November 15, 2024

DealBook: Investing in Good Governance

The Rules columnist says that by 2001, the stock market seems to have learned to price how good-governance and poor-governance companies.Beth A. Keiser/Associated PressThe Rules columnist says that by 2001, the stock market seems to have learned to price how good-governance and poor-governance companies.

Can investors generally beat the market by concentrating their portfolios on companies that practice good corporate governance? There is evidence that good-governance features included in standard governance indexes do improve the performance of companies – but that their significance is already reflected in market prices.

In a well-known study issued a decade ago, Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick identified a trading strategy that would have produced abnormally high returns in the 1990s. The strategy was based on an index, the G-Index, consisting of 24 governance provisions that weaken shareholder rights.

In a subsequent study, Alma Cohen, Allen Ferrell and I showed that, among the 24 provisions, only six – including staggered boards, poison pills and supermajority requirements – really mattered. As a result, we constructed an E-Index based on these six “entrenching” provisions.

Those studies showed that buying shares in the 1990s of companies that scored well on the governance indexes and shorting companies that scored poorly would have beaten the market. The correlation between governance and stock returns has attracted interest from researchers, and the G-Index and E-Index have subsequently been used in hundreds of studies by financial economists.

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In a recent study that will be published by The Journal of Financial Economics, Alma Cohen, Charles Wang and I document that the correlation between governance and stock returns in the 1990s did not persist in later years. This correlation disappeared because markets learned to distinguish between good-governance and poor-governance firms (as defined by the governance indexes) and to price the difference into stock values.

We show that many relevant players – institutional investors, researchers and the media – started paying more attention to corporate governance in the 1990s – and that this trend accelerated in the early 2000s. From 2000 to 2002, the number of articles related to governance that appeared in major newspapers in the United States tripled, and the number of governance-related proposals submitted by institutional investors more than doubled. These and other barometers of interest in governance have remained high since then.

The increase in attention to governance had an impact. By 2001, the stock market seems to have learned to price how good-governance and poor-governance companies differ in their expected profitability.

The reaction of stock prices to earnings announcements indicated whether the release surprised the market. We found that, from 1990 to 2001 but not in later years , the earnings announcement of good-governance companies were more likely than those of poor-governance companies to surprise the market positively.

Over all, our study concluded that, during the 1990s, investors gradually learned to appreciate the difference between the good-governance and poor-governance companies. As a result, investors pushed up the stock prices of companies with good governance relative to those with poor governance. Once stock prices came to reflect this difference, it was no longer possible to use the governance indexes to outperform the market.

Does that mean that governance provisions in these indexes became irrelevant for investor interests? Not at all. We found that, as was the case in the 1990s, companies scoring well on these indexes continued to have a higher return on assets, net profit margin and sales growth in the 2000s than poorly scoring companies in their industry.

Good-governance companies also continued to have a higher Tobin’s Q – a standard measure based on the ratio of market capitalization to book value that financial economists use. Thus, the provisions in the governance indexes remain important for the value and performance of companies even if they are already factored into market prices.

Are there any ways left for investors to make money from governance? Yes. Some governance arrangements outside the governance indexes might not be priced yet, and investors could look for them. Our findings indicate that markets might require significant time to recognize fully, and incorporate into prices, the significance of certain governance arrangements.

As to the arrangements in the standard indexes whose significance is already recognized, investors would do well to encourage companies to make changes expected to improve value and performance. For example, shareholders could seek removal of entrenching provisions, like staggered boards and supermajority requirements, at the many companies that still have them.

Such changes may not enable some shareholders to outperform others, but they could benefit all the shareholders of these companies, as well as the economy. Governance is and will remain consequential for the wealth of shareholders and the value of companies.

This article is based on a study, Learning and the Disappearing Association between Governance and Returns, that Mr. Bebchuck co-authored with Alma Cohen and Charles Wang.


Lucian A. Bebchuk is the William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman professor of law, economics and finance, and director of the Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School. He is also a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. His research — which focuses on corporate governance, law and finance, and law and economics — is available on his SSRN page.

Article source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/investing-in-good-governance/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix Blog: Share of Men in Labor Force at All-Time Low

CATHERINE RAMPELL

CATHERINE RAMPELL

Dollars to doughnuts.

Friday’s jobs report for August was chock full of all sorts of bad news. Among the most distressing: The share of men actively participating in the labor force — that is, working or looking for work — was at an all-time low.

Source: Bureau of Labor StatisticsSource: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Just 69.8 percent of all men over age 16 were in the labor force in August, compared to a long-term average of 78.3 percent since the Labor Department began tracking these data in 1948. The share has been falling pretty steadily over the last six decades but has declined sharply in the last few years.

Some of this could be attributed to the fact that the country has been aging, so more people are of retirement age. But the participation rate has also fallen dramatically for men of prime working age, 25-54:

Source: Bureau of Labor StatisticsSource: Bureau of Labor Statistics

There are many competing (or in some cases complementary) arguments for why the share of men in the labor force has been declining.

