November 15, 2024

Economix Blog: Policy Impact and Red Herrings

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Casey B. Mulligan is an economics professor at the University of Chicago. He is the author of “The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Contracted the Economy.”

Red herrings are frequently inserted into policy discussions but can be readily identified as long as we remember a simple truth about public policy impact.

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The impact of public policy on an economic outcome like employment is, by definition, the difference between employment with the policy in place and what employment would have been under an alternative “baseline” policy. Policy impact quantifies how things are different as a consequence of the policy.

Consider these statements:

“The Affordable Care Act will not reduce full-time employment because workers understand that full-time employment is the path to career advancement” (see my previous post).

“Unemployment insurance does not reduce employment because Americans fundamentally want to work and provide for themselves” (see, for example, this commentary on gawker.com)

These are all examples of red herrings, irrelevant statements that are attached to hypotheses.

Take the full-time employment example. It may be true that full-time employment is the path to career advancement, but that is hardly relevant to the Affordable Care Act as long as we assume that full-time employment would be that path regardless of whether we have that law.

That is, lots of people will choose full-time employment because of the career opportunities it provides, but they are counted as full-time employed under the policy and as full-time employed under the baseline policy (say, continuing as if the act had never become law). A policy impact estimate, by definition, counts only those for whom career advancement does not trump their decision to be in a full-time position.

As I explained in that an earlier post, the Affordable Care Act introduces funds and insurance opportunities for part-time employees that will be unavailable to most full-time employees. As long as there are more than zero people whose full-time vs. part-time work decision depends on funds or insurance, there is the potential for policy impact.

In my second example, it may be true that most people want to work and provide for themselves. But I assume motivation to work is the same regardless of whether unemployment benefits are paid for, say, 99 nine weeks or 26. What’s different between the 99-week policy and the 26-week baseline are the circumstances in which people find themselves.

As long as motivation is not the sole factor determining employment, there is the potential for unemployment insurance to have a policy impact, even in a country in which the people are fundamentally hard-working.

Nobody expects a government program to make everything different. So policy analysis is particularly useful in subtracting out the outcomes that would occur regardless of policy measures.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/policy-impact-and-red-herrings/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Today’s Economist: Casey B. Mulligan: Health Coverage Worthy of a Senator

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Casey B. Mulligan is an economics professor at the University of Chicago. He is the author of “The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Contracted the Economy.”

To promote economic efficiency and the goal of universal health coverage, perhaps members of Congress should not be required to enroll in the new insurance exchanges.

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The Affordable Care Act of 2010 seeks to invigorate the nongroup health insurance market – that is, health insurance that people can buy without going through an employer – by creating and subsidizing insurance exchanges similar to the one created by Massachusetts in 2007. In addition, the law seeks to make health insurance affordable for middle-class families by having the federal government pay part of premiums and out-of-pocket costs, but only for people buying nongroup health insurance through the new exchanges.

A provision of the law known as the Grassley amendment requires members of Congress and their staffs to obtain their own health insurance through the exchanges. The amendment gives the authors of the law, and the authors of future tweaks of the law, a personal stake in the success of the plans to be provided through the new exchanges.

Because members of Congress are accustomed to high-quality medical care provided to them through federal employee benefit programs, one might expect that they would push for top quality care to be delivered through the exchanges too. That is one reason why an (ultimately unfounded) report that the Grassley amendment might be reversed prompted so much outrage. (What’s actually at issue is uncertainty over whether the employer contributions in the current health plan for those on Capitol Hill can be applied to coverage through the exchanges.)

But the possibility that middle-class families could obtain care that is both top quality – good enough for your senator – and subsidized creates a number of economic problems. It gives employers a stronger incentive to drop their coverage, because employers and their employees can take comfort in the prospect that the alternative to employer insurance is a health plan that is good enough for your senator.

If the exchange plans were good enough, people who are rushing to find a job, and people considering leaving their job, would no longer have to see employment as their only means of obtaining top quality, subsidized coverage. As a result, some of those would work less (see the Congressional Budget Office on some of health reform’s work incentives, and a 1994 explanation from Alan Krueger and Uwe E. Reinhardt).

The more attractive the subsidized plans are, the more people will join them, and the greater the costs to the federal government. If the Affordable Care Act proves to be too expensive, drastic steps may result, such as closing enrollment in the subsidized exchange plans or repeal of the law all together. Either result would mean that the law’s objectives would go unmet.

