November 23, 2024

High & Low Finance: How Apple and Other Corporations Move Profit to Avoid Taxes

A decade ago, that was a question some short-sellers were asking about Parmalat, the Italian food company that had seemed to be coining money.

It turned out that the answer was not a happy one: The cash was not real. The auditors had been fooled. A huge fraud was being perpetrated.

Now it is a question that could be asked about Apple. Its March 30 balance sheet shows $145 billion in cash and marketable securities. But this week it borrowed $17 billion in the largest corporate bond offering ever.

The answer for Apple is a more comforting one for investors, if not for those of us who pay taxes. The cash is real. But Apple has been a pioneer in tactics to avoid paying taxes to Uncle Sam. To distribute the cash to its owners would force it to pay taxes. So it borrows instead to buy back shares and increase its stock dividend.

The borrowings were at incredibly low interest rates, as low as 0.51 percent for three-year notes and topping out at 3.88 percent for 30-year bonds. And those interest payments will be tax-deductible.

Isn’t that nice of the government? Borrow money to avoid paying taxes, and reduce your tax bill even further.

Could this become the incident that brings on public outrage over our inequitable corporate tax system? Some companies actually pay something close to the nominal 35 percent United States corporate income tax rate. Those unfortunate companies tend to be in businesses like retailing. But companies with a lot of intellectual property — notably technology and pharmaceutical companies — get away with paying a fraction of that amount, if they pay any taxes at all.

Anger at such tax avoidance — we’re talking about presumably legal tax strategies, by the way — has been boiling in Europe, particularly in Britain.

It got so bad that late last year Starbucks promised to pay an extra £10 million — about $16 million — in 2013 and 2014 above what it would normally have had to pay in British income taxes. What it would normally have paid is zero, because Starbucks claims its British subsidiary loses money. Of course, that subsidiary pays a lot for coffee sold to it by a profitable Starbucks subsidiary in Switzerland, and pays a large royalty for the right to use the company’s intellectual property to another subsidiary in the Netherlands. Starbucks said it understood that its customers were angry that it paid no taxes in Britain.

Starbucks could get away with paying no taxes in Britain, and Apple can get away with paying little in the United States, thanks to what Edward D. Kleinbard, a law professor at the University of Southern California and a former chief of staff at the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation, calls “stateless income,” in which multinational companies arrange to direct the bulk of their profits to low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions in which they may actually have only minimal operations.

Transfer pricing is an issue in all multinational companies and can be used to move profits from one country to another, but it is especially hard for countries to monitor prices on intellectual property, like patents and copyrights. There is unlikely to be a real market for that information, so challenging a company’s pricing is difficult.

“It is easy to transfer the intellectual property to tax havens at a low price,” said Martin A. Sullivan, the chief economist of Tax Analysts, the publisher of Tax Notes. “When a foreign subsidiary pays a low price for this property, and collects royalties, it will have big profits.”

The United States, at least theoretically, taxes companies on their global profits. But taxes on overseas income are deferred until the profits are sent back to the United States.

The company makes no secret of the fact it has not paid taxes on a large part of its profits. “We are continuing to generate significant cash offshore and repatriating this cash will result in significant tax consequences under current U.S. tax law,” the company’s chief financial officer, Peter Oppenheimer, said last week. A company spokesman says the company paid $6 billion in federal income taxes last year. When I asked how much it had paid in prior years, there was no answer.

There is something ridiculous about a tax system that encourages an American company to invest abroad rather than in the United States. But that is what we have.

Floyd Norris comments on finance and the economy at nytimes.com/economix.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/business/how-apple-and-other-corporations-move-profit-to-avoid-taxes.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Reuters BreakingViews: Incentives Play Role in Success of Netflix

The star attractions at Netflix keep winning over new, and sometimes unlikely, fans. But one feature of the movie streaming service’s business model is less well known: the unusual way it offers incentives to its staff. Rivals struggling to compete with the company, which is led by its founder, Reed Hastings, might want to take a peek.

Defying and converting skeptics with innovation has become standard operating practice for Netflix. An additional 3.3 million people subscribed last quarter, bringing the total to 23 million, while operating margins held strong at 14 percent.

A new adversary sounds intimidated. Charlie Ergen, whose Dish Network bought Blockbuster out of bankruptcy, says he does not plan to challenge Netflix on streaming because of its “insurmountable lead.” Even Time Warner’s boss, Jeffrey L. Bewkes, who once likened Netflix to the Albanian Army, changed his tone recently and expressed some admiration for what the $12 billion company had accomplished.

Part of the success may stem from the uncommon way Netflix rewards its people. Employees eligible for stock options can tailor the mix of salary and equity in their compensation packages. The amount of options used to be restricted, but the cap was lifted last year. Mr. Hastings took only about 9 percent of his $5.5 million pay in cash.

Equally unusual is how Netflix doles out options. They are granted monthly instead of annually, as is typical. Given how Netflix shares swing wildly, this makes sense. About a fifth of them are also on loan to short sellers, who think the company is overvalued or the business model is not sustainable.

This can help smooth volatility and reduce some frustration that might discourage managers. To wit, on Nov. 1, the shares were at about $167. A month later they were up to $200. And they opened 2011 at just over $178. Because of the dollar-cost averaging afforded employees, they can worry less about underwater options and more about how to keep Netflix a step ahead of the competition.

Heeding Say on Pay

Companies that ignore say-on-pay votes may pay a hefty price: lawsuits. Shareholders are speaking up on executive compensation with the voice they were given by last year’s financial overhaul legislation. Their advice is not legally binding, but that has not stopped disgruntled investors from calling in lawyers to enforce their views.

The Dodd-Frank Act created say-on-pay to blunt criticism that executives were compensating themselves like rock stars. Beginning on Jan. 21, most public companies had to put pay packages for top officers to an “advisory vote” by shareholders. The law did not change directors’ fiduciary duties, so ignoring a thumbs-down verdict is allowed.

Few boards have faced that option. On Friday, for example, just 27 percent of Goldman Sachs’s shareholders voted against 2010 pay of $18 million for its chief, Lloyd C. Blankfein. At last count, only 12 of more than 350 companies that have held meetings received less than majority support for their executives’ pay. Still, those few could face costly consequences.

A negative vote can lead to bad publicity or the ouster of directors. But for Jacobs Engineering and Beazer Homes, which lost say-on-pay votes this year, it has meant lawsuits against management by major shareholders.

The suits claim the votes were slam-dunk evidence that executive pay was excessive. By not altering pay after the votes, the suits argue, management unjustly enriched itself, breached its duties to shareholders and, in Jacobs’s case, wasted company assets.

These are tough arguments to win. The law generally leaves compensation decisions up to the directors. It is easy to see the reasoning for that. Most shareholders do not pay enough attention to make informed decisions about corporate matters, and some others might have agendas that diverge from the interests of smaller investors.

Still, executive compensation has generally soared, even when profits and share prices have fallen. Many incentives for chief executives are misaligned with shareholder interests. When that perception is wrong, boards should explain why. And when it is not, they are better off heeding shareholder concerns about pay, and adjusting accordingly than squandering more of their owners’ treasure on defending themselves in court.

JEFFREY GOLDFARB

and REYNOLDS HOLDING

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=161312aa8d3dc699d498f36a54c04ec7