April 26, 2024

A Low-Growth World Can Also Mean High Profits

The economy barely budged in the fourth quarter of 2012, expanding at an annual rate of 0.4 percent, and then only after the initial reading was revised upward. Unemployment was 7.6 percent in March , and home prices, though off their lows, were about where they were a decade ago.

As mediocre as those numbers are, they were achieved with huge Federal Reserve assistance and government spending. Another sobering consideration is that the situation is not so great elsewhere, either. Europe, which is getting central bank help of its own, has sunk into another recession. And while Asia is expanding much faster than the West, it is doing so-so or worse by the standards of its own recent history.

While the first quarter of this year was expected to be better than the fourth quarter of last year, at least in the United States, many economists and investment advisers find themselves resigned to living in a world with persistently low growth. Populations are aging in the developed world, economists point out, while resources are scarcer, and the huge debts run up to finance government stimulus will have to be repaid eventually, diverting money from other uses.

“Hopefully it won’t be slow forever, but over the short to medium term it’s something you need to prepare yourself for, for sure,” said Russell Croft, a co-manager of the Croft Value fund.

The Congressional Budget Office, in a report on the domestic economy issued in February, forecast “real potential gross domestic product” growth of 1.8 percent to 2.5 percent a year through 2023.

Farther afield, the International Monetary Fund expects global growth of 3.8 percent this year and 4 percent in 2014. That is a modest upturn from its estimate of 3.2 percent for 2012, but according to United Nations data, lower than in 9 of the 10 years before the financial crisis.

As somber as the outlook is, slow growth has not been much of a hindrance to stock and bond markets in the last four years, when corporate profit margins reached record highs. That is proof that investment portfolios need not suffer along with the economy, something that hardly surprises Jeremy Grantham, chief investment strategist of the fund management company GMO.

In a recent letter to shareholders, Mr. Grantham said he found little connection between strong profits and strong economic growth. If anything, rapid expansion can hurt bottom lines, he said, because companies tend to pay too high a price trying to exploit it.

“The problem with growth companies and growth countries is that they so often outrun the capital with which to grow and must raise more capital,” diluting earnings per share, he said.

That doesn’t make it safe to ignore the economic environment. Those who foresee continued lethargy point out that investors have already had several years to adjust to slow growth and have put their money to work accordingly. That means that they can expect returns to be lower, and to come from fewer market niches, and not necessarily the ones that conventional wisdom suggests would do better.

“The attitude is that slow growth equals a bad investment environment, so you want to buy bonds,” said Nathan J. Rowader, director of investments at the Forward Funds. “But interest rates are very depressed, so you can’t get decent returns in bonds. You need to think about it from a secular standpoint. Low growth and low rates is a good environment for stocks.”

Mr. Rowader favors businesses that return cash to shareholders rather than investing it in a heroic effort to wring growth out of an economy that has little of it.

“It’s important in this scenario to buy dividend-paying stocks, because the ways that companies can grow earnings are limited,” he said. “It means something to show that they can pay dividends and grow them over time instead of hoping that the economy gets better.”

Suitable companies tend to have strong balance sheets and credit ratings, Mr. Rowader said. They do not have much debt, but can borrow cheaply anytime they choose. He prefers European examples over American ones because they have similar business mixes, but are often cheaper.

“They can grow their dividends over time, but they’re being punished because they’re European,” he said. “You can also get a bump up when that undervaluation starts to correct itself.”

Three such companies in Forward’s portfolios are Lottomatica, an Italian provider of gambling technology; Danone, the French food giant; and Ensco, a British enterprise engaged in deepwater oil drilling.

CHUCK AKRE, manager of the Akre Focus fund, says he likes to look for stocks of companies that can expand despite the poor economy.

“We continue to be focused on trying to find compounders,” Mr. Akre said, meaning companies that generate comparatively high returns on capital and have a record of plowing earnings back into their businesses in wise, profitable ways. The sorts of returns that they can produce are lower in a sluggish economy, he added, but their valuations are lower, too, so shareholders can still do well.

Two of his holdings are MasterCard and Visa. Even though “in a slower-growth economy people spend a little less on cards,” he said, these companies can still flourish from the broad global trend toward increasing card use and less reliance on cash and checks.

Mr. Akre also owns shares of American Tower, which rents space on cellphone towers through contracts that call for annual price increases. “It’s a great business model regardless of the environment,” he said. “It’s vertical real estate.”

Mr. Croft shares Mr. Rowader’s appreciation of big dividend payouts, but Mr. Croft prefers to obtain them from American companies that do business in places with “pockets of growth that are faster than the U.S.,” he said.

His selections include Mondelez International, a snack food manufacturer spun off from Kraft that derives 45 percent of sales from emerging markets; the tobacco producer Philip Morris International and “solid blue-chip companies that may not be as expensive as they used to be,” like Johnson Johnson and Pfizer.

Mr. Croft also likes companies that are improving productivity or resolving issues that have limited profits, including three makers of big-ticket items of various sorts, Whirlpool, Ford Motor and Honeywell. The idea is to own businesses that are fixing themselves when the economy is struggling to manage the same feat.