There is an alternative approach, pursued in Massachusetts, for those not covered through an employer, a spouse’s employer, or Medicaid or Medicare. They may be eligible to join one of several subsidized plans under the state’s Commonwealth Care program (most are operated by the Medicaid managed care organizations), but those are less desirable than the plans typically offered by employers. With that as the alternative for their middle-class employees, employers would be discouraged from dropping coverage. People would have an incentive to work, because that’s where the best plans would be available.

Massachusetts did not have anything like the Grassley amendment.

For these reasons, economists have long recommended that subsidized goods be of somewhat lower quality than goods available without subsidy. Massachusetts followed that advice, and found that (a) their health reform approach significantly reduced the number of uninsured and that (b) less than 10 percent of the people in Massachusetts whose family income fell in the subsidy-eligible range chose to participate in the subsidized plans.

Although politically incorrect and perhaps unfair, allowing members of Congress to keep their federal employee coverage might be the best thing for universal coverage and reducing the impact of the Affordable Care Act on the federal budget.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/health-coverage-worthy-of-a-senator/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Today’s Economist: Casey B. Mulligan: Tax Exclusions for Health Insurance

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Casey B. Mulligan is an economics professor at the University of Chicago. He is the author of “The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Contracted the Economy.”

The magnitude and distributional effects of the tax exclusion for health insurance look quite different when viewed from the perspective of the entire safety net.

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Expenditures on health services, especially those made through employer-sponsored health-insurance plans, are largely excluded from a host of taxes. The tax exclusions affect both the size of the health-services sector and society’s distribution of disposable income.

By excluding health services from tax, governments in effect redirect money toward health care and away from other activities that might be subsidized or prevent government from reducing overall tax rates, or both. The tax exclusions therefore have a lot in common with direct government spending on health, and for this reason are often described as “tax expenditures.”

A typical approach to estimating the size of the health subsidy implicit in the tax exclusions is to estimate the amount of federal personal income tax revenue that is lost because of the income that escapes tax. It’s important to know the amount of the implicit subsidy, because it is directly related to the amount by which the health sector is enlarged by public policy.

However, the income-tax approach underestimates the amount of the exclusion, because health services are often excluded from many other taxes. The payroll tax is an important instance: employer-provided health-insurance premiums are exempt from payroll and state personal income taxes, too, regardless of whether the employer or employee pays them.

Health-insurance premiums paid by employers on behalf of their employees will escape pretty much anything that taxes an employee’s wages and salaries, because those premiums are not officially considered part of employee wages or salaries. For example, the food-stamp program and Section 8 housing subsidy programs implicitly tax wages and salaries by withholding benefits according to how much a person earns, but for that purpose they ignore employee fringe benefits like health insurance.

Health goods and services often escape state sales taxes, depending on the type of good or service delivered or the type of organization delivering it. Many health services are delivered by nonprofit institutions that escape corporate income and property taxes, too. Just as with the housing industry, we vastly underestimate the government’s effect on the health industry if we focus only on the income tax.

A good summary statistic for the overall effect of tax exclusions on the health industry would be a measure of the marginal tax rate on earned income that included all the relevant taxes. When an employee accepts a $1 pay cut so that his employer can add that dollar to his health insurance contribution, that overall marginal tax rate would tell us how much of that dollar comes back to the employee in the form of the various tax reductions.

I am not aware of a marginal tax-rate measure comprehensive enough for this purpose (it would also need to pay special attention to the Medicaid program and its different treatment of adults and children), but previous studies have taken some useful steps in this direction. The studies find marginal tax rates greater than 50 percent for families above but near the poverty line, which means most of the money they might devote to employer-provided health insurance would come back to them in terms of reduced taxes and enhanced benefits.

More study is needed to quantify accurately the government’s effect on the health market. But we can be sure that public policy has served to enlarge the health industry at the expense of others and that previous estimates do not fully appreciate the magnitude of the distortion.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/tax-exclusions-for-health-insurance/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Today’s Economist: Casey B. Mulligan: A Tale of Two Welfare States

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Casey B. Mulligan is an economics professor at the University of Chicago. He is the author of “The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Contracted the Economy.”

In “A Tale of Two Cities,” Dickens wrote, “It was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness.” The governments of the United States and Britain are embarking on different approaches to helping their poor and unemployed, and one of them may regret its policy decisions.

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As recently as 2010, Britain had a complex system of antipoverty programs ranging, including housing benefits, job seekers’ allowances and mortgage-interest assistance. With so many benefits available, many people found they could make almost as much from the combined programs as they could from working, even while any one of the benefits might not have been all that significant by itself. As Britain’s Department for Work and Pensions described, beneficiaries remained “trapped on benefits for many years as a result.”

