November 14, 2024

Common Sense: After Post Sale, Spotlight Shines More Intensely on The Times

Great journalism takes courage. It takes a sense of public mission. It takes independence. It takes time. Perhaps most of all, it takes money.

For decades, America’s great newspaper families had all of these. They shielded their editors and reporters from the pressures of advertisers and the short-term interests of public shareholders and Wall Street analysts. Subscribers were attracted to great journalism, advertisers followed, and big profits flowed to the family members and shareholders.

This week’s announcement that the Graham family had decided to sell The Washington Post and most of its publishing assets to Amazon’s chief executive, Jeffrey Bezos, surely quashed any lingering doubts that the old model is all but dead.

The sale of The Post leaves The New York Times as one of the last major family-run newspapers, and it is certainly the biggest, which inevitably puts it in the spotlight: will the Sulzbergers succumb to the forces that led most every other major newspaper family to sell?

“It’s absolutely true that the family did not want to be out there all by themselves,” Alex Jones, author of “The Trust: The Private and Powerful Family behind The New York Times,” and the director of the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, told me this week. “They’re now the only iconic newspaper family, and it’s a lonely place to be.” Mr. Jones said he spoke to several family members after the Post announcement, and said they were shocked by the news. Nonetheless, “They’re absolutely committed to the stewardship of The New York Times,” he said.

The chairman and publisher of The Times, Arthur Sulzberger Jr., and his cousin, Michael Golden, the vice chairman, confirmed that this week. In a statement, they said, “The Times is not for sale” and stressed that the company was “profitable and generates very strong cash flow, which we believe makes us perfectly able to fund our future growth.” They added, “The Times has both the ideas and the money to pursue innovation.”

That The Times and its controlling family would be among the last survivors should come as no surprise, since it is the strongest of the great newspapers journalistically, and it is profitable. The Times has won 112 Pulitzer Prizes since 1918, including four this year, more than any other newspaper. A week ago, The Times reported quarterly operating earnings of $77.8 million, up 13 percent from a year earlier.

By contrast, The Washington Post’s newspaper division had losses of $53.7 million last year, with no end in sight.

Donald Graham, the chairman and chief executive of The Washington Post Company, who spoke to Mr. Sulzberger shortly after the sale was announced, told me this week: “I don’t think our deal has any implications whatever for The New York Times Company. The Post and The Times are completely different businesses, as different as, say, The Post and The Wall Street Journal. The Times is quite profitable and should be for a long time.”

But Mr. Graham also said the Post sale was not just about profits or money. As he put it in his letter this week to Post employees, “The point of our ownership has always been that it was supposed to be good for The Post.” He added, “The newspaper business continued to bring up questions to which we have no answers,” and concluded, “We were certain the paper would survive under our ownership, but we wanted it to do more than that. We wanted it to succeed.”

In the wake of the announcement, the Sulzberger family held two meetings, one with the Ochs-Sulzberger family trust, which owns a controlling stake in the company, and the other with the broader family, to discuss the Post sale and the decision to issue a statement from Mr. Sulzberger and Mr. Golden. The family surely has much to discuss, because it faces the same question the Graham family did: Would The Times be better off both journalistically and financially under different ownership?

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/10/business/after-post-sale-spotlight-shines-more-intensely-on-the-times.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

DealBook: For Bank of America, Countrywide Bankruptcy Is Still an Option

The real issue around Bank of America is not whether it survives, but whether it sacrifices Countrywide to save itself. More specifically, will Bank of America put Countrywide into bankruptcy? And will this stem the bleeding?

The Countrywide acquisition will go down in history as a deal from hell. It has already cost Bank of America tens of billions of dollars in litigation settlements, let alone losses resulting in a $20.6 billion charge to earnings in the second quarter. Bank of America has already announced that it expects another $5 billion charge for earnings, and American International Group said this week that it would sue Bank of America for $10 billion, mostly for loans issued by Countrywide. It appears that $5 billion is the floor.

These mounting losses have raised the question whether Bank of America might be overwhelmed by Countrywide’s liabilities. Bank of America could be the first candidate for the new insolvency regime put in place by the Dodd-Frank Act.

But the issue is much more complicated than this. The reason is that the losses of Countrywide are not those of Bank of America. Only if Bank of America took steps after the Countrywide acquisition to assume these liabilities is there a problem.

Let me explain.

Bank of America acquired Countrywide, but it did not assume its liabilities. Instead, the assets and liabilities of Countrywide were held separately in the formerly public company Countrywide Financial Corporation.