“Everyone talks about how margins are at their peaks, and they wonder how long it can keep going,” he said. “You’ve got to find companies that are hitting new peaks and are going to keep getting better.”

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/business/mutfund/a-low-growth-world-can-also-mean-high-profits.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Today’s Economist: Simon Johnson: The Debate on Bank Size Is Over

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Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You.”

While bank lobbyists and some commentators are suddenly taken with the idea that an active debate is under way about whether to limit bank size in the United States, they are wrong. The debate is over; the decision to cap the size of the largest banks has been made. All that remains is to work out the details.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

To grasp the new reality, think about the Cyprus debacle this month, the Senate budget resolution last week and Ben Bernanke’s revelation that — on too big to fail — “I agree with Elizabeth Warren 100 percent that it’s a real problem.”

Policy is rarely changed by ideas alone and, in isolation, even stunning events can sometimes have surprisingly little effect. What really moves the needle in terms of consensus among policy makers and the broader public opinion is when events combine with a new understanding of how the world works. Thanks to Senator Sherrod Brown, Democrat of Ohio; Senator Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, and many other people who have worked hard over the last four years, we are ready to understand what finally defeated the argument that bank size does not matter: Cyprus.

There is no shortage of recrimination about how the Europeans handled the Cypriot situation. And it’s hard to feel good about a policy process that ends with the president of the Eurogroup of finance ministers, Jeroen Dijsselbloem of the Netherlands, flip-flopping on the most important issue of all: who will bear losses and in what precise order of priority, in the (likely) event of future euro-zone financial system meltdowns.

Specifically, Mr. Dijsselbloem began by making a clear statement on Monday regarding how the Cyprus situation would serve as a template for future assistance within the euro zone. After a few hours of falling stock prices for banks in peripheral Europe, he did not so much walk this statement back as sprint it back at full speed, with this remarkable retraction (provided here in its entirety):

Cyprus is a specific case with exceptional challenges which required the bail-in measures we have agreed upon yesterday.

Macroeconomic adjustment programs are tailor-made to the situation of the country concerned and no models or templates are used.

I would translate this into plain English as: “We, the combined finance ministers of Europe, have no idea what we will want to do in the future — and we have no plans to work that out before bad things actually happen.”

My colleague Jacob F. Kirkegaard, a must-read expert on European policy and its nuances, is hopeful that Europe is moving toward a variant of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation rules-based approach to bank resolution, in which small depositors have complete confidence they will be fully protected and other kinds of investors understand where they stand relative to potential losses (and to each other).

Contrast the chaos of the last week and Mr. Dijsselbloem’s verbal contortions with what happened when IndyMac Bancorp failed in 2008 (on the latter, I recommend Chapter 7 in Sheila Bair’s book, “Bull by the Horns”). The F.D.I.C. has very clear rules, laid out by statute and reinforced by precedent. The agency knows how to close a small or medium-scale bank without a macroeconomic soap opera — and a national catastrophe. (IndyMac had $32 billion in assets when it failed.)

But the bigger point from Cyprus is much simpler. Why would you want one or two banks to become so large in terms of their assets relative to gross domestic product that a single mistaken calculation can bring down the economy? In the American context, why would you allow any bank to outgrow the F.D.I.C.’s ability to resolve it in a relatively straightforward and low-cost manner? (The largest bank failure handled to date was that of Washington Mutual, also known as WaMu, with $307 billion in assets; JPMorgan Chase, today the world’s largest bank when measured properly, has assets closer to $4 trillion).

According to their proponents, two troubled Cypriot banks, Bank of Cyprus and Laiki Bank (also known as Cyprus Popular Bank and previously known as Marfin Popular Bank), “only” made the mistake of buying Greek government bonds, before those were restructured and fell in value, reflecting the terms of the latest euro-zone rescue package for Athens.

The third largest Cypriot bank, Hellenic Bank, also has some problems but remains out of the news for now. (For background, see this Bank of Cyprus investor presentation through September 2012 and Laiki’s third-quarter results. In both cases, these are the latest available on their Web sites.)

But this single mistake resulted in combined losses worth at least one-quarter of Cyprus’s G.D.P., not just because the bets were big relative to the balance sheets of those banks, but rather because the banks are so big relative to the economy. Banking assets in Cyprus reached seven times G.D.P., with the Bank of Cyprus having a balance sheet valued at roughly twice Cypriot G.D.P. and Laiki only slightly smaller (see the investor relations presentations linked above, with more background at Figure 3 in this paper).

And in another case study for Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig’s cautionary book, “The Bankers’ New Clothes,” the Cypriot banks had wafer-thin layers of equity, so big losses have to fall on creditors (unless taxpayers somewhere are feeling generous). For Bank of Cyprus, equity was supposedly 2.3 billion euros at the end of the third quarter of 2012, when the bank’s assets were 36.2 billion euros. I haven’t seen a convincing statement of Laiki’s recent equity funding level. The chairman of the Bank of Cyprus resigned on Tuesday, although there remains some confusion about who among the bank’s board and senior management remains on the job.