For example, a lot of traditionally male jobs, in industries like manufacturing and construction, have disappeared, and many of the men who were displaced gave up looking for work when they couldn’t find similar jobs.

The federal disability rolls have also skyrocketed, and when people go on disability, they rarely return to the labor force:

Additionally, the share of women in the labor force rose steadily from the 1940s to the late 1990s. There is some debate about what effect this had on men’s employment. Most economists I’ve spoken with have argued that women were not “taking” men’s jobs, especially since for a long time “women’s work” was distinctly different from “men’s work” and the total employment pie was growing. At the very least, though, the entrance of more women into the job market theoretically made it less essential for married men to work, even if women tend to be in much lower-paying jobs.

What say you, readers? Why do you think the share of men working has fallen so dramatically?

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/share-of-men-in-labor-force-at-all-time-low/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Bucks Blog: The Latin American Alternative

The stock market has been volatile, to say the least, for much of this year, as investors follow each bit of news about the finances of countries in the euro zone. Some investors, looking for an alternative, have started to consider Latin America, Paul Sullivan writes in his Wealth Matters column this week — quite a turn of events since the 1990s and early 2000s, when countries there were in dire financial straits.

The question now, he writes, is whether Latin America’s economies are now on solid footing or whether they’re in the midst of a boom and bust cycle, typical of the past.

Have you looked at Latin American investments lately? The investment strategists he spoke to agreed that investors there had to keep their eyes open. What do you think?

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=c289f34b790cfa5a8b84ea9b1bb4d3e9

Economix: Financial Lobbying and the Housing Crisis

Today's Economist

Casey B. Mulligan is an economics professor at the University of Chicago.

A recent update to a continuing study finds a link between bailouts and the lobbying of the financial industry.

It is sometimes asserted that the housing boom of the first half of the last decade was largely a result of easy credit by the Federal Reserve – that low interest rates made it too easy for too many people to borrow to purchase a new, bigger home.

But interest rates were only a bit lower in the decade than they were in the 1990s, when there was not a housing boom. By the standards of the 1990s, one might expect the somewhat lower interest rates of the last decade to elevate housing prices only a bit (as I have estimated; Edward Glaeser of Harvard and his co-authors have, as well), rather than the much sharper increase that actually occurred.

It’s also true that bank lending standards were relaxed during the housing boom, with risky borrowers allowed to purchase homes, and all kinds of borrowers allowed to purchase homes with little money down. But as Professor Glaeser has frequently noted, for instance in this post, the housing boom is not primary explained by easy credit.

Even if interest rates and lending standards had been the same in the last decade as they were in the 1990s, however, a crisis might still have been brewing, because interest rates should have been higher during the housing boom than they were before.

Housing prices were elevated during the boom (in part for the reasons cited above) and, by comparison with the 1990s, this made it more likely that — if and when housing prices came back down — even high-income borrowers making 20 percent down payments would default. With default more likely, interest rates needed to be higher, even for high-income borrowers putting 20 percent down.

The study, by Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, Thierry Tressel, three economists at the International Monetary Fund, suggests that implicit subsidies and a lack of regulation helped make it possible for lenders to offer lower rates on mortgages that were increasingly likely to default. My fellow Economix blogger Simon Johnson has also noted the interplay of political influence on regulation and finance.

The study by the I.M.F. economists found that the heaviest lobbying came from lenders making riskier loans and expanding their mortgage business most rapidly during the housing boom. The loans originated by those lenders were, by 2008, more likely to be delinquent.

Most important, lobbying meant access to tax dollars. The lenders lobbying more heavily were 7 percent more likely to receive bailout funds, received larger amounts of those funds, and enjoyed a 27 percent greater increase in their market capitalization in October 2008, the month the bailout program was announced.

The authors did not disentangle the path by which lobbying brought forth bailout funds, but it is likely to have followed some combination of political access enjoyed at the time and the lobbying lenders’ assertions of need — created by the lax lending that had gone before, itself facilitated by lobbying during the housing boom years.

Nobody knows for sure how much of the blame for the housing boom can be put on the federal government, but we’re starting to see how political influence was associated with mortgage lending and, ultimately, with taxpayer subsidization of delinquent and defaulting mortgages.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=4c7c00a6ca86d21c17dd1a6796eef523

Bernanke Discusses Federal Role in Research

“We know less than we would like about which policies work best,” Mr. Bernanke said in remarks to a conference on innovation at Georgetown University.

Mr. Bernanke listed options available: direct financing to research institutions, grants to universities or private sector researchers, contracts for specific projects and tax incentives. But he offered no preference to which is best. That varies based on the type of project, he said.

The federal government accounted for roughly 26 percent of total spending on research and development in the United States in 2008. That’s down from around 50 percent in the previous three decades.

Mr. Bernanke also said that government support for research and development financing was most effective if seen as a long-term investment in the economy.

Lags from basic research to commercial applications that can benefit the economy can be very long, he said. For instance, the Internet revolution of the 1990s was based on scientific investments made in the 1970s and 1980s.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=d6fd31dcca86e53a93db12c9f9a28a96