December 21, 2024

DealBook: With Jefferies Deal, ‘Baby Berkshire’ Deviates From Buffett

For years, Leucadia National Corporation followed the investment philosophy of Warren E. Buffett, earning the nickname “Baby Berkshire Hathaway.”

But the conglomerate is now deviating from the deal maker’s playbook. It is buying an entire investment bank, which Mr. Buffett has never done.

On Monday, Leucadia agreed to pay $2.8 billion for the remaining shares of Jefferies Group. With the acquisition, Leucadia, which already owns 28.6 percent of Jefferies, will add a growing midsize investment bank to its eclectic holdings. Jefferies is gaining a deep-pocketed partner to help navigate the uncertainty on Wall Street, an environment that has humbled bigger rivals like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.

“It allows us an even larger foundation to build our company for three, five, seven years with a robust capital base, extremely smart investors as our partners, and do it in a tax-efficient manner,” said Richard B. Handler, the chief executive of Jefferies.

Independent investment banks like Leucadia have been a dwindling breed. Since the financial crisis, new regulations and a sluggish global economy have crimped industry profits. Jefferies’ revenue from fixed-income trading fell 9 percent in the third quarter from the previous three months, mirroring a slump across Wall Street.

With profits slipping, some smaller investment banks are finding it difficult to go it alone. Last week, Stifel Financial agreed to buy KBW in a deal valued at $575 million. The boutique investment bank Gleacher Company recently put itself up for sale.

“I don’t think anyone would say that this is a robust period for investment banking firms,” Mr. Handler said.

Jefferies has sought to transcend its roots from a firm that traded stocks and bonds. In recent years, the investment bank has worked to raise its profile in areas like mergers advisory, a relatively low-cost business that does not require much capital.

The lack of complexity may be part of the appeal. Leucadia is paying about 1.2 times Jefferies’s tangible book value, a measure of a company’s worth.

Investors are not nearly as sanguine about the firm’s bigger brethren, which have significantly larger balance sheets and face stiffer capital requirements. Goldman’s stock trades at 0.9 times its tangible book value, while Morgan Stanley stands at 0.6 times.

Jefferies does not plan to use its expanded war chest to increase the size of its balance sheet, Mr. Handler said in a conference call with analysts. But it could use its new financial heft to make investments, like the $400 million lifeline Jefferies arranged to bail out Knight Capital, a trading firm.

If the deal is approved, Jefferies will begin a new life as the biggest division of Leucadia, a conglomerate that has little recognition outside Wall Street but has drawn the admiration of value investors.

In the late 1970s, Ian Cumming and Joseph Steinberg took over the company, then a struggling specialized lender named Talcott National. The two men, who were classmates at Harvard Business School, named their new firm after Leucadia, Calif., a seaside town.

Like Mr. Buffett, the partners invested in undervalued stocks, building a diverse group of holdings that includes telecommunications companies, the National Beef Packing Company and the Hard Rock Hotel and Casino in Biloxi, Miss. They even worked with Berkshire, buying a commercial loan company now known as Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.

But the Jefferies deal diverges from the Berkshire model. Mr. Buffett is famously wary of investing in complex financial firms. More than 20 years ago, he was burned by his stake in Salomon Brothers, after a bond trading scandal. When he more recently poured billions of dollars into Goldman and Bank of America, Berkshire received securities that paid out handsome dividends, rather than solely betting the stocks would rise in value.

The Jefferies deal may be more than just a traditional takeover play. The acquisition also provides a potential succession plan. Mr. Cumming will retire, handing over the role of chief executive to Mr. Handler of Jefferies. Leucadia’s president, Mr. Steinberg, will become chairman.

The teams have a long history together. Mr. Handler and Mr. Steinberg have been friends for years, and their firms have done business for more than a decade.

Leucadia first took a stake in Jefferies in 2008, gaining 14 percent of the company and two board seats. The two companies had discussed tightening their bond for several years, and the outlines of a merger took shape several months ago, according to people with direct knowledge of the matter.