Furthermore, these banks structured their liabilities so that their only real creditors providing private-sector funding were depositors (i.e., they issued very little by way of bonds or similar forms of debt). Hence the options became either a complete bailout supported by the euro zone (making the bank creditors whole) or losses for at least some depositors.

The scale of losses in the latter route will disrupt the economy for many years and is likely to end the Cypriot offshore banking model.

Given that we have a choice, why would any American want to allow a few banks to become so vulnerable and so big relative to the economy?

Our largest banks are not yet at Cypriot scale, thank goodness. But they want to get bigger and they receive implicit government subsidies, in the form of downside protection available to creditors, which enable them to borrow more and potentially expand without limit.

In fact, it was the stated policy of former Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner to encourage these banks to grow further — for example, to provide financial services to emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and Africa. This is not any kind of market outcome but rather a poorly conceived and extremely dangerous government subsidy scheme.

The good news at the end of last week was that the Senate unanimously decided that the United States should go in another direction, by ending the funding advantages of megabanks.

The decision was expressed in an amendment to the nonbinding Senate budget resolution, but this does not make it any less momentous. The vote was 99 to 0, as a result of a lot of hard work by Senators Brown and David Vitter, Republican of Louisiana, and their respective staffs. Senators Bob Corker, Republican of Tennessee, and Mark Pryor, Democrat of Arkansas, also joined this important initiative.

Lobbyists were, naturally, apoplectic.

But making last week even more decisive, Mr. Bernanke’s language shifted significantly. In a recent interaction with Senator Warren, which I wrote about in this space, Mr. Bernanke had essentially denied that large financial institutions represent a threat.

Now he has denied that denial, saying in the clearest possible terms during a news conference on March 20: “Too big to fail is not solved and gone,” adding, “It’s still here.”

And in case anyone did not fully grasp his message, Mr. Bernanke explained, “Too big to fail was a major source of the crisis, and we will not have successfully responded to the crisis if we do not address that successfully.”

Now that the policy consensus has shifted, how exactly policy plays out remains to be seen (Rob Blackwell of American Banker has some suggested scenarios).

Legislation under development by Senators Brown and Vitter will definitely be worth supporting. Opinion on Capitol Hill has now moved in a way that will continue to reinforce itself, particularly as the European disaster unfolds.

The Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors is getting the message. Even William Dudley, president of the New York Fed, a traditional bastion of Wall Street, is signaling that he now knows which way the wind is blowing.

The Orwellian doublespeak of Wall Street — nicely described by Dennis Kelleher of Better Markets — has taken a beating. Next up: cutting the subsidies of the biggest banks in a meaningful way.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/the-debate-on-bank-size-is-over/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Cyprus’s Bailout Plan Meets With Skepticism

The Parliament put off until later this weekend a vote on a crucial new proposal that would confiscate 22 to 25 percent of uninsured deposits above 100,000 euros through a new tax on account holders in one of the nation’s most troubled banks.

So with a deadline imposed by the European Central Bank looming on Monday, it appeared there was still no immediate path to a lifeline of 10 billion euros, or $13 billion, that Cyprus needs to keep its banks from collapsing.

Cyprus’s so-called troika of lenders — the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank — must still approve any plan. President Nicos Anastasiades was scheduled to fly to Brussels on Saturday to meet with European Union leaders, a spokesman said.

Monday is a national holiday in Cyprus, but banks are supposed to reopen on Tuesday for the first time in more than a week. There is widespread fear of a classic bank run.

On Friday, Cypriots jammed into supermarkets after lining up all day Thursday at automated teller machines to withdraw as much cash as possible. Gas stations were taking cash only, and some retailers reported that they would no longer accept credit.

One of the provisions Parliament approved Friday would impose new restrictions on withdrawing cash or moving money out of the country when the banks reopen. These new capital controls would prohibit or restrict check-cashing and bar “premature” account closings or any other transaction the authorities deemed unwarranted.

Lawmakers also voted to restructure the nation’s largest and most troubled bank, Laiki Bank, by splitting off its troubled assets into a so-called bad bank. Accounts with no problem would be transferred to the nation’s largest financial institution, the Bank of Cyprus. Lawmakers also voted to require that any bank on the verge of bankruptcy be split apart in the same way.

By effectively shutting down one of the banks needing support, the government could lower the 5.8-billion-euro sum that international lenders are demanding in exchange for a bailout. The consolidation of Laiki, also known as Cyprus Popular Bank, effectively relieves the government of a large expense of supporting the banking system, which is on the verge of collapsing under a mountain of souring loans to Greek businesses and individuals.

Still to be voted on is the measure to impose a tax of 22 to 25 percent on uninsured deposits at the Bank of Cyprus. That proposal was made after lawmakers rejected a plan earlier in the week to tax insured deposits to help raise the amount needed to secure the bailout. The Parliament appears to be trying to make up the difference in part by shifting the burden to large account holders.

