November 25, 2024

Japanese Island’s Activists Resist Nuclear Industry’s Allure

The move, while reminiscent of a Greenpeace action, was highly unusual in understated Japan. But it was emblematic of the islanders’ nearly three-decade fight against the powers arrayed against them — their own government and the nuclear industry it has championed.

“The sea is our livelihood,” said Ms. Takebayashi, 68, whose family has fished for sea bream, mackerel and other local delicacies for generations. “We will never let anyone sully it.”

The story of Iwaishima’s battle has become something of a touchstone in Japan, especially among those who feel uneasy in the wake of the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant for having accepted decades of government assurances that nuclear power was safe. And because the plans to build the plant are closer to approval than any others in Japan, many antinuclear activists see the island’s struggle as their best hope of ending the country’s reliance on nuclear energy.

If the plans are scuttled, they believe, the decision is likely to set a precedent that will end the construction of nuclear plants in Japan.

Iwaishima’s tale of resistance started in 1982. The town of Kaminoseki — made up of Iwaishima, two islets and the Murotsu peninsula off Japan’s main island, Honshu — was one of many backwaters that seemed ripe for the revitalization that the nuclear industry promised.

With no industry to speak of beyond small-scale farming and fisheries, the town struggled to keep up with Japan’s rapid changes in the postwar era.

So in 1982, when the Chugoku Electric Power Company first raised the idea of building a nuclear power plant on the peninsula’s deserted tip, many residents were enthusiastic.

Chugoku Electric wooed them, paying for lavish “study tours” to nuclear reactors around the country — trips that included stops at hot springs, according to residents who participated. It also offered local fishing cooperatives compensation for the loss of fishing grounds that would be filled in to build the 3.5-million-square-foot plant.

“The town needed the money,” said Katsumi Inoue, 67, who led a movement supporting the plant. “Kaminoseki was shrinking. We needed to grow.”

But Iwaishima, an island of about 1,000 people just two and a half miles from the planned site, was not convinced. The island’s fishing cooperative voted overwhelmingly against the plans. On a chilly morning in January 1983, almost 400 islanders cut short their New Year’s festivities to stage a protest march, the men in their fishing boots and the women in bonnets, through alleyways lined with stone walls.

It was the first of more than 1,000 protests the islanders would carry out, some of them involving scenes of high drama to rival Ms. Takebayashi’s 2009 protest.

In one protest this year, a small armada of fishermen raced out to sea to head off the utility’s vessels. “No nuclear power plant here!” they shouted, their boats’ engines in full throttle. “This sea does not belong to you.”

Not even the residents of Iwaishima are exactly sure why they were willing to challenge the establishment when so many of their compatriots were not. The best they can venture is that their livelihoods depend on the sea too much to take a chance, and that if disaster struck, it would be much harder to flee.

Beyond that, many of the island’s men had, over time, left for work elsewhere. Some of them worked in nuclear plants, and they returned home with worrisome stories. They would become part of the front line in the island’s struggle.

Kazuo Isobe, 88, was one of them. He left the island in Japan’s postwar chaos and initially worked at construction sites. But in the 1970s, he started work at the newly opened Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

He worked to clean up radioactive buildup at the plant’s No. 2 reactor, using rags while sweltering in a protective suit.

His radiation records from the time, which he provided, show he received about 850 millirems of radiation during just three months of work — about the amount of radiation allowed for nuclear workers in a year, and more than eight times as much as the limit set for civilians.

When Mr. Isobe heard, on a trip back to Iwaishima in 1982, that Chugoku Electric planned to build a nuclear plant just across the water, he was “terrified.”

“I had seen with my own eyes that radiation is hard to contain,” Mr. Isobe said. “I told everyone in the neighborhood not to agree to anything they said.”

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/world/asia/28nuclear.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Nuclear Plant, Left for Dead, Shows a Pulse

This does not seem like a particularly opportune moment to breathe life back into a reactor that was designed before the computer age. But its owner, the quasi-governmental Tennessee Valley Authority, says the plant may be its best bet for generating cleaner and more economical new electricity.