The only change was that instead of Countrywide Financial stock being held by the public, it was now held by Bank of America. Because of limited liability laws for corporations, public shareholders of Countrywide Financial are not liable for Countrywide’s debts, and neither is Bank of America.

This is standard procedure in a merger. Limited liability means that a company’s owners are not ordinarily liable for the debts the company incurs. When a company is acquired, its new owner usually just obtains ownership of the company’s stock. But this does not make the new owner liable for the target company’s liabilities.

Companies use limited liability laws to plan and structure their operations, often using hundreds of different subsidiaries. For instance, there was talk last year of bankruptcy for BP, the British energy giant. But this was overstated, because BP’s North American operations were run by a wholly separate subsidiary corporation, which held the company’s Mexican Gulf operations. The real risk of bankruptcy was to this subsidiary.

When Bank of America acquired Countrywide, it did not become responsible for its past misdeeds and any litigation liability. This is true even though it is now clear that Countrywide was insolvent at that time. Even so, Bank of America could have had Countrywide Financial put into bankruptcy and cordoned off these liabilities. It could still have done this today had it continued to operate Countrywide as a separate company.

Unfortunately for Bank of America, it didn’t keep things so neat when it acquired Countrywide. Instead, Bank of America engaged in a number of complex transactions to consolidate Countrywide into its operations.

The complaint filed by A.I.G. against Bank of America describes these transactions: On June 2, 2008, Countrywide Home Loans, a subsidiary of Countrywide Financial, sold Countywide Home Loans Servicing, another subsidiary, to NB Holdings, another subsidiary that was wholly owned by Bank of America. Bank of America paid Countrywide Home Loans for this sale by issuing it a note for $19.7 billion. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing was the actual subsidiary of Countrywide that serviced almost all of Countrywide’s mortgage loans. Countrywide Home Loans also sold a pool of residential mortgages to NB Holdings for $9.4 billion. On Nov. 7, 2008, Countrywide Home Loans sold the rest of its assets to Bank of America for $1.76 billion.

Separately, Bank of America also acquired notes worth $3.6 billion from Countrywide Financial’s bank and the equity in a number of other Countrywide subsidiaries. Bank of America also assumed $16.6 billion of Countrywide’s debt and guarantees.

If the A.I.G. complaint accurately describes these transactions, it means that the net effect was to leave Countrywide Financial and Countrywide Home Loans without assets, except the $11.16 billion payment and the $19.7 billion and $3.6 billion notes ($34.46 billion total). Countrywide’s liabilities stayed with the Countrywide.

Bank of America turned Countrywide into a shell with assets of $34.46 billion, part of it in the form of loans from Bank of America. Once the settlements exceed this amount, Countrywide is out of money. Again, the exact amount is uncertain and this is an approximation, but it appears that Countrywide’s remaining assets are rapidly being subsumed by litigation claims and other liabilities related to the financial crisis.

The best strategy for Bank of America would appear to be to throw the old Countrywide into bankruptcy.

Normally this would be the end of the matter and Bank of America would not be liable for any of Countrywide’s debts.

However, in any bankruptcy proceeding, anyone with claims against Countrywide will argue that Bank of America fraudulently transferred out Countrywide’s assets. And there are other legal arguments, including that Bank of America should be liable for Countrywide’s debts because of these transfers. The A.I.G. complaint against Bank of America, for example, makes a similar claim, arguing that Bank of America is a successor in interest to Countrywide by virtue of these transfers.

The validity of these claims is hard to assess and will depend on how careful Bank of America was in transferring the Countrywide assets. If a court finds that Bank of America underpaid for these assets, Bank of America may be liable for some of Countrywide’s debts.

Bank of America thus still has residual exposure to Countrywide in a bankruptcy and a hefty litigation bill to fight off such claims.

Bank of America’s lawyers are likely poring over these transfers and assessing any liability in anticipation of just such a bankruptcy filing. The bottom line is that, unless Bank of America’s lawyers really messed up the transfers, Bank of America is far from insolvency itself, having the option of cordoning off this liability to a large extent through a bankruptcy filing. If nothing else, a Countrywide bankruptcy would tie this up in litigation for years if not a decades.

Boy, did Ken Lewis really blow this one.


Steven M. Davidoff, writing as The Deal Professor, is a commentator for DealBook on the world of mergers and acquisitions.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=a7681769c7a8bc860973e0367729583c