When euro zone finance ministers negotiated the original bailout terms last weekend, Cypriot officials had resisted limiting the tax to large accounts, evidently to avoid damaging the country’s reputation as a haven for wealthy banking clients. Many of the wealthiest citizens of Russia have euro-denominated bank accounts in Cyprus, which is one reason that euro zone finance ministers have taken such a hard line.

The decision to tax uninsured deposits came after Cyprus proposed nationalizing the pension funds of state-owned Cypriot companies.

Lawmakers approved the pension takeover on Friday, but the move was denounced in Germany, whose political and financial influence in the euro zone tends to dictate policy.

  “When you consider that there was massive resistance against involving the savings, then it is not easy to see how tapping the pension funds, which we view as socially a much more drastic step, is a very good idea,” Steffen Seibert, a spokesman for the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, told reporters.

The suggestion of tapping pension funds touches off a visceral response in Germany, where history has proved the dangers of such ideas. German pensions were tapped to finance both world wars, and the idea remains anathema to German leaders today.

Contributing reporting were Melissa Eddy in Berlin, James Kanter in Brussels, David M. Herszenhorn in Moscow, Niki Kitsantonis in Athens and Andreas Riris in Nicosia.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/23/business/global/cyprus-bailout-vote.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Today’s Economist: Simon Johnson: The London Whale, Richard Fisher and Cyprus

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Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You.”

In the ordinary course of political events, months or even years pass between a definitive investigation and sensible policy remedies being proposed. There was a lag, for example, between the Pecora hearings in the 1933 and some of the modern securities legislation that followed. (Consider reading Michael Perino’s book, “The Hellhound of Wall Street,” or watch his 2009 conversation with Bill Moyers, in which I took part.)

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

We finally had a modern Pecora moment last Friday, when Senators Carl Levin of Michigan and John McCain of Arizona laid bare how JPMorgan Chase has been run since the financial crisis and since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, which supposedly “reformed” banks.

Within 24 hours, we had the clearest possible statement of how to think about the modern financial system – and make it less risky – in the form of a speech by Richard Fisher, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The timing was presumably coincidental, yet it also reflects the speed with which smart people are reassessing the risks posed by the mismanagement of financial institutions. With Mr. Fisher as a thought leader, some of the best new ideas are being developed within the Federal Reserve System.

The question now is how fast attitudes will change within the Board of Governors, the seven presidential appointees who sit atop the Federal Reserve System. Unfortunately, at least two powerful governors seem to resist sensible further reform.

At its heart, the Levin-McCain report reveals executives with a profound misunderstanding of risk in the world’s largest bank (I use the calculations of comparative bank size offered by Thomas Hoenig, vice chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). Even worse, the report shows us in some detail that banks – even after Dodd-Frank – can and do readily manipulate complicated measures of risk in order to make their positions look safer than they really are.

As Jeremy Stein, a Fed governor, pointed out recently, there are strong incentives to do this repeatedly in banking organizations (read the opening few paragraphs of his speech carefully).

The banking regulators – in this case, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency – are clearly unable to keep up with this form of “financial innovation” (which is really just clever ways to misreport risk).

Did JPMorgan Chase’s top management do this intentionally? Did they mislead investors, particularly in the fateful conference call on April 13, 2012? This is a fascinating question on which the courts will no doubt rule. (You should also review this report by Josh Rosner of Graham Fisher, with the link kindly provided by Better Markets.)

Jamie Dimon will survive because JPMorgan Chase remains profitable. But it is profitable precisely because it receives implicit subsidies from being too big to fail. JPMorgan Chase disputes the precise scale of these subsidies – as Idiscussed here last week. Let’s just call them humongous.

This is not about individuals, this is about policy. And Richard Fisher has exactly the right approach:

At the Dallas Fed, we believe that whatever the precise subsidy number is, it exists, it is significant, and it allows the biggest banking organizations, along with their many nonbank subsidiaries (investment firms, securities lenders, finance companies), to grow larger and riskier.

This is patently unfair. It makes for an uneven playing field, tilted to the advantage of Wall Street against Main Street, placing the financial system and the economy in constant jeopardy.

It also undermines citizens’ faith in the rule of law and representative democracy.

Mr. Fisher’s speech is entitled “Ending ‘Too Big To Fail,’” the same title as a recent speech by Jerome Powell, a governor of the Fed board (which I wrote about here recently).

The difference between Mr. Fisher’s approach and what Mr. Powell proposes is significant, particularly regarding the timing for needed action.

Mr. Fisher wants to make the largest banks smaller – and particularly force investors to confront the reality that they will face losses when high-risk investment banking arms fail. In Mr. Fisher’s words:

The downsized, formerly too-big-to-fail banks would then be just like the other 99.8 percent, failing with finality when necessary – closed on Friday and reopened on Monday under new ownership and management in the customary process administered by the F.D.I.C.

