that some of the financial sector’s extraordinary wealth is harnessed to protect and benefit the world’s poorest people.

Philippe Douste-Blazy, the French foreign minister from 2005 to 2007, is the chairman of Unitaid and a special adviser to the United Nations secretary general on innovative financing.

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: September 29, 2011

An earlier version of this Op-Ed misstated the usual levy on airline tickets. It is about $2, not about $5.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/opinion/to-ease-the-crisis-tax-financial-transactions.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Greek Rescue Plan May Allow for Default on Some Debt

Details of the agreement, reached early Thursday in Berlin after seven hours of talks, were not disclosed. The talks had centered on the role private investors and banks would have to play in stabilizing Greece’s finances and reducing a debt burden that threatens to stifle any prospect of economic recovery.

A statement from the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, said they had “listened” to the views of the president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, who flew in from Frankfurt unexpectedly to join the meeting.

Though it did not say if they had settled the issue of whether Greece should be allowed to write down some of its debt — something Mr. Trichet has argued publicly and adamantly against — suggestions ahead of the summit meeting in Brussels were that the E.C.B had softened its stance.

“The demand to prevent a selective default has been removed,” the Dutch Finance Minister Jan Kees de Jager told the Dutch parliament in The Hague, Reuters reported.

Were Mr. Trichet to accept a temporary default, the euro-zone leaders may have to consider new ways to ensure that Greek banks could access funding that they currently receive from the E.C.B, possibly by guaranteeing Greek bonds themselves for a short period.

The euro and European stocks rallied on news of a potential deal, while the risk premium investors demand to hold the weaker euro zone bonds rather than benchmark German ones fell.

The French-German agreement was being presented to the other leaders of the 17 member euro zone in Brussels. The summit meeting was called after days market turbulence in which borrowing costs spiked in Italy and Spain, raising fears the euro debt crisis would spread to those, much bigger countries, potentially setting off another global financial crisis.

Representatives of big European banks were said to be in Brussels in parallel meetings, said one official not authorized to speak publicly.

Germany, Finland and the Netherlands have been at odds with the E.C.B. and some governments over their insistence that private bondholders share the pain. Besides concerns over contagion, the central bank has said that a selective default would make it impossible to accept Greek bonds as collateral.

“Selective default” is a term used by credit rating agencies when the terms of a bond, such as the repayment deadline or interest rate, have been altered. It falls short of an outright default rating, which is usually triggered when the borrower stops making payments.

Many saw the summit meeting as a moment of truth, particularly for Mrs. Merkel, whose caution has been blamed by some for the region’s failure to stem the crisis.

The central elements of the package are expected to be a buyback of Greek bonds, probably financed via the euro zone bailout fund known as the European Financial Stability Facility, the official said. That would reduce the stock of Greek debt by around 20 percentage points of gross domestic product.

The official said the final statement from the summit meeting would remain relatively vague on the exact extent that banks will “voluntarily” participate in the bailout, for fear that too much commitment now on might spook credit rating agencies, according to another euro area official involved in the talks, who also was not authorized to speak publicly. Details of the private sector involvement will be communicated at a later date, he said.

European leaders are not expected to increase the size of the E.F.S.F., although such a step is not being ruled out for the future, the second official said.

But the final statement is likely to include details of a plan to assist Greece as well through the transfer of more European Union funds earmarked for development, based around infrastructure spending, the official added.

Another element being considered was a plan that would have private creditors swap Greek bonds that mature in the next few years for longer-term ones, but it was less clear if that would be adopted.

Officials suggested that an earlier proposal for a tax on banks had been dropped. This was once seen as a tool for raising private sector financing without provoking a default but posed technical problems since the tax would have to be levied by each national government and would exclude countries that did not use the euro even if they had Greek liabilities.

Asked about the bank tax idea Jean-Claude Juncker, the prime minister of Luxembourg and head of the Eurogroup of finance ministers, said: “I don’t think that there will be an agreement on that.”

In all the Commission wants the euro area and the International Monetary Fund to contribute 71 billion euros, or $100 billion, to the rescue plan, up to 2014.

One element attracting consensus is the need to reduce the burden on indebted nations, not only by buying back Greek bonds but also through a reduction in the interest rates offered to Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which have also accepted international help. The maturities of these loans would also be extended.

As part of the Greek package, Ireland and Portugal — the other two euro countries that have received international bailouts — will receive new, similarly favorable financing conditions on their official loans, the second official said, meaning that they would have to pay the E.F.S.F.’s borrowing rate plus some costs, which are all expected to come in around 3.5 percent.

Ireland will not be required to raise its relatively low corporate tax rate, currently 12.5 percent, as some countries, such as France, had sought, the official said.

“They will have a lower interest rate and extended maturities without giving up anything,” the official said.

Matthew Saltmarsh in London contributed reporting.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=2e05e9c1b0665d6bc3e8552ec4966053

European Leaders Delay Summit Meeting Over Greece

In addition, the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, was crucial in resisting pressure for a meeting on Friday, arguing that it would be too early to deliver the comprehensive package of measures needed to restore stability to the euro zone, one official briefed on the discussion said.

Mrs. Merkel is not opposed to holding a meeting of euro zone leaders soon, said the same official.

Herman Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, hoped to organize the meeting for next Monday or Tuesday, said the official, who was not authorized to speak publicly.

Other diplomats, who also were not authorized to speak publicly, suggested that the date might be later next week.

Meanwhile, the results of stress tests on European banks are due on Friday, promising another difficult landmark in a turbulent few weeks that have included credit downgrades for Portugal and Ireland and a tide of uncertainty engulfing the Italian bond and stock markets.

Pia Ahrenkilde Hansen, a spokeswoman for the European Commission, on Wednesday described as “incomprehensible” a decision Tuesday by the ratings agency Moody’s Investors Service to downgrade Ireland’s credit to junk status.

Another agency, Fitch Ratings, gave Italy a vote of confidence Wednesday despite the recent turmoil there, maintaining its rating on Italian debt. “In the absence of negative shocks, adherence to the fiscal targets set out by the government would be consistent with stabilizing Italy’s sovereign credit profile and rating at AA-,” it said.

Also Wednesday, the International Monetary Fund said that Greece must move quickly and decisively to bring its public debt under control.

“It is essential that the authorities implement their fiscal and privatization agenda in a timely and determined manner,” the fund said in a report, adding that “the debt dynamics show little scope for deviation.”

The backdrop to the continuing uncertainty was the failure of finance ministers from the 17 countries in the euro zone to conclude a comprehensive agreement Monday on a second bailout package for Greece, estimated to be worth 85 billion euros, or $120 billion. The ministers agreed to lighten the burden on debtor countries by reducing their interest rates and extending loan maturities, as well as helping them to buy back their bonds.

Still unresolved is the dispute over the extent to which creditors will have to sacrifice in a second bailout for Greece, and whether Europeans should include bond swaps in the rescue with the accompanying likelihood of it being declared a selective default by credit rating agencies. The European Central Bank opposes such an outcome, arguing that, by allowing the European bailout fund to finance buying back Greek bonds at market rates, private bondholders would be involved, as Germany wishes, but without a risk of default. France has said that any solution must be acceptable to the central bank.

“My bet is there will be some form of summit next week,” said a European official who was not authorized to speak publicly. “And it will go further toward the E.C.B model than to selective default — though there is everything to play for and it all depends on what Mrs. Merkel does.”

In its report on Greece, the I.M.F. highlighted the risk of default for the Greek banking sector, saying that having bondholders participate in any future bailouts “may well generate” a selective default rating for Greece, “although perhaps only for a short period of time.”

Adding to tension this week is anticipation about bank stress tests that will be released on Friday after stock markets close. The tests, which will examine banks’ ability to withstand economic and market shocks, could reinforce fears that many banks remain fragile.

In an indication that more banks may fail than did so last year, the Helaba Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen in Frankfurt conceded on Wednesday that its capital reserves would not meet the threshold to pass.

Helaba complained bitterly, however, that the European Banking Authority, which is conducting the tests, had refused to give the bank credit for state aid it had received, and said it would have passed otherwise.

According to Helaba, the banking agency said it did not have time to scrutinize whether the state aid qualified as core Tier 1 equity.

Germany’s landesbanks, typically owned by state and local governments and local savings institutions, are regarded as a weak spot in the nation’s otherwise powerful economy. They have been among the most vocal critics of the stress tests. All the landesbanks passed the tests last year, a result that contributed to skepticism that the exercise was strict enough.

Hans-Dieter Brenner, the chief executive of Helaba, said in a statement that the banking agency had “without reason pilloried a financial institution that is healthy to the core.” The agency declined to comment.

The I.M.F report released Wednesday on Greece also referred to one, unidentified, smaller bank whose capital fell “well short” of minimum requirements and was exploring the idea of a merger with its major shareholder.

Stephen Castle reported from Brussels and Jack Ewing from Frankfurt.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=5374f5b01cbedbb207fe6ca65206e65c

Memo From Berlin: Germans’ Deep Suspicions of Nuclear Power Reach a Political Tipping Point

No matter that the incipient nuclear catastrophe was about 5,500 miles away, or that Germany, unlike Japan, did not lie on known tectonic fault lines. On the streets of major cities, hundreds of thousands of protesters, casting events in Japan as a portent of what might happen here, turned out ahead of state elections to demand a halt to Germany’s own nuclear power program, the source of nearly a quarter of the nation’s electricity.

Those two intertwined phenomena — angst and electoral maneuvering — led to what seemed one of the most abrupt reversals of Angela Merkel’s years as German chancellor: On Monday, she abandoned plans laid only nine months earlier to extend the life of the country’s nuclear power stations and ordered instead that they be phased out by 2022.

The decision meant that, at Europe’s heart, the Continent’s economic powerhouse had committed itself far more radically than its neighbors to the east or west to replace nuclear power with renewable sources of energy like wind turbines — or at least, critics said, with nuclear-generated power imported from neighbors like France.

But the German move also raised a question whose answer seemed elusive: What is there in this land of 82 million people that has, over decades, bred an aversion to nuclear energy that seems unrivaled among its economic peers, defying its reputation for reasoned debate?

“Just as creationists attempt to ban the theory of evolution from the school books,” said a physicist, Peter Heller, in a Web posting that challenged the national nuclear orthodoxy, “it almost seems as if every factual and neutral explanation in Germany is now in the process of being deleted” from the nuclear debate.

Indeed, said Reinhard Wolf, a professor in Frankfurt, the debate is so passionate that “you are either with us or against us.”

“There is no middle ground,” Professor Wolf said.

The power of antinuclear sentiment has already redrawn the politics of survival for Mrs. Merkel. Recent regional elections in the southern state of Baden-Württemberg and in the northern city-state of Bremen have undermined her conservative Christian Democratic Union to the benefit of the antinuclear Green Party. The Greens’ showing was so strong it seemed that if national elections were held now, they would emerge again as kingmakers, as they were before Mrs. Merkel came to power in 2005.

Within days of that fundamental shift, her energy policy, once firmly based on extending the life of Germany’s nuclear plants, swung around in favor of closing the plants much sooner. As she said after the Fukushima crisis began, events in Japan changed “everything in Germany.”

When Mrs. Merkel on Monday announced her plans to phase out all of Germany’s 17 nuclear reactors, said Gerd Gigerenzer, director of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development here, she courted the danger “that when a government reacts too quickly to an incident like Fukishima, it creates the impression that there is no real reason except winning votes.”

“The government has decided to listen to the anxiety of the people and go to the position where the opposition wants them to go,” Mr. Gigerenzer said in a telephone interview.

Some call the process Merkelism, defined by the columnist Roland Nelles in the weekly Der Spiegel as politics “based on two principles.”

“The first is that, if the people want it, it must be right,” Mr. Nelles wrote. “The second is that whatever is useful to the people must also be useful to the chancellor.”

That calculation seemed borne out by opinion surveys suggesting that around 70 percent of Germans believed that their chancellor was maneuvering for electoral advantage. The same proportion, significantly, said they were prepared to pay higher electricity bills in return for ending nuclear energy.

That again seemed to underscore the way the nuclear debate here draws such apocalyptic comparisons.

“What Sept. 11, 2001, meant for the vulnerability of the West,” the center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung said, for instance, the catastrophe in Japan on March 11, 2011, “will mean for the idea that nuclear power is controllable. That idea can no longer be supported.”

Of course, few modern German reflexes are completely free of what Professor Wolf in Frankfurt called “the German experience” of its Nazi past, which has made many suspicious of the industrialization of destructive forces, whether chemical or nuclear.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=8f91c3475c82c45b1b7dfcd7ccb1b536