November 18, 2024

Today’s Economist: Nancy Folbre: Replicating Research: Austerity and Beyond

Nancy Folbre, economist at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Nancy Folbre is an economics professor at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

The Harvard economists Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff ironically titled their much-celebrated book on financial instability and economic growth “This Time Is Different,” asserting that the last crisis was not unique. Rather, they contend it was the most recent manifestation of an age-old tendency for both governments and private investors to delude themselves about the dangers of debt.

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Doubly ironic, then, that Thomas Herndon, a graduate student in my department, was seeking to replicate an article that Professors Reinhart and Rogoff published in 2010 for an econometrics class when he discovered evidence of errors in their cross-national analysis of the impact of national debt on economic growth. Efforts to replicate influential research seldom get much attention, but this time was different.

It’s worth asking why. It’s also worth asking how the chance of similar errors might be minimized in the future.

I won’t recapitulate the details of the controversy, which received immediate attention on The New York Times site (in both Economix and in Paul Krugman’s column and blog) and in other news media, including The Washington Post, The Financial Times and National Public Radio.

Professors Rogoff and Reinhart have conceded that they overstated the negative effect of high levels of government debt on economic growth but insist that the error did not undermine their larger argument.

As much of this news coverage emphasized, the political stakes are high, because the paper in question has been frequently invoked as justification for austerity, in the concerted efforts to cut public spending both in this country and in Europe.

Journalists may also have been receptive because confidence in austerity policies has already begun to dissipate as a result of poor outcomes in Europe (a recurrent theme in Professor Krugman’s columns) and growing evidence of cruel consequences, like increased hunger among Greek children.

Further, journalists know the sound of a good story: a graduate student enrolled in a distinctly unconventional economic department in a financially pinched public university found an obvious mistake in research published in the leading journal of the profession by two prestigious Harvard faculty members. He joined forces with two faculty members, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin, to publish an online critique.

Because the mistake concerned calculation of some weighted averages in an Excel spreadsheet it could be more easily explained than a more technical statistical problem.

Less attention has been devoted to the timing of the revelation. It’s easier to describe the tiny bit of blood on Goliath’s forehead than to explain why it took almost three years for a pebble to reach that target.

It seems pretty clear that efforts to ensure that published results can be replicated have not been stringent enough. Although many important journals now require authors to make data sets and calculations available online, the May Papers and Proceedings issue of the American Economic Review, in which the original article was published, stipulates only that “papers are published only if the data used in the analysis are clearly and precisely documented and are readily available to any researcher for purposes of replication.”

Professors Rogoff and Reinhart, who drew some of their data for the article from publicly available sources and also made a larger data set available on the Web site for their aforementioned book, were not required to make the actual data or spreadsheet on which they based their specific calculations available to other researchers. Dean Baker of the Center for Economic Policy and Research complained publicly soon after the original article was published.

Mr. Herndon was able to obtain the now-famous spreadsheet only about two weeks ago, after e-mailing the authors repeatedly and explaining that he planned to publish a replication based on analysis of highly similar data yielding results significantly different from theirs.

Related difficulties have afflicted other economists seeking to replicate influential published articles. Setting rules is easy. To what extent are journal editors willing to actually monitor conformity and impose sanctions on those who fail to document their work in sufficient detail? Bruce McCullough of Drexel University, who has published extensively on these issues, suggested in an e-mail to me that editors have the power to prevent publication or to shame violators publicly.

On the other hand, detailed monitoring is time-consuming and costly. Austerity in both university and publisher budgets militates against it.

Further, as Dan Hamermesh of the University of Texas at Austin points out, the professional incentives to perform replications are weak and editors are seldom enthusiastic about publishing them. Indeed, replications that confirm previous results typically get less attention than those that controvert them.

As Professor Hamermesh puts it, “economists treat replication the way teenagers treat chastity – as an ideal to be professed but not to be practiced.”

This combination of weak incentives and weak norms weakens the reliability of economic research.

Still, the younger generation is often out front on replication because they relish a chance to cross swords with their elders. Significant example of controversies initiated by junior economists include Jesse Rothstein’s critique of Caroline Hoxby’s research on school choice and Justin McCrary’s critique of Steven Levitt’s research on electoral cycles in police hiring. Maybe graduate students should be even more actively encouraged to police the profession.

Replication problems aren’t unique to economics. Considerable evidence suggests that all scientists are prone to unconscious bias and subtle misperceptions and what are called “shoehorn effects,” trying to make results conform to expectations.

The most important remedy may lie in efforts to encourage the kinds of theoretical, political and cultural diversity that provide intrinsic motivation to challenge the conventional wisdom.

