November 15, 2024

Today’s Economist: Simon Johnson: Twelve Angry Central Bankers

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Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You.”

This does not happen very often: the 12 presidents of Federal Reserve Banks have spoken with great clarity and in public on a financial reform issue: the need to change the rules for money-market funds. They are explicitly taking on the biggest banks and their allies, including some recalcitrant officials.

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While this will be a long haul – and these central bankers need a lot of external support – we are starting to see some progress toward building a new, more skeptical understanding of how the financial system works.

As far as I have been able to determine, the comment letter submitted on Feb. 12 by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston – on behalf of all the regional Fed banks – was literally the first time these 12 organizations have spoken with one public voice without involving the Fed’s Board of Governors.

The Federal Reserve System – 100 years old this year – has a curious legal structure. The system comprises a very powerful Board of Governors and the 12 regional banks, with each of the latter nominally owned by member banks in its region. (Before the 1930s, the Washington-based board was less important, and the New York Fed was arguably the most powerful element of the system; see Liaquat Ahamed’s brilliant Pulitzer Prize-winning history of that period, “Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World.”)

Ben Bernanke, as chairman of the Board of Governors, sits on the Financial Stability Oversight Council, a new body created by the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation to watch for systemic risks. This council has called for comments regarding a proposal for the reform of money-market funds, and Mr. Bernanke can hardly comment on his own ideas.

But the regional Feds are separate legal entities, and they are allowed to comment, so we get some unusual insight into sensible official thinking.

The problem is straightforward. Money-market funds operate in some ways like banks – their liabilities are regarded by investors to be just like bank deposits when times are good. But when times are scary – as when Lehman Brothers failed in September 2008 – there can be rapid and destabilizing runs by investors out of the funds. What we saw in fall 2008 had the potential to become even more damaging than the bank runs that characterized moments of panic before the introduction of deposit insurance.

The industry proposes to deal with this by allowing temporary restrictions on withdrawals when the pressure is on. This is a terrible idea that will just encourage people to run sooner and faster.

Of course, what the industry really wants is an implicit government guarantee – downside insurance for funds, preferably without any insurance premium or effective regulation, which is the current status quo. In fall 2008, these funds got an explicit guarantee, and they know that similar support would be available in the future — unless a way is found to make this part of the system less prone to collapse and contagion.

In principle, the Securities and Exchange Commission is in charge of changing money-market fund rules. Unfortunately, the financial-sector lobby has fought this issue to a deadlock at the highest levels of the S.E.C. Fortunately, post-Dodd-Frank, the Financial Stability Oversight Council has the ability to push for stronger standards, which it can either use directly or by bringing enough pressure to move the S.E.C. forward.

On this issue, the 12 regional Fed presidents have their priorities exactly right. There are some nuances on the details, but the most important idea is to float the net asset value for money-market funds, i.e., eliminate the illusion that these investment products necessarily have a stable value. The value of your equity mutual funds goes up and down every day, in a way that you can measure and understand. The same is true for money-market funds, but this reality is currently masked from investors.

We need more transparency and honesty around the nature of these investment products. This is good for consumers and absolutely essential for system stability. The Systemic Risk Council, led by Sheila Bair, the former chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, has also been pushing in this direction (I’m a member of this council).

You might also want equity buffers at money-market funds, and the Fed presidents bring this up as a possibility. It is encouraging to see these individuals push for higher equity (less debt relative to total assets); I favor much higher equity throughout the financial system. But I doubt the levels of equity under discussion will be enough to make a significant difference.

(In addition, the New York Fed is indicating, at least at the technical level, a preference for a minimum balance at risk. In this approach, an investor pulling money out of a fund would have some fraction set aside, perhaps five cents on the dollar, that would be in first-loss position for a period of 30 days or more – with the goal of discouraging runs. I see no sign that this idea is getting traction either among officials or more broadly.)