Mr. Powell, by contrast, is not willing to take any additional actions at this time. As far as we can see, the Fed’s chairman, Ben Bernanke, is on the same side as Mr. Powell in this argument. But the Bernanke-Powell team is losing ground almost every day, at least on the merits of the argument. On Wednesday, Mr. Bernanke seemed to move a little closer to Mr. Fisher’s position but did not go as far as he should.

As Jesse Eisinger sums up the JPMorgan Chase mess with its multibillion-dollar trading loss last year, “Regulators remain their duped and docile selves.” The view that “smart regulation” can rein in excessive risk-taking is completely implausible.

Cyprus now demonstrates that the case for limiting the size of individual banks relative to the size of the economy is beyond debate. The awful financial debacle in that country, including the fumbled bailout unfolding this week, is a further reminder of the dangerous ledge on which we live.

If you let a few banks become very large relative to the economy, then their missteps can cause enormous damage – and big costs that will fall on someone. The losses incurred by Cypriot banks – around 6 billion euros (almost $8 billion) – are roughly on the same scale as the losses suffered by JPMorgan Chase as a result of its failed “London Whale” trades.

As the Nobel laureate Christopher Pissarides points out, nothing about this situation is fair or good for economic prosperity. A few Cypriot banks bet big on Greek bonds, very big, and their losses are about one-third of Cypriot G.D.P. Why would anyone want bank executives and traders to be in a position to do this much damage to a country?

The question is only what the size cap should be – surely in the United States we should seek to be below the risk levels that built up in Cyprus (or Iceland or Switzerland or Britain). In fact, why should any single financial institution be big enough to damage the United States with its miscalculations or misrepresentations? Yet the existence of too-big-to-fail subsidies means that a financial company like JPMorgan Chase has motive and opportunity to become even larger.

The British have figured out that finance needs to become safer; the authorities there are pushing for higher capital levels (above what seems likely to happen in the United States). And Martin Wolf, an influential senior columnist at The Financial Times, has a ringing endorsement of Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig’s new book, “The Bankers’ New Clothes,” on what is wrong with banking. Expect more British thinking to follow in this direction.

Why, in the United States, are we standing by?

As with so much in our economy today, much depends on the Federal Reserve. The Fed could do a great deal by itself to make the largest banks smaller and safer; the F.D.I.C. is ready to move in this direction.

The Fed likes to look to Congress for action. But Congress will not act unless so advised by the Fed.

It’s time for Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Powell to listen more carefully to Mr. Fisher – as they watch the awful events in Cyprus.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/the-london-whale-richard-fisher-and-cyprus/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix Blog: Simon Johnson: The London Whale, Richard Fisher and Cyprus

DESCRIPTION

Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You.”

In the ordinary course of political events, months or even years pass between a definitive investigation and sensible policy remedies being proposed. There was a lag, for example, between the Pecora hearings in the 1933 and some of the modern securities legislation that followed. (Consider reading Michael Perino’s book, “The Hellhound of Wall Street,” or watch his 2009 conversation with Bill Moyers, in which I took part.)

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

We finally had a modern Pecora moment last Friday, when Senators Carl Levin of Michigan and John McCain of Arizona laid bare how JPMorgan Chase has been run since the financial crisis and since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, which supposedly “reformed” banks.

Within 24 hours, we had the clearest possible statement of how to think about the modern financial system – and make it less risky – in the form of a speech by Richard Fisher, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The timing was presumably coincidental, yet it also reflects the speed with which smart people are reassessing the risks posed by the mismanagement of financial institutions. With Mr. Fisher as a thought leader, some of the best new ideas are being developed within the Federal Reserve System.

The question now is how fast attitudes will change within the Board of Governors, the seven presidential appointees who sit atop the Federal Reserve System. Unfortunately, at least two powerful governors seem to resist sensible further reform.

At its heart, the Levin-McCain report reveals executives with a profound misunderstanding of risk in the world’s largest bank (I use the calculations of comparative bank size offered by Thomas Hoenig, vice chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). Even worse, the report shows us in some detail that banks – even after Dodd-Frank – can and do readily manipulate complicated measures of risk in order to make their positions look safer than they really are.

As Jeremy Stein, a Fed governor, pointed out recently, there are strong incentives to do this repeatedly in banking organizations (read the opening few paragraphs of his speech carefully).

The banking regulators – in this case, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency – are clearly unable to keep up with this form of “financial innovation” (which is really just clever ways to misreport risk).

Did JPMorgan Chase’s top management do this intentionally? Did they mislead investors, particularly in the fateful conference call on April 13, 2012? This is a fascinating question on which the courts will no doubt rule. (You should also review this report by Josh Rosner of Graham Fisher, with the link kindly provided by Better Markets.)

Jamie Dimon will survive because JPMorgan Chase remains profitable. But it is profitable precisely because it receives implicit subsidies from being too big to fail. JPMorgan Chase disputes the precise scale of these subsidies – as Idiscussed here last week. Let’s just call them humongous.