Beginning next month, Britain will strive to put its welfare system on a different path by unifying many programs under a single “universal credit” system, what the department describes as an “integrated working-age credit that will provide a basic allowance with additional elements for children, disability, housing and caring.” The department forecasts that its “universal credit will improve financial work incentives by ensuring that support is reduced at a consistent and managed rate as people return to work and increase their working hours and earnings.”

In the United States, the welfare system includes dozens of federal programs, enumerated by Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation as those “providing cash, food, housing, medical care, social services, training and targeted education aid to poor and low-income Americans.” Beginning in 2014, more programs will be added and expanded by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: new health-insurance premium-support programs, new cost-sharing subsidies for out-of-pocket health expenditures, financial hardship relief from the new individual mandate penalties, new subsidies for small businesses employing low-income people and expansion of Medicaid.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Affordable Care Act’s means-tested subsidies and cost-sharing will implicitly add more than 20 percentage points to marginal tax rates on incomes below 400 percent (see Page 27 of the C.B.O. report) of the poverty line (a majority of families fit in this category) by phasing out the assistance as family incomes increase, although a number of families will not receive the subsidies because they already get health insurance from their employer.

These marginal tax-rate additions are on top of the marginal tax rates already in place because of personal income taxes, payroll taxes, unemployment insurance, food stamps and other taxes and means-tested government programs. In 2014, some Americans will be able to make almost as much from combined benefits as they would by working, and sometimes more.

In summary, the United States intends to move in the direction of more assistance programs and higher marginal tax rates, while Britain intends to move in the direction of fewer programs and lower marginal tax rates.

Either country, or both, may ultimately fail to fully carry out the new programs by granting waivers and exceptions, refusing to administer them or by rewriting its new laws. But if both do follow through, perhaps future empirical economic research comparing the United States and Britain will reveal which country is living an age of wisdom and which one in an age of foolishness.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/a-tale-of-two-welfare-states/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Today’s Economist: Casey B. Mulligan: A Time for More Nations

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Casey B. Mulligan is an economics professor at the University of Chicago. He is the author of “The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Contracted the Economy.”

Catalonia, which includes Barcelona, has long been a part of Spain, but its peaceful residents increasingly talk about being an independent country again. In elections over the weekend, where independence was one of the most discussed campaign issues, a majority of offices were won by parties that support more Catalan independence, in one form or another.

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An independent Catalonia would reinforce a worldwide trend. The world’s economics and demography are changing, and economic theory predicts that national borders will change with them (see “The Size of Nations,” by Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore or “A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations,” by David Friedman in The Journal of Political Economy ).

The number of countries has grown since World War II, especially since 1990. The Soviet Union broke into multiple nations. Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia; Yugoslavia dissolved.

In most cases, many citizens of the parts wanted independence from the larger whole. The large countries were often divided by language or ethnicity and were often held together by nondemocratic leadership. The new independent countries emerged as democracy took hold, or shortly after.

In a few instances, countries combined. East Germany and West Germany unified. North and South Vietnam became one when North Vietnam won the Vietnam War. North Yemen and South Yemen were unified. As their names suggest, they have some common language, culture and history, more so than many former Soviet republics did.

Catalonia has its own language, Catalan, and a long history. Under Franco, Spain suppressed many Catalan institutions. And labor was mobile in Spain during the Franco regime, with many Spanish-speakers moving to Catalonia, Spain’s most prosperous region. The prevalence of Spanish in Catalonia, as well as the heavy hand of Franco, may have undercut an independence movement. But Franco’s death in 1975 and the emergence of democracy in Spain did not foster an independent Catalonia.

New generations have been learning Catalan, however, and that may be tipping the balance toward independence.

Catalonia objects to the amount of taxes it pays Spain’s central government, compared with the benefits it receives. One potential step would be to address that situation without full independence, by having Spain’s central government “charge” Catalonia less for being part of Spain by providing tax breaks or more public services.

As governments and redistribution grow, richer regions find taxes to be increasingly burdensome. With the cold war over, ethnically unique regions no longer perceive the same national security benefits of being part of a larger nation.

Catalonia’s situation is worth watching, as it may hold lessons for Libya, Iraq and even the United States, where regions sometimes diverge in terms of culture, language and preferences for governing. A small nation can be established peacefully and may prove to have long-term benefits.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/28/a-time-for-more-nations/?partner=rss&emc=rss