A generation ago, many banks viewed money-market funds with suspicion and even hostility, as they were competing for part of the same investor base. Now, however, the big bank-holding companies like money-market funds. Some banks manage money-market funds, and almost all of them rely on them for short-term cheap funding.

But this funding is cheap in part because of the implicit government guarantees provided to money-market funds. This encourages banks to rely on unstable funding, and we should be pushing in the other direction – toward longer-term, more stable sources of funding.

Expressing these concerns is not populism; the Fed is perhaps the least populist organization in the country. This is sensible economics with a clear and powerful rallying cry: Float the net asset value.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/twelve-angry-central-bankers/?partner=rss&emc=rss

High-Speed Traders Profit at Expense of Ordinary Investors, a Study Says

The chief economist at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Andrei Kirilenko, reports in a coming study that high-frequency traders make an average profit of as much as $5.05 each time they go up against small traders buying and selling one of the most widely used financial contracts.

The agency has not endorsed Mr. Kirilenko’s findings, which are still being reviewed by peers, and they are already encountering some resistance from academics. But Bart Chilton, one of five C.F.T.C. commissioners, said on Monday that “what the study shows is that high-frequency traders are really the new middleman in exchange trading, and they’re taking some of the cream off the top.”

Mr. Kirilenko’s work stands in contrast to several statements from government officials who have expressed uncertainty about whether high-speed traders are earning profits at the expense of ordinary investors.

The study comes as a council of the nation’s top financial regulators is showing increasing concern that the accelerating automation and speed of the financial markets may represent a threat both to other investors and to the stability of the financial system.

The Financial Stability Oversight Council, an organization formed after the recent financial crisis to deal with systemic risks, took up the issue at a meeting in November that was closed to the public, according to minutes that were released Monday.

The gathering of top regulators, including Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner and Ben S. Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, said in its annual report this summer that recent developments “could lead to unintended errors cascading through the financial system.” The C.F.T.C. is a member of the oversight council.

The issue of high-frequency trading has generated anxiety among investors in the stock market, where computerized trading first took hold. But the minutes from the oversight council, and the council’s annual report released this year, indicate that top regulators are viewing the automation of trading as a broader concern as high-speed traders move into an array of financial markets, including bond and foreign currency trading.

Mr. Kirilenko’s study focused on one corner of the financial markets that the C.F.T.C. oversees, contracts that are settled based on the future value of the Standard Poor’s 500-stock index. He and his co-authors, professors at Princeton and the University of Washington, chose the contract because it is one of the most heavily traded financial assets in any market and is popular with a broad array of investors.

Using previously private data, Mr. Kirilenko’s team found that from August 2010 to August 2012, high-frequency trading firms were able to reliably capture profits by buying and selling futures contracts from several types of traditional investors.

The study notes that there are different types of high-frequency traders, some of which are more aggressive in initiating trades and some of which are passive, simply taking the other side of existing offers in the market.

The researchers found that more aggressive traders accounted for the largest share of trading volume and made the biggest profits. The most aggressive scored an average profit of $1.92 for every futures contract they traded with big institutional investors, and made an average $3.49 with a smaller, retail investor. Passive traders, on the other hand, saw a small loss on each contract traded with institutional investors, but they made a bigger profit against retail investors, of $5.05 a contract.

Large investors can trade thousands of contracts at once to bet on future shifts in the S. P. 500 index. The average aggressive high-speed trader made a daily profit of $45,267 in a month in 2010 analyzed by the study.

Industry profits have been falling, however, as overall stock trading volume has dropped and the race for the latest technological advances has increased costs.

Ben Protess contributed reporting.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/business/high-speed-trades-hurt-investors-a-study-says.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix Blog: Simon Johnson: 3 Questions on Financial Stability

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Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of “13 Bankers.”

The Dodd-Frank financial legislation of 2010 created a Financial Stability Oversight Council, tasked with taking an integrated view of risks in and around the financial sector in the United States. Known as the FSoc (pronounced EFF-sock), the council comprises all leading regulators and other responsible officials, headed by the Treasury secretary.