Two University of Chicago economists, George Stigler and Gary Becker, wrote a famous article entitled “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum” – there’s no arguing over tastes.

In my department, our slogan is De Omnibus Est Disputandum: argue about everything.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/replicating-research-austerity-and-beyond/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economic View: Financial Crises’ Impact Varies Widely

Their title is meant to be ironic. “This time is different” is what policy makers always say before a bubble bursts. Yet each time, according to the authors, the results are fundamentally the same.

But while there are strong patterns in the authors’ mountains of data, this simple summary misses an important fact: There’s dramatic variation in the aftermaths of crises, and much of it is caused by how policy makers respond. This history has important implications today.

Economists have long known that financial crises can devastate an economy for years. “A Monetary History of the United States,” by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, showed in agonizing detail the impact of uncontrolled banking panics in the Great Depression. And previous studies have shown that recessions that involve crises are, on average, more severe than those that don’t.

The Reinhart-Rogoff study emphasizes common patterns across crises. It eschews complicated statistical techniques, relying instead on simple graphs and averages. And the averages are stunning. For 14 major crises since 1929, the associated decline in real per capita gross domestic product averaged 9.3 percent. For postwar crises, it took an average of 4.4 years for output to return to its pre-crisis level.

But study their charts more closely and you’ll find that those averages mask remarkable variation. Norway had only a slight decline in per capita G.D.P. — around 1 percent — after its 1987 crisis, and output was back to its previous level in just three years. By contrast, real per capita G.D.P. in Argentina fell more than 20 percent in conjunction with its 2001 crisis, and took eight years to recover.

The Depression illustrates the variability vividly. Real per capita G.D.P. fell nearly 30 percent in the United States, and didn’t return to its pre-crisis level for a decade. But in Spain, it fell only 9 percent in the Depression as a whole, and actually rose in the year after its 1931 banking crisis.

There was even huge variation within the United States during this period. The Friedman-Schwartz study found four distinct waves of banking panics in the early 1930s. After the first three, output plummeted. But after the last one, in early 1933, output skyrocketed, with industrial production rising nearly 60 percent from March to July. That time was very different.

What explains the variations? Crises don’t happen in isolation. They’re often accompanied by other factors, which differ across episodes. For example, financial crises that happen along with currency crises tend to be followed by much more severe recessions.

Likewise, some panics follow particularly big declines in house and stock prices, which have damaging effects on their own. The most recent recession would likely have been severe — and the recovery slow — even if the financial system hadn’t been stressed, simply because of the decline in wealth and the climb in household indebtedness.

BUT an even larger determining factor is the policy response. Why was the Great Depression so much worse here than in Spain? According to an influential paper by Ehsan Choudhri and Levis Kochin, Spain benefited from not being on the gold standard. Its central bank was able to lend freely and increase the money supply after the panic. By contrast, in 1931, the Federal Reserve in the United States raised interest rates to defend its gold reserves and stay on the gold standard, setting off further declines in output and exacerbating the banking crisis.

Likewise, the policy response largely explains why output fell after the American banking panics in 1930 and 1931, but rose after the final wave in early 1933. After the first waves, the Fed did little, and President Herbert Hoover signed a big tax increase to replenish revenue. After the final wave, President Franklin D. Roosevelt abandoned the gold standard, increased the money supply and began a program of New Deal spending.

A 2009 study by the International Monetary Fund concluded that fiscal expansion can mitigate the impact of crises. But the Reinhart-Rogoff study points out that policy makers’ ability to take strong fiscal action depends on whether they start with high levels of debt. In the current episode, China and South Korea have recovered faster, partly because they have taken more aggressive fiscal stimulus measures. They could do that because they entered the crisis in good fiscal health.

The response to troubles in the banking system also matters. After its banking panic in 1991, Sweden aggressively restored its banks to health. They were nationalized, recapitalized with public funds, and then returned to private control. After three rough years, Sweden grew rapidly, soon returning to its pre-crisis trend.

Japan, by contrast, put off cleaning up its banks after its 1992 crisis. For years, it allowed financial institutions to avoid realizing losses by simply rolling over loans to unproductive or failing companies. Partly as a result, it has struggled almost two decades with anemic growth and deflation. And, unlike Sweden, it is still miles from its pre-crisis trajectory.

So where does this more nuanced interpretation of the evidence leave us? First, as the extreme cases show, financial crises matter. Left uncontrolled, they can leave an economy in shambles for years. So policy makers need to make the financial system less prone to crises, and to fight panics aggressively when they arise. This is a lesson that European leaders, sitting on the edge of a financial meltdown and dithering over a solution, should keep foremost in their minds. And it’s a cautionary tale for those who’d hinder worldwide attempts at stricter financial regulation.