Leucadia’s management was particularly impressed with Jefferies’s handling of the recent market scare. After MF Global collapsed last year, investors raised concerns about Jefferies holdings in European government debt. Mr. Handler and his team quickly sold off the bonds and provided regular updates on the firm’s financial health, arresting a potentially fatal stock slide.

“Their ability to manage and grow Jefferies through the elongated financial bubble, successfully navigate the crises that followed where others could not, and protect the firm from the attacks based on false information exactly one year ago with deftness and grace, should comfort all,” Mr. Cumming said in a statement.

Peter Eavis contributed reporting.

Article source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/with-jefferies-deal-a-baby-berkshire-goes-where-buffett-hasnt/?partner=rss&emc=rss

DealBook: MF Global Bankruptcy Rattles Wall St. Firms

The markets were haunted this Halloween by the ghosts of the past financial crisis.

With MF Global filing for bankruptcy on Monday, investors pummeled many financial stocks, fearful that problems were lurking on the books of other Wall Street firms. It was a crisis of confidence, not unlike in 2008 when the markets punished stocks on mere speculation of trouble.

On Monday, companies with perceived exposure to MF Global bore the brunt of the pain. The Jefferies Group, which issued a statement saying it had a minimal stake in the brokerage, fell by nearly 10 percent. The Fortress Investment Group, which proactively disclosed that it had “literally zero” exposure, dropped by more than 11 percent.

“Investors across the financial sector are definitely on high alert trying to avoid or minimize these sovereign debt exposures,” said Ed Ditmire, an analyst at Macquarie Capital.

MF Global made a risky bet in a tumultuous market. Recently, the firm revealed that it had $6.3 billion of sovereign debt in troubled countries like Italy and Spain. The position was nearly five times the firm’s equity of more than a billion dollars. As the sovereign debt crisis reached a peak in October, two rating agencies cut the grades on the company’s debt, saying they questioned the firm’s risk controls given the size of the position.

The downgrades sent the company into a tailspin. Trading partners asked the firm to post more money against their portfolio. Adding to the jitters, MF Global reported a third-quarter loss, which further eroded its stock and made its capital position even more tenuous. The firm drew down a $1.3 billion credit line as it fought to stay afloat. But it proved insufficient, and MF Global was forced to file for bankruptcy.

After Moody’s downgrade last week, MF Global sent a letter to clients trying to reassure them of the firm’s strength. On Monday, as some clients called to ask questions and liquidate their accounts, MF Global was not picking up the phone.

Some financial exchanges prevented MF Global employees from entering Monday, while others, including the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the IntercontinentalExchange, halted the firm’s trading in the morning. That forced clients of MF Global to sit tight or liquidate their holdings.

“I’m disappointed in the way the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, MF Global and the regulators have handled this bankruptcy,” said James L. Koutoulas, chief executive of Typhon Capital Management, a hedge fund client of MF Global. “They had no contingency plan in place and just cut off our trading screens, and we’re forced to liquidate clients’ accounts unfavorably.”

It is difficult to know what other firms could face the same pressure. Most of the small brokerages that clear futures trades like MF Global are private companies, so their capital positions are not as vulnerable to the whims of the public markets. The rest of the industry is dominated by large banks, which analysts say have sufficient capital.

The irony is that MF Global’s sovereign debt may turn out to be right — eventually. The firm was ostensibly making the wager that Europe would come to the rescue of its troubled economies and the countries would not default on their debt.

In such a event, MF Global’s holdings would most likely have paid off. But investors and others just did not have the patience to wait and see.

“The positions still have not caused any losses to the best of my knowledge,” said Richard Repetto, an analyst at Sandler O’Neill. “But this risk-taking is just excessive compared to the size of the balance sheet.”

Michael J. de la Merced contributed reporting.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=a5b1b7629ad6284ebd75a0906301c08e