So far, it has done little — reflecting the predominant official view that in the post-crisis recovery phase, financial risks in the United States are generally receding.

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But three important and related issues emerged this summer that the FSoc needs to consider quickly: impending bank mergers that could create two more too-big-to-fail banks; whether to force the breakup of Bank of America; and how to rethink capital requirements for large systemically important banks, particularly as continuing European sovereign debt problems undermine the credibility of the international Basel Committee approach to bank capital.

On the merger front, Capital One plans to buy the online business of ING, and PNC is acquiring the American business of Royal Bank of Canada. Both acquisitions would create banks with assets around $300 billion. (Steven Pearlstein had a very good column in The Washington Post on Sunday on the background to these deals.)

In some official minds, Dodd-Frank has made it impossible for too-big-to-fail banks to exist — if any such bank got into trouble, it would be shut down without any significant costs being incurred by taxpayers. Most independent analysts and many people active in financial markets regard this proposition as unproven at best and, most likely, incorrect.

For example, in a new working paper, “Too-Systemic-to-Fail: What Option Markets Imply About Sector-Wide Government Guarantees,” Bryan T. Kelly, Hanno Lustig and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh compare the price of put options (i.e., the option to sell and therefore lock in a price) for the financial sector stock index relative to put options on individual banks’ stocks (Disclosure: I’m a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, which published this paper, and co-director of its Africa Project but had nothing to do with this paper).

Put options are cheaper if they are less valuable to investors as protection against price collapses, and the index puts are a lot cheaper than the appropriately weighted sum of put options on individual bank stocks, particularly during the recent financial crisis.

The authors infer that “investors price in substantial government bailout guarantees for the financial sector as a whole” — thus the index puts are cheap, because you don’t need to insure privately against overall collapse — with around half of the market value of the financial sector during 2003-9 accounted for by collective bailout guarantees. No other sector in the United States economy gets anything like this kind of insurance.

At the same time, the researchers point out that the government does not eliminate all idiosyncratic company-specific risk; this is why put options on individual companies stocks are relatively more valuable. In a sense this message is encouraging, because it suggests some specific companies can fail or otherwise go out of business.

But presumably, at critical moments specific megabanks have a particular and complete kind of downside protection. It’s hard to envisage the potential failure of a $2 trillion bank like Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase or Bank of America without systemwide adverse consequences.

The first question for the FSoc is therefore: Wouldn’t allowing mergers by Capital One and ING and by PNC and Royal Bank of Canada create financial companies whose potential risk is more likely to be systemic?

The largest financial institution allowed to fail without a bailout since the collapse of Lehman Brothers was CIT Group, which had a balance sheet of around $80 billion. Perhaps Capital One and PNC are already too big to fail; PNC is No. 12 and Capital One is No. 13 on the official list of bank holding companies, ranked by assets as of June 30.

We don’t know where the critical cutoff is — and perhaps more studies along the lines of the work by Professors Kelly, Lustig and Nieuwerburgh would be helpful, or the FSoc could find another way to make a reasonable and fact-based determination.

But what really matters is what could happen in future systemic crises, and this is very hard to predict. So why not err on the side of caution and keep large banks from becoming bigger through merging? Or the FSoc could require these merging banks to demonstrate that they will generate social value commensurate with or in excess of the extra social risks that they are creating.

The second question is closely related: Why not break up Bank of America? The Dodd-Frank legislative process ended up rejecting the idea that existing banks, as of 2010, should be broken up — as long as they continue to operate in a reasonable and sustainable fashion. But the legislative intent was also clear with regard to big banks that are in trouble: There should be preemptive action, either through pressing bank management or, if that doesn’t work, through regulator-imposed requirements.

These requirements can include making the bank smaller, simpler and less systemic – in other words making sure that any kind of future “resolution” or “intervention” for that bank (both euphemisms for a form of bankruptcy) would not be a systemic event.

If Bank of America were to fail today, it would create a systemic problem and presumably set off some sort of desperate policy reaction. The bank is the largest bank-holding company in the United States, with assets at the end of June of more than $2.26 trillion.