Second, the importance of the policy response in determining the effects of crises argues strongly against complacency here at home. A country as creditworthy as the United States can continue to use fiscal stimulus to help return the economy to full employment. And, as I argued in a previous column, there’s much more the Fed could be doing. Whether we continue to fester or finally embark on a robust recovery depends on whether we choose to use the tools available.

Finally, governments around the world, including our own, should remember that it helps to be in sound fiscal shape before a crisis hits. When we’re all finally through the current mess, governments should rededicate themselves to fiscal responsibility. Being careful in good times gives policy makers the ability to fight crises in bad ones.

Christina D. Romer is an economics professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and was the chairwoman of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/business/financial-crises-impact-varies-widely-economic-view.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Inflation in China Poses Big Threat to Global Trade

The latest sign that things were moving too fast came on Sunday, when China’s central bank ordered the biggest banks to set aside more cash reserves.

The move essentially reduces the amount of money available for loans, and is an attempt to cool down the economy. It follows the government announcement on Friday that China’s economy was growing at an annual rate of 9.7 percent, by far the strongest performance by any of the world’s biggest economies.

Because China is now the world’s second largest economy, after the United States, and because the country has been a leading source of global growth during the last two years, money problems here can reverberate from Wal-Mart to Wall Street and the world beyond.

High inflation endangers China’s status as the low-cost workshop for the world. And if the government’s efforts to fight inflation cause the economy to stumble, that will cloud the outlook for international businesses — whether multinationals like General Electric or copper miners in Chile — that have been counting on China for growth.

Inside China, inflation also poses a threat to social stability, a particular worry for Beijing, especially since authoritarian governments in North Africa and the Middle East have become the focus of popular uprisings.

“China’s inflation is a big concern, and actual numbers are worse than officially reported,” said Carmen M. Reinhart, an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.

She says Beijing is engaged in an economic tug of war, trying to encourage sustainable growth while struggling to control inflation.

Food prices are soaring, and the government said on Friday that the consumer price index in March had risen 5.4 percent, its sharpest increase in nearly three years. Hoping to tame inflation, in the last six months Beijing has tightened restrictions on bank lending and raised interest rates on loans (to discourage borrowing) and deposits (to encourage savings).

The decision on Sunday to raise the capital reserve ratio for banks, to 20.5 percent of their cash, was the fourth such increase this year.

The government has also increased agricultural subsidies to curb food prices, and tried to forbid some Chinese companies from raising consumer prices. These efforts stand in contrast to those in the United States, where inflation is low (the underlying annual inflation rate was 1.2 percent last month) and where the debate centers on how much to stimulate the economy given the size of the deficit. Inflation is also running low in Europe, where some countries are imposing harsh austerity measures to pare their budget gaps.

But analysts say the results of this economic management have been mixed. Growth has begun to moderate from its torrid pace of about 10 percent annual growth but inflation has become worse.

For example, housing prices continue to climb even though Beijing has long promised to curb the property market and to spend billions of dollars over the next few years on affordable housing.

The average apartment in central Shanghai now costs more than $500,000. Even in second-tier cities like Chengdu, in central China, the price of a typical home costs about 25 times the average annual income of residents.

Analysts say too much of the country’s growth continues to be tied to inflationary spending on real estate development and government investment in roads, railways and other multibillion-dollar infrastructure projects.

In the first quarter of 2011, fixed asset investment — a broad measure of building activity — jumped 25 percent from the period a year earlier, and real estate investment soared 37 percent, the government said on Friday.

Some of the inflationary factors, like global commodity and food prices, may be beyond Beijing’s ability to influence. Gasoline prices have also jumped sharply, in line with global oil prices. As the world’s largest car market, China’s demand for fuel is soaring, and gasoline prices are close to $4.50 a gallon, up from $3.82 a gallon in late 2009.

Rising food prices, meanwhile, are showing up in various ways — including higher prices at fast-food chains, like Master Kong, which in January raised the price of its popular instant noodles by about 10 percent.

China’s current supercharged boom began in early 2009, during the global financial crisis, when Beijing moved aggressively to increase growth with a $586 billion stimulus package and record lending by state-run banks.

The loose monetary policy, and big investments in local government projects, did revive economic growth. But even at the time there were already concerns about soaring property prices, undisciplined bank lending and the huge debts being amassed by local governments.

Xu Yan contributed research from Shanghai.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=ddb197fa4c17622dc5e97d0909cec48f