May 8, 2024

Economic View: Pigovian Taxes May Offer Economic Hope

NO one enjoys paying taxes — and no politician relishes raising them. Yet some taxes actually make us better off, even apart from the revenue they provide for public services.

Taxes on activities with harmful side effects are a case in point. Strongly favored even by many conservative Republican economists, these levies are known as Pigovian taxes, after the British economist Arthur C. Pigou, who advocated them in his 1920 book, “The Economics of Welfare.” In today’s deeply polarized political climate, they offer one of the few realistic hopes for progress.

To see how Pigovian taxes work, consider a driver checking out the offerings at his local auto dealership. He is trying to decide between two vehicles, one weighing 6,000 pounds and the other, 4,000 pounds. After comparing sticker prices, mileage estimates and other features, he views the choice as roughly a tossup. But because he has a slight preference for the larger vehicle, he buys it. His decision, however, could be viewed as a bad choice for society as a whole, because of the side effects. The laws of physics tell us that heavier vehicles tend to cause more damage in crashes. They also spew more emissions into the air and cause more wear and tear on roads.

By providing an incentive to take those external costs into account, taxing vehicles by weight would make the total economic pie larger. Those who don’t really need heavier vehicles could buy lighter ones and pay less tax. Others could pay the extra tax as fair compensation for their heavier vehicles’ negative side effects.

But the mere fact that Pigovian taxes produce greater benefits than costs doesn’t make them an easy sell politically. Like other changes in public policy, a Pigovian tax produces winners and losers. And it’s an iron law of politics that prospective losers lobby harder to block change than prospective winners do for its adoption. That asymmetry creates a powerful status-quo bias that makes even broadly beneficial policy changes hard to achieve.

Yet, in principle, any change that makes the economic pie larger makes it possible for everyone to enjoy a bigger slice than before. The practical challenge is to slice the larger pie so that everyone comes out ahead. A first step toward a vehicle-weight tax would be to make it revenue-neutral — for example, by returning its revenue in the form of lump-sum rebates to each buyer. That would soften the blow, while preserving the incentive to buy lighter vehicles.

For example, if the tax were 20 cents a pound, a 6,000-pound vehicle would be taxed at $1,200, as opposed to $800 for a 4,000-pound one. If an equal number of vehicles of each weight were sold, all buyers would get a $1,000 rebate when the total tax income was redistributed. The buyer in our example would thus be making a net payment of $200 because of the tax, but his total outlay would have been $400 lower if he’d bought the smaller vehicle instead.

Although revenue neutrality would help, buyers who really need large vehicles might feel aggrieved. Paradoxically, the key to mollifying them is to propose Pigovian taxes not just on vehicle weight but also on a swath of other activities that cause undue harm to others. We could drivers tax contributing to traffic congestion, for example, on the grounds that entering a crowded roadway causes delays to others. We could tax noise, carbon emissions and other specific forms of air and water pollution. Although some people would end up as losers under any single one of these measures, virtually everyone would come out ahead under a broad suite of Pigovian taxes.

That’s because adopting a large number of them is like repeated flips of a coin whose odds are stacked heavily in your favor. If someone offered a chance to flip a coin that paid $10 for heads and lost $1 for tails, would you take it? It’s an attractive gamble, obviously, but if there is only a single flip, there’s a 50 percent chance that you’ll be a loser. After many flips, however, you’d almost certainly be a net winner.

Likewise, any single Pigovian tax is an attractive gamble for the average taxpayer, who would get a rebate equal to the amount she’d paid in tax and would benefit from the resulting reduction in harm. Under a collection of such taxes, the odds of being a net winner go up sharply. Only the minuscule minority who cause much more than average amounts of harm in almost every category might end up paying more total tax than before. And even those few would still be net winners, because of the corresponding reductions in harm.

A BROAD slate of Pigovian taxes would thus meet the challenge of how to divide the larger pie so everyone comes out ahead. And because the prospect of a continued divided government makes short-run legislative progress unlikely on other fronts, why not pick this low-hanging fruit right now?

The case for Pigovian taxes isn’t easily reduced to bumper-sticker slogans. Still, the basic ideas are not complicated, and President Obama has the biggest megaphone on the planet. It should be easy for him to persuade rational voters to embrace policies that would make virtually everyone better off.

But he must also persuade House Republicans. Getting their votes will be the real test of his celebrated rhetorical skills.

Robert H. Frank is an economics professor at the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/business/pigovian-taxes-may-offer-economic-hope.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix Blog: Weekend Business Podcast: European Debt, Bank Fees and Beats Headphones

New governments have been installed in Italy and Greece and Greek debt restructuring is under way, but European credit markets remain shaky.

One cause may be the questions that are being raised about the status of credit default swaps that were bought as insurance in the event of a Greek default, Gretchen Morgenson says on the new Weekend Business podcast.

In her column in Sunday Business, she says that not all the holders of Greek bonds have agreed to take a “voluntary” discount, or haircut, on the debt. Some of them bought credit default swaps that, they believed, provided insurance in the event of a Greek default. If that insurance provides solid protection, then it may not be in their interest to agree to a reduction in the value of their bonds. But the usefulness of the credit default swaps isn’t entirely clear in this situation, adding another layer of difficulty to resolving the Greek crisis.