If Bank of America is forced to divest various activities, like those it bought from Merrill Lynch, that would not eliminate systemic risk. But it would make this one troubled institution less central to the economy, and, if handled properly, less of a brake on economic recovery.

This raises the third and arguably most important question: Why not increase capital requirements further for systemically important financial institutions?

Warren Buffett’s agreement last week to invest in Bank of America has highlighted the lack of capital, at least at that one bank: It has too little equity relative to its debts, hence the need for Mr. Buffett.

But Mr. Buffett, it now appears, is getting cumulative preferred stock — so he gets a guaranteed dividend before any common-stock holders get a return. This makes sense for him, without question. And his holding is loss-absorbing, in the sense that his equity would be wiped out before there was any question of defaulting on money owed to any creditors.

This is presumably the best that Bank of America could do in terms of raising capital through the market. But it should not be enough from the perspective of FSoc, which is charged with overall responsibility for systemic risks.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has proposed a methodology for systemically important institutions, but it rests on a very weak analytical basis, as Americans for Financial Reform pointed out in a recent letter. The FSoc would be making a very bad mistake if it continued to follow the European lead that set the lowest common denominator at Basel.

The evident capital problems of European banks, and the way this will slow growth, were flagged at the Jackson Hole, Wyo., meeting of policy makers last week by Christine Lagarde, the new managing director of the International Monetary Fund and, until recently, finance minister of France (see this assessment by Felix Salmon). The FSoc should listen to her warnings and think about what this means for American banks.

If the Dodd-Frank legislation is to have lasting impact, the FSoc needs to establish itself as a meaningful overseer of systemic financial risks. It needs to meet and deliberate in an open and transparent manner. It should confront pressing questions of systemic risk head on, being clear about the analytical basis for its decisions. Business as usual is a recipe for disaster — in the United States, as in Europe.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=2b0e3b19c1a637cbfdab9dfcb927099f

Economix Blog: Another Round of Bailouts?

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Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of “13 Bankers.”

In the wake of recent equity market declines, the clamor for bailouts of various kinds grows ever louder around the world. Influential voices call for “leadership” from the United States and Western Europe, and for policy makers in those countries to “get ahead of the curve.” This is all code for a simple and familiar plea: Do something that will protect investors, particularly creditors who have lent a lot of money to banks and countries that now appear to be in serious difficulty.

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But providing another round of unconditional creditor bailouts in this situation would be a mistake. What we need is a combination of transparent losses where bad loans were made, combined with a ring-fencing approach that protects sound governments and companies. There is no sign yet that policy makers are willing to make that distinction clear.

The situation around the world is undeniably bad. As Peter Boone and I argued in a Peterson Institute policy paper released a couple of weeks ago, Europe is most definitely “on the brink” of a serious economic crisis that could involve widespread defaults or significant inflation or both. At the same time, Bank of America shares this week fell to their lowest in two years; with other large banks under pressure, there is a legitimate fear of rerunning the parts of the financial crisis of 2008-9.

The Financial Stability Oversight Council’s recently released first annual report does not provide particularly up-to-date numbers, but most of the global warning lights discussed in Chapter 7 must now be flashing red. As recently as 2008-9, there were three kinds of government support available to the American and European economies when such systemic financial trouble hit. But all three traditional forms of bailout are now much harder to pull off.

First, over the last 30 years interest-rate cuts and other forms of expansionary monetary policy became standard practice in the face of potential financial market disruption — this is the original meaning of the “Greenspan put.” But short-term interest rates are already very low in the United States. The European Central Bank (E.C.B.) has room to cut rates — but both the E.C.B. and the Federal Reserve fear that inflation may soon return. Now, unlike in the fall of 2008, they are reluctant to respond to the latest round of stock market declines with a dramatic easing of monetary policy.

