cecchetti

Bruce Bartlett held senior policy roles in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and served on the staffs of Representatives Jack Kemp and Ron Paul. He is the author of “The Benefit and the Burden: Tax Reform — Why We Need It and What It Will Take.”

Economists are still searching for answers to the slow growth of the United States economy. Some are now focusing on the issue of “financialization,” the growth of the financial sector as a share of gross domestic product. Financialization is also an important factor in the growth of income inequality, which is also a culprit in slow growth. Recent research is improving our knowledge of financialization, which has yet to get the attention of policy makers.

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According to a new article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives by the Harvard Business School professors Robin Greenwood and David Scharfstein, financial services rose as a share of G.D.P. to 8.3 percent in 2006 from 2.8 percent in 1950 and 4.9 percent in 1980. The following table is taken from their article.

Robin Greenwood and David Scharfstein Data from the National Income and Product Accounts (1947-2009) and the National Economic Accounts (1929-47) are used to compute added value as a percentage of gross domestic product in the United States.

They cite research by Thomas Philippon of New York University and Ariell Reshef of the University of Virginia that compensation in the financial services industry was comparable to that in other industries until 1980. But since then, it has increased sharply and those working in financial services now make 70 percent more on average.

While all economists agree that the financial sector contributes significantly to economic growth, some now question whether that is still the case. According to Stephen G. Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi of the Bank for International Settlements, the impact of finance on economic growth is very positive in the early stages of development. But beyond a certain point it becomes negative, because the financial sector competes with other sectors for scarce resources.

Ozgur Orhangazi of Roosevelt University has found that investment in the real sector of the economy falls when financialization rises. Moreover, rising fees paid by nonfinancial corporations to financial markets have reduced internal funds available for investment, shortened their planning horizon and increased uncertainty.

Adair Turner, formerly Britain’s top financial regulator, has said, “There is no clear evidence that the growth in the scale and complexity of the financial system in the rich developed world over the last 20 to 30 years has driven increased growth or stability.”

He suggests, rather, that the financial sector’s gains have been more in the form of economic rents — basically something for nothing — than the return to greater economic value.

Another way that the financial sector leeches growth from other sectors is by attracting a rising share of the nation’s “best and brightest” workers, depriving other sectors like manufacturing of their skills.

The rising share of income going to financial assets also contributes to labor’s falling share. As illustrated in the following chart from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, that share has fallen 12 percentage points since its recent peak in early 2001 and even more from its historical level from the 1950s through the 1970s.

Labor Share of Nonfarm Business Sector

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor

The falling labor share results from various factors, including globalization, technology and institutional factors like declining unionization. But according to a new report from the International Labor Organization, a United Nations agency, financialization is by far the largest contributor in developed economies (see Page 52).

The report estimates that 46 percent of labor’s falling share resulted from financialization, 19 percent from globalization, 10 percent from technological change and 25 percent from institutional factors.

This phenomenon is a major cause of rising income inequality, which itself is an important reason for inadequate growth. As the entrepreneur Nick Hanauer pointed out at a Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee hearing on June 6, the income of the middle class is critical to economic growth because of its buying power. Mr. Hanauer believes consumption is really what drives growth; business people like him invest and create jobs to take advantage of middle-class demands for goods and services, which must be supported by good-paying jobs and rising incomes.

According to research by the economists Jon Bakija, Adam Cole and Bradley T. Heim, financialization is a principal driver of the rising share of income going to the ultrawealthy – the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution.

Research by the University of Michigan sociologist Greta R. Krippner supports this position. She notes that financialization exacerbates the well-known problem of corporate ownership and control: while corporate assets are owned by shareholders, they are controlled by managers who often extract an excessive share of corporate profits for themselves.

One main source of income for financial executives is fees paid to financial asset managers, according to the Princeton economist Burton G. Malkiel. Among the best compensated of these are hedge-fund operators, who typically receive 2 percent of the assets under their control plus 20 percent of any increase, annually. (Additionally, they reap special tax benefits that are widely viewed as unjustified.)