Since an earthquake and tsunami unleashed a nuclear disaster at Japan’s Fukushima reactors in March, several countries have distanced themselves from nuclear energy. The German chancellor announced her intention to shutter all of the country’s nuclear facilities by 2022, and the Swiss Parliament is heading in the same direction.

A modern reactor project in Texas was canceled after Fukushima, and one in Maryland fell apart last year. And even before the catastrophe in Japan, the nuclear industry as a whole had been suffering from a surfeit of generating capacity, the cheap price of natural gas and the high price of construction.

So why is the Tennessee Valley Authority — which recently announced it would close 18 antiquated and dirty coal-fired plants — trying to revive a reactor that for years has served only as a salvage heap?

Right now, said Eric T. Beaumont, a nuclear expert and partner in Copia Capital, a private investment firm in Chicago, “it doesn’t seem like the most prudent use of money.”

“They should definitely be doing something different,” said Louis A. Zeller, science director for the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, a regional advocacy group. He likes to call Bellefonte “the zombie reactor” because it is neither dead nor alive.

Mr. Zeller and other skeptics say that beyond the obvious challenges the nuclear industry faces, the Bellefonte 1 project has inescapable flaws. The reactor is too expensive and too antiquated, they contend, and it lies in an earthquake zone.

But the authority is moving forward, estimating that Bellefonte 1 could be up and running as early as 2020, half a century after it was conceived. Cost estimates for completing the reactor run $4 billion to $5 billion on top of the $4 billion that has already been invested.

Thomas Kilgore, the authority’s president and chief executive, said finishing it now would make more sense later. “Why nuclear?” he said. “Once you get the unit built, you’ve got inflation locked out.”

Mr. Beaumont, the industry analyst, said that “based on cost, I absolutely think you can say it’s crazy.” But that assessment might change over time, he allowed.

The Environmental Protection Agency could force additional coal-generated power plants to close as it polices greenhouse gas emissions, increasing the demand for cleaner sources of energy, he said. The price of natural gas will eventually rise, making nuclear energy more competitive, he added, and at some point, existing nuclear plants will wear out.

T.V.A. executives have another troublesome variable to deal with, unpredictable changes in demand, which is what they say caused them to shut down construction in 1988.

“I can’t forecast out 8 or 10 years,” Mr. Kilgore said, but “we just know when we get there, Bellefonte 1 is a good economic proposition.”

Because the plant already has a precious construction license, albeit from 1974, and because of the authority’s independent status, it faces far fewer obstacles than most other reactor builders.

The T.V.A. does not answer to state regulators. It has no shareholders to worry. As a federally chartered corporation established in 1933 as part of the New Deal, it is overseen by nine directors who are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Today it supplies electricity across parts of seven states, serving roughly nine million people.

It also enjoys financial advantages that most public utilities lack, borrowing money at rates similar to those paid by the United States Treasury, which is critical for building hugely expensive reactors.

That makes it one of the very few American builders that could pull off a nuclear power comeback in this climate. With the exception of Watts Bar 1, another T.V.A. plant that was mothballed for a time but was finished in 1996, no new reactor construction has been started since the early 1990s. Two new plants in Georgia and South Carolina are awaiting construction permits, and the authority is working on finishing a second Watts Bar reactor similar in vintage to Bellefonte 1 that is expected to be completed next year.

Authority managers have said they would ask their board this summer for money to complete Bellefonte 1; last year the board voted to allocate $248 million just to explore that possibility.

Currently, the T.V.A. gets 60 percent of its energy from fossil fuels, mostly coal, and in addition to the 18 generators it recently agreed to shut at the urging of the E.P.A., it must decide whether to scrub or close several more. The authority’s goal is to have 50 percent of its generation come from “low or zero carbon-emitting sources” by 2020, which is why Bellefonte 1 is a dinosaur back in play.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=f612b998d66a5a683360d2e3ce0ca1ad