Second, after the initial monetary policy response in fall 2008, it was fiscal policy that took the lead in preventing global economic free fall — with significant attempts to provide countercyclical stimulus in the United States, much of Western Europe, and China.

Now the euro zone faces a series of fiscal crises (see my paper with Peter Boone). Further stimulus is out of the question — the issue in Europe is who will do what kind of austerity and how fast.

The fiscal crisis in the United States is more imagined than real. The Standard Poor’s downgrade of long-term United States government debt prompted a huge sell-off — but not in government debt. Investors around the world vote with their feet; they see United States government assets as among the safest available. Still, further fiscal stimulus is most definitely not on the political table in Washington.

And even Chinese fiscal policy shows signs of tightening — as the authorities try to prevent any overheating that could accelerate inflation.

Third, in 2008-9, monetary and fiscal policies were complemented by government capital injections directly into United States and European banks. But these became harder to do under the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation — unless there is a large-scale systemic approach, which would be very hard to get through this Congress.

The worst financial-sector problems are in Europe. But the recent banking stress tests there were completely unrealistic as they did not include default events that now appear inevitable. To run one set of misleading stress tests (in 2010) might be considered excusable; to do this twice during the same crisis is unconscionable. There is no coherent financial sector policy within the euro zone.

What are the policy options now? The people in charge of European and United States policy would clearly prefer to do nothing or postpone dealing with the underlying issues. This is a bad idea as it puts markets in charge — and these markets are panicked.

The core to any feasible strategy must be bank capital. As Anat Admati and her colleagues have been arguing, large banks and other financial institutions without sufficient capital are prone to failure — this is what spreads failure and panic far and wide. The Basel III framework, negotiated just last year, is crumbling before our eyes; the failure to ensure sufficient capital is at the heart of the European meltdown — and why the pressure on United States banks is mounting.

The Europeans have to decide, once and for all, which governments will restructure their debts and which will be protected — to an unlimited degree — by the European Central Bank (again, my paper with Peter Boone has more details and proposals). A full-scale bank recapitalization program is required, along with management changes at almost all major European financial institutions.

If the Europeans fail to get a grip on their economic situation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation will be pressed to use its Dodd-Frank resolution powers to take over and manage the unwinding of a major American financial institution. In that scenario, creditors are supposed to face losses that are transparent and clearly understood; the theory is that this will stabilize market expectations. The F.D.I.C. has argued that it could have done this in the case of Lehman Brothers. I have my doubts.

The Dodd-Frank reform process decided not to break up global megabanks, but rather to handle them under the F.D.I.C.’s resolution framework. We’re about to find out if this was a good idea — or if we are just on the brink of more unconditional bailouts.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=2bd9e04e50bf48cc41e320f166ca55f1

Economix: The Banking Emperor Has No Clothes

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Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of “13 Bankers.”

Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geitner. in a speech in Atlanta this week, said, Tami Chappell/ReutersTreasury Secretary Timothy F. Geitner. in a speech in Atlanta this week, said, “The U.S. banking system today is less concentrated than that of any other major country.”

In a major speech earlier this week to the American Bankers Association’s international monetary conference, Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner laid out his view of what went wrong in the financial sector before 2008, how the crisis was handled 2008-10 and what is needed to reform the system. As chairman of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the only senior member of President Obama’s original economic team remaining in place, Mr. Geithner’s influence with regard to the banking system is second to none.

Unfortunately, Mr. Geithner’s speech contained three major mistakes: his history is completely wrong, his logic is deeply flawed, and his interpretation of the Dodd-Frank reforms does not mesh with the legal facts regarding how the failure of a global megabank could be handled. Together, these mistakes suggest that one of our most powerful policy makers is headed very much in the wrong direction.

On history, Mr. Geithner places significant blame for the pre-2008 excesses on Britain and other countries that pursued light-touch regulation. This is reasonable – though surely he is aware that the United States has led the way in lightening the touch of regulation, at least since 1980. A senior British official retorted immediately, “Clearly he wasn’t referring to derivatives regulation, because as far as I can recollect, there wasn’t any in America at the time.”