In a separate discussion, Richard Thaler, the behavioral economist, says that while business executives realize that they shouldn’t allow their companies to become the butt of jokes on late-night talk shows, many of them don’t seem to know how to act on that principle. A case in point, he says, is the recent controversy over Bank of America’s decision to impose a fee for use of its debt cards — a fee that was later scrapped. In the Economic View column in Sunday Business, he writes that customers tend to be outraged when businesses appear to be “gouging” them. And people may get that impression when businesses begin to charge for services that had previously been free.

In another conversation on the podcast, David Gillen and Andrew Martin talk about the pricey Beats headphones being purveyed by Dr. Dre, the hip-hop artist, in a new business venture.

You can find specific segments of the podcast at these junctures: Gretchen Morgenson on European debt (27:05); news headlines (18:05); Beats headphones (14:32); Richard Thaler (7:25); the week ahead (1:49).

You can download the program by subscribing from The New York Times’s podcast page or directly from iTunes.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=555c4387e6f82b5111eb48565133c0e6

Economic View: Business Investment as a Key to Recovery

• The economy is in bad shape. Technically, the recession ended in June 2009, and since then the economy has been recovering. But it doesn’t feel that way to many Americans. Things have stopped getting worse, but they have not gotten much better. The recovery has been so meager that unemployment lingers at historically high levels.

• The disappointing news about job creation is closely linked to lackluster growth in G.D.P. Economists call the relationship between growth and unemployment “Okun’s Law,” after Arthur Okun, who studied it in the 1960s. In essence, Okun’s Law says that to reduce the unemployment rate, we need for gross domestic product to grow by more than its long-run average rate of about 3 percent. So far in 2011, the growth rate has been less than 1 percent.

• The most volatile component of G.D.P. over the business cycle is spending on investment goods. This spending category includes equipment, software, inventory accumulation, and residential and nonresidential construction. And the recent economic downturn offers this case in point about the problem: From the economy’s peak in the fourth quarter of 2007 to the recession’s official end, G.D.P. fell by only 5.1 percent, while investment spending fell by a whopping 34 percent.

• The subpar recovery has coincided with a historically weak investment recovery. Compare our recent experience with that of the early 1980s, when the nation last experienced a deep economic downturn in which unemployment topped 10 percent. That recession ended in the fourth quarter of 1982. In the subsequent two years, investment spending grew by a total of 54 percent. By contrast, in the first two years of this recovery, it grew by half that amount.

• While the sluggish housing market can explain the slow pace of residential investment, it is not the whole story. Business investment has also been weak. Over the last two years, nonresidential fixed investment has grown by only 12 percent, whereas during the two years after the 1982 recession, it grew by 27 percent. Similarly, the narrow category of spending on business equipment and software fell more than twice as much in this recession as it did in the 1982 recession, and it has been slower to recover.

So much for what we know for sure. Now comes the hard part: what to make of these facts.

Advocates of traditional fiscal stimulus often view low levels of investment as a symptom, rather than a cause, of the weak recovery. Businesses are reluctant to invest, they argue, because they lack customers eager to spend. If the government can goose demand by handing out dollars to households short on cash, or by buying goods and services directly, businesses will respond by expanding their own spending as well.

Yet fluctuations in investment spending, rather than being only a passive response, are also one of the driving forces of the booms and busts of the business cycle. The great economist John Maynard Keynes suggested that investment spending is in part determined by the “animal spirits” of investors, which he described as “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction.” Recessions occur when optimism turns to pessimism, and businesses are reluctant to place bets on a prosperous future. Recovery occurs when investor confidence returns.

To be sure, both points of view may well be true. The relationship between investment and the overall economy is what an engineer would call a positive feedback loop. Greater business investment would increase hiring, both by those who produce the investment goods and those who buy them. Greater employment would mean more workers taking home paychecks, which in turn would increase the overall demand for goods and services. When businesses saw more customers coming through their doors, they would then increase investment spending yet again.

WHAT can policy makers do to stoke animal spirits and encourage businesses to invest?

One obvious step would be a cut in the taxation of income from corporate capital. According to a 2008 study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Corporate taxes are found to be most harmful for growth.” Tax reform that reduced the burden on capital income and shifted it toward consumption would improve prospects for long-run growth and, in so doing, encourage greater investment today.

Yet it would be overly optimistic to think that any single public policy, by itself, could lead to the kind of robust investment spending seen in previous recoveries. Myriad government actions influence the expected future profitability of capital. These include not only policies concerning taxation but also those concerning trade and regulation.

For example, passing the free trade agreement with South Korea, which has languished in Congress more than four years after first being negotiated, would be a step in the right direction. So would reining in the National Labor Relations Board; its decision to block Boeing from opening a nonunion plant in South Carolina may have been hailed by organized labor, but it surely did not hearten investors.

Economists often rely on the convenient shortcut of separating long-run and short-run issues. Recessions are then viewed as short-run problems that require short-run solutions. That approach, however, may be simplistic. Lack of investment spending is a large part of the economy’s current difficulties, but capital investments are always made with an eye toward the future.

The best fix for our short-run problems may be to focus on policies that will foster long-run growth as well.

N. Gregory Mankiw is a professor of economics at Harvard. He is advising Mitt Romney, the former governor of Massachusetts, in the campaign for the Republican presidential nomination.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=1f58460725faf7b5ef7333003032d001