This is not about individuals, this is about policy. And Richard Fisher has exactly the right approach:

At the Dallas Fed, we believe that whatever the precise subsidy number is, it exists, it is significant, and it allows the biggest banking organizations, along with their many nonbank subsidiaries (investment firms, securities lenders, finance companies), to grow larger and riskier.

This is patently unfair. It makes for an uneven playing field, tilted to the advantage of Wall Street against Main Street, placing the financial system and the economy in constant jeopardy.

It also undermines citizens’ faith in the rule of law and representative democracy.

Mr. Fisher’s speech is entitled “Ending ‘Too Big To Fail,’” the same title as a recent speech by Jerome Powell, a governor of the Fed board (which I wrote about here recently).

The difference between Mr. Fisher’s approach and what Mr. Powell proposes is significant, particularly regarding the timing for needed action.

Mr. Fisher wants to make the largest banks smaller – and particularly force investors to confront the reality that they will face losses when high-risk investment banking arms fail. In Mr. Fisher’s words:

The downsized, formerly too-big-to-fail banks would then be just like the other 99.8 percent, failing with finality when necessary – closed on Friday and reopened on Monday under new ownership and management in the customary process administered by the F.D.I.C.

Mr. Powell, by contrast, is not willing to take any additional actions at this time. As far as we can see, the Fed’s chairman, Ben Bernanke, is on the same side as Mr. Powell in this argument. But the Bernanke-Powell team is losing ground almost every day, at least on the merits of the argument. On Wednesday, Mr. Bernanke seemed to move a little closer to Mr. Fisher’s position but did not go as far as he should.

As Jesse Eisinger sums up the JPMorgan Chase mess with its multibillion-dollar trading loss last year, “Regulators remain their duped and docile selves.” The view that “smart regulation” can rein in excessive risk-taking is completely implausible.

Cyprus now demonstrates that the case for limiting the size of individual banks relative to the size of the economy is beyond debate. The awful financial debacle in that country, including the fumbled bailout unfolding this week, is a further reminder of the dangerous ledge on which we live.

If you let a few banks become very large relative to the economy, then their missteps can cause enormous damage – and big costs that will fall on someone. The losses incurred by Cypriot banks – around 6 billion euros (almost $8 billion) – are roughly on the same scale as the losses suffered by JPMorgan Chase as a result of its failed “London Whale” trades.

As the Nobel laureate Christopher Pissarides points out, nothing about this situation is fair or good for economic prosperity. A few Cypriot banks bet big on Greek bonds, very big, and their losses are about one-third of Cypriot G.D.P. Why would anyone want bank executives and traders to be in a position to do this much damage to a country?

The question is only what the size cap should be – surely in the United States we should seek to be below the risk levels that built up in Cyprus (or Iceland or Switzerland or Britain). In fact, why should any single financial institution be big enough to damage the United States with its miscalculations or misrepresentations? Yet the existence of too-big-to-fail subsidies means that a financial company like JPMorgan Chase has motive and opportunity to become even larger.

The British have figured out that finance needs to become safer; the authorities there are pushing for higher capital levels (above what seems likely to happen in the United States). And Martin Wolf, an influential senior columnist at The Financial Times, has a ringing endorsement of Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig’s new book, “The Bankers’ New Clothes,” on what is wrong with banking. Expect more British thinking to follow in this direction.

Why, in the United States, are we standing by?

As with so much in our economy today, much depends on the Federal Reserve. The Fed could do a great deal by itself to make the largest banks smaller and safer; the F.D.I.C. is ready to move in this direction.

The Fed likes to look to Congress for action. But Congress will not act unless so advised by the Fed.

It’s time for Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Powell to listen more carefully to Mr. Fisher – as they watch the awful events in Cyprus.

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/the-london-whale-richard-fisher-and-cyprus/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Lenders Ask Greece for Additional Cuts

Greek officials scramble to tackle demands for more austerity to obtain the money, even as social distress deepens.

The cycle was staged again Thursday as the Greek government tried to figure out how to meet one of the troika’s toughest requirements: designating 25,000 of the country’s 650,000 or so civil servants for eventual dismissal.

That was one of the international creditors’ demands late Wednesday as their inspectors suspended the latest examination of Greece’s economic overhaul program, leaving town and leaving Greek officials to sharpen their pencils and steel their resolve to find more budget cuts.

The mission chiefs are expected to return to Athens in early April, the troika of lenders — the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund — said in a statement on Thursday.

After a week poring through Greece’s books, representatives of the three bodies did praise Greece for making “significant” progress in mending its finances. But they said Athens needed to follow through more strictly on pledges to reduce the size of its bloated government before unlocking the next installment of Greece’s bailout allowance: a 2.8 billion euro ($3.6 billion) tranche due next month.

On Wednesday night, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras and his finance minister, Yannis Stournaras, expressed confidence that Greece would receive the money, speaking ahead of a European Union economic summit meeting in Brussels. European leaders there are trying to head off a rising anti-austerity tide while there are signs that programs like the one in Greece are retarding the bloc’s return to growth.

In the eyes of Greece’s creditors, the country has fallen short too many times on pledges to cut government spending and revamp major areas of the economy that the outside experts say Greece requires if it is to move toward financial independence.

Recently, though, Greece has shown progress. It reported a primary surplus of 1.64 billion euros for January — meaning that the government was bringing in more revenue than it was spending, excluding interest payments. It was Greece’s first primary surplus since 2002.

Further, inflation was only 0.1 percent in February, the lowest reading in 45 years. Such data have largely quieted fears that Greece could exit the euro zone.

The judiciary has also made several prominent moves in recent weeks to show it is rooting out corruption by jailing two former politicians for graft and tax evasion.

And yet Greece, which has received more than 200 billion euros in bailout loans since May 2010, is still making little headway on structural changes that creditors say must happen if the economy is ever to resume growing and become self-sustaining.

The most politically challenging moves for Greece’s coalition government involve the troika’s demands to continue cutting the number of public sector employees. Creditors said Greece had not provided enough details on how it plans to dismiss 7,000 civil servants accused of misdemeanors; to put 25,000 other workers into a special labor reserve that will eventually be eliminated; or to step up the pace of Civil Service retirements.

Until troika auditors are persuaded that Athens can hit those marks, the next aid installment may not be released.

Those measures would need to be taken even as Greek unemployment is at a record 26 percent. In the fourth quarter, nearly 1.3 million people were out of work, in a population of 10 million. Youth unemployment has surged to nearly 58 percent.

Greek consumers continue to make do with less, in response to three years of pay and pension cuts. The real disposable income of households has fallen by a third in that time, and recent increases in property taxes and the value-added tax have crimped spending.

The government reported a revenue shortfall of 260 million euros for the first two months of the year, citing increased tax evasion by citizens and businesses, and the closing of regional tax offices to trim government expenses.

And plans to privatize Greek state-owned assets to raise tens of billions of euros in revenue have stalled again. The head of the agency running that program stepped down last weekend after he was charged with breach of duty for commissioning a power plant in 2007 when he was head of the power board. It was the second such resignation in two years.

Officials say they remain hopeful, though, that some lucrative assets, including the state gambling agency, may be sold in the coming months, a step that they hope will restore confidence in the country and lure investors back to Greece.

Niki Kitsantonis contributed reporting.

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: March 15, 2013

An earlier version of this article misstated the next installment of Greece’s bailout package. It is 2.8 billion euros, not 2.5 billion euros. It also misstated the revenue shortfall reported by the government for the first two months of the year. It is 260 million euros, not 260 billion euros.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/business/global/once-more-troika-asks-greece-to-sharpen-pencils.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Israel Central Bank Chief to Step Down in June

In a brief statement, the Bank of Israel said governor Stanley Fischer informed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he will step down on June 30. It gave no explanation for the departure and said he would give a news conference on Wednesday to formally announce the decision.

Fischer, an internationally respected economist, served as deputy director of the International Monetary Fund and held top posts the World Bank and Citigroup Inc. before taking over Israel’s central bank in 2005.

His monetary policies and Israel’s tight control of its banks are seen responsible for the nation’s stability despite the worldwide economic crisis that hit during his reign. Israel’s economy continues to grow, and unemployment is roughly 6.5 percent, relatively low in world terms.

His departure comes two years before the end of his second five-year term. Israeli media speculated that his resignation was due to personal reasons, not a disagreement with the government.

In a statement, Netanyahu praised Fischer and thanked him for his service.

“Professor Stanley Fischer played a major role in the economic growth of the state of Israel and in the achievements of the Israeli economy,” he said. “His experience, his wisdom and his international connections opened a door to the economies of the world and assisted the Israeli economy in reaching many achievements during a period of global economic crisis.”

Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz called Fischer “an asset not only to the Israeli economy but also to Israel’s international image, thanks to his status and connections in the world.”

Fischer, 69, was born in North Rhodesia, now Zambia, and educated at the London School of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as the thesis adviser to U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke at MIT in the 1970s.

At the IMF, he worked on resolving financial crises in Mexico, Russia, and Southeast Asia during the 1990s. He was a vice chairman at Citigroup when he was hired as central bank chief.

Fischer was initially seen as an outsider when he first arrived, wearing tailored suits in an open-collar Mediterranean country and speaking heavily accented Hebrew. He quickly won plaudits for his calm demeanor and success in managing the economy through turbulent times.

In Israel, Fischer has been credited with moving early to cut interest rates and intervening in the currency market to protect the local export sector.

With the economy improving in 2009, Israel began raising interest rates, making it the first nation to take such a step toward post-recession stabilization. He was also instrumental in promoting Israel’s successful bid for acceptance into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a grouping of 30 of the world’s richest nations.

In mid-2011, Fischer applied for the top job at the IMF, after its director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was forced to resign. At the time, he called it a “once-in-a-lifetime” opportunity. He was disqualified because, 67 years old at the time, he was two years above the maximum age for an incoming managing director.

Sever Plocker, an Israeli economic commentator, said Fischer was “the responsible adult” of the Israeli economy throughout his eight-year tenure and revamped the entire approach to economic thinking in Israel.

Fischer pushed for a bill outlining a new governing structure for the central bank that promotes transparency and stability. He maintained large sums of foreign currency reserves, now standing at some $75 billion, and wielded significant influence over fiscal policy that has led to Israel’s high growth rate and low unemployment.

“Because of his status, everyone was afraid of him and his criticism, and he is responsible for Israel’s government carrying out a largely responsible policy these past eight years,” said Plocker, the economic editor at the Yediot Ahronot daily.

“He was willing to use interest rates as a tool. Previous governors saw interest rates only as a way to battle inflation. He also used them to prevent unemployment and recession,” Plocker said.

“No man is irreplaceable, but his departure is a huge loss to the Israeli economy,” he said.

Fischer faced some criticism from those who said his low interest rate policy contributed to a surge in Israel’s housing prices. Plocker countered that the effect was negligible, and a lack of supply was the main cause of the housing crisis.

His successor will face significant challenges, including the still skyrocketing real-estate market, shielding the country from the European economic crisis and coping with a larger than expected government deficit that could well bring deep cutbacks.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2013/01/29/world/middleeast/ap-ml-israel-economy.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

DealBook: In Davos, Atmosphere for Bankers Improves

FRANKFURT — Two years ago, Jamie Dimon, chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, told an audience in Davos that people should stop picking on bankers. Mr. Dimon is still waiting for his wish to come true.

Bankers, always a big presence at the World Economic Forum in the Swiss town of Davos, arrive this year under less regulatory pressure and with better profits than in past years. But they are still on the defensive.

Mr. Dimon, scheduled to appear on one of the first panels when the Davos forum opens Wednesday, is again embroiled in controversy. Last week JPMorgan’s board cut his pay for 2012 in half, to $11.5 million, holding him accountable for a multibillion dollar loss in derivatives trading.

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International bankers are under fire from the law-enforcement authorities as well, and one does not have to go far from Davos to find examples.

UBS, based in Zurich, agreed to pay a $1.5 billion fine to the global authorities after admitting this month that it had helped manipulate a key benchmark rate used to set mortgage and other interest rates.

Wegelin, a private bank based in St. Gallen, Switzerland, shut down this month after admitting it had helped wealthy Americans evade taxes. The bank, founded in 1741, had been Switzerland’s oldest.

And at a news conference last week in Washington, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, lamented a “waning commitment” to tougher financial regulation and called upon the banking authorities to finish the job of fixing the world’s banks.

For all that, though, bankers may find the atmosphere in Davos a bit more congenial than in some recent years. Among the government overseers who will also be flocking to the Swiss town, there seems to be a growing feeling that the banks have taken enough abuse.

This month, for instance, an international conclave of central bankers and bank supervisors, meeting in Basel, Switzerland, relaxed new rules that were intended to ensure that banks would be able to survive an event like the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.

The rules, which are not binding but are a benchmark for national regulators, would require banks to maintain a 30-day supply of cash or liquid assets that are easy to convert into cash. But after the decision in Basel this month banks would have until 2019 to accumulate the additional cash and assets, instead of 2015. The regulators also broadened the kinds of assets that qualify, so that now they can include even some mortgage-backed securities: the same general class of security that was at the heart of the crisis.

Many analysts see the decision as a gift to the banking industry, which had maintained that planned new regulations would force them to curtail lending. Bank stocks in Europe rose after the decision.

“Most bankers I talked to breathed a huge sigh of relief,” said Cornelius Hurley, a professor at the Boston University School of Law and former counsel to the Federal Reserve board of governors.

Gavan Nolan, a credit analyst at Markit, a data provider in London, agreed that changes in the rules ‘‘went further than many had presumed, and in a direction that seems to favor the banks.’’ Still, in a note to clients he added, ‘‘the effects shouldn’t be overstated.’’ The rules ‘‘will still make it more difficult to make money, in comparison to the previous era.’’

The discussions at Davos may offer clues about whether the Basel decisions foreshadow other concessions to bankers. There is a risk that efforts to rein in financial risk could lose momentum as the Lehman trauma fades, Mr. Hurley said.

“We said to ourselves back in 2008 a crisis is a terrible thing to waste,” he said. “It seems the farther away we get the evidence is that we are wasting it.”

The World Economic Forum tends to be a place for talk rather than action, but it is one of the few events that reliably brings central bankers, regulators, economists, legislators and bankers under one snow-laden roof.

The discussions sometimes have been contentious, as in 2010 when U.S. policy makers like Representative Barney Frank met behind closed doors with top bankers including Brian T. Moynihan, then the chief executive of Bank of America.

Mr. Frank left the meeting fuming about bankers’ unwillingness to accept more safeguards and vowed to impose them anyway. Six months later Congress passed the sweeping financial regulation bill known as Dodd-Frank.

But Mr. Frank himself has retired, and there are signs that the officials who set the tone for global bank regulation have become more worried about a credit crunch in Europe than