More broadly, Mr. Geithner seems to have forgotten how big banks were saved — by government intervention, at his urging. He should probably watch “Too Big to Fail,” now playing on HBO, or peruse the book by Andrew Ross Sorkin of The New York Times, on which it is based –- just look in the index for Geithner and trace the arguments that he made for repeated and unconditional bailouts of big banks and their creditors from mid-September 2008. (Mr. Sorkin’s book ends in fall 2008, while Mr. Geithner was still head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; for more on what happened after he became Treasury secretary, see my book with James Kwak, “13 Bankers.”)

On logic, Mr. Geithner’s thinking includes a major non sequitur, as he continues to deny that the size of our largest banks poses a problem. “Some argue that the U.S. financial system is too concentrated, which could promote systemic risks,” he said. “But the U.S. banking system today is less concentrated than that of any other major country.”

But big banks in almost all other major countries have run into serious trouble, including those in Britain and Switzerland — where policy makers are now open about the potential scope of further disasters. French and German banks made large amounts of reckless loans to peripheral Europe and have strongly resisted higher capital requirements, helping to create the current potential for contagion throughout the euro zone (and explaining why the Europeans are so keen to keep control of the International Monetary Fund). The Japanese banking system has been in terrible shape for two decades.

Lawrence H. Summers, Mr. Geithner’s former mentor, likes to point out that big banks in Canada were not in serious trouble during the global recession. But whatever your view of whether Canada has good regulation or was mostly lucky –- and put me in the skeptical camp, after my recent talks with their senior officials –- the simple point is that big banks in Canada are actually small in comparison with American and other global banks. The largest five Canadian banks have a combined head count roughly equal to that of Citigroup (just under 300,000 people) and even the biggest of them has only about one-third the assets of JPMorgan Chase.

Mr. Geithner’s thinking on bank size is completely flawed. The lesson should be: big banks have gotten themselves into trouble almost everywhere; banks in the United States are very big and have an incentive to become even bigger; one or more of these banks will reach the brink of failure soon.

Mr. Geithner’s most serious mistake is to believe that we can handle the failure of a global megabank within the Dodd-Frank framework. He argues that expanded powers for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation mean that banks can be allowed to fund themselves with more debt relative to equity than would otherwise be the case, because the F.D.I.C. can supposedly impose losses on creditors in the “resolution” situation, in which it takes control of a troubled bank. Because the bank could actually default on its loans, management and lenders will be more careful.

“But given the other protections here, including our resolution authority, we do not need to impose on top of that requirement any of the three other proposed forms of additional capital,” he said in the speech. (The italics are mine.)

I’ve talked repeatedly with senior officials in the United States and other countries about the resolution authority, and I’ve also discussed the issue directly with some of the top legal minds on Wall Street, people who work closely with big banks. Mr. Geithner’s interpretation is simply wrong. (Disclosure: I’m a member of the F.D.I.C.’s newly established Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee, an unpaid group of 18 experts that meets for the first time on June 21, but my assessment here is purely personal.)

There is no cross-border resolution mechanism or other framework that will handle the failure of a bank like Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase or Goldman Sachs in an orderly manner. The only techniques available are those used by Mr. Geithner and his colleagues in September 2008 –- a mad scramble to find buyers for assets, backed by Federal Reserve and other government guarantees for creditors.

The right conclusion for Mr. Geithner should be: huge cross-border financial operations are immune from orderly resolution; such companies should therefore be run on a completely segmented basis, with separate capital requirements and no recourse to parent companies.

Consequently, capital requirements should be much higher than currently proposed by any official, for capital is the buffer that stands between bad management decisions and taxpayer bailouts when bank resolution is not possible. Real estate trusts that are not too big to fail routinely finance their assets with 30 percent equity and 70 percent debt. In a volatile world, this makes complete sense. We should move all our big banks, as well as the rest of our financial system, in that direction.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=e9a3b37f54602ed11c59f5f3a9e967eb