Professor Malkiel has long been a fierce critic of actively managed funds, which seldom deliver better returns than an investor could get by simply buying low-cost index funds. Over the decade ending in 2011, index funds easily outperformed actively managed funds, in part because of the low fees on the former and high fees on the latter.

Among those pointing their fingers at financialization is David Stockman, former director of the Office of Management and Budget, who followed his government service with a long career in finance at Salomon Brothers and elsewhere. Writing in The New York Times, he recently said financialization was “corrosive” and had turned the economy into “a giant casino” where banks skim an oversize share of profits.

It’s not yet clear what public policies are appropriate to deal with the phenomenon of financialization. The important thing at this point is to be aware of it, which does not yet appear to be the case in Washington.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/financialization-as-a-cause-of-economic-malaise/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Mr. Hildebrand, the president of the Swiss central bank, was called “arrogant” and “egotistical” by bankers quoted anonymously in the pages of Swiss newspapers. His supposed sin: Wanting banks to hold extra capital. The fact that Mr. Hildebrand was himself a former hedge fund manager in New York seemed only to heighten the sense that he had betrayed his profession.

“He’ll never find another job in Switzerland,” the Swiss newspaper Der Sonntag quoted an unnamed high-ranking banker as threatening Mr. Hildebrand in 2010.

The unusually bitter attacks on a central bank chief were a measure of what was at stake. Mr. Hildebrand, 48, had a high-visibility role in a struggle between bankers trying to preserve their most lucrative business practices and regulators trying to defuse a system that, many believe, nearly blew up the world economy.

“Many of us on the public side had to deal with industry push-back, at times amplified by public coverage,” Mr. Hildebrand said. “One lesson that emerges is that the capacity of the financial industry to lobby for its short-term interests is far reaching.”

The debate centers on an international accord that most people outside the industry have never heard of, the so-called Basel III rules. The core issue and main point of dispute is capital — the money that banks accumulate through issuing stock and holding onto profits, money that they do not have to repay. The regulators want banks to finance their operations with more capital and less borrowed money. Advocates argue that the bigger the capital buffer, the greater the stability of the financial system. But financing operations from capital, rather than borrowing money, is less profitable, and that means lower bonuses.

“In the financial crisis the banks got the upside and the public got the downside,” said Stephen G. Cecchetti, head of the monetary and economic department of the Bank for International Settlements, in Basel, Switzerland. The bank houses the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the secretive panel that establishes global banking standards. “We want to make sure that doesn’t happen again.”

After some fierce battles, proponents of the tighter rules have achieved some success in pushing through measures that will force banks to reduce risk. The Federal Reserve on Tuesday published draft regulations that draw heavily on the agreements reached in Basel. But there is a long phase-in period that the banking industry could use to try to water down the rules. And many economists fear that the new regulatory regime still allows banks to take outsize risks.

Flaws in earlier Basel rules, known as Basel II, allowed the financial crisis to gather in the first place, many economists say, enabling the illusion that banks were comfortably cushioned against risk. In fact, the banks had badly underestimated the malignant potential of their holdings. Faulty regulation also worsened the European sovereign debt crisis, assigning government bonds virtually zero risk. That encouraged banks to extend billions in credit to countries like Greece and Italy, setting up a dangerous correlation between the solvency of countries and the health of banks. The thinking, in effect, was “Why imprison capital to insure against losses that were unlikely ever to happen?”

The technical term was “risk weighted assets.” It was as if a homeowner only had to make a down payment on the part of a house that might catch fire. Other parts of the property, like the swimming pool and the lawn, would not count.

The flaws in this model became obvious in the days after investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008. Banks that appeared to be well capitalized discovered that they had hugely underestimated risk. Derivatives tied to the United States real estate market, with top credit ratings, suddenly became impossible to sell and effectively worthless.

One of the most vivid examples was right around the corner from Mr. Hildebrand’s office in Zurich, the Swiss bank UBS. In the years before the crisis, UBS was, on paper, one of the best capitalized banks in the world. But in the course of 2008 UBS rapidly depleted its cushion as it absorbed losses from investments in the American real estate market.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=315a259c5d3e0adb4fd28cadaf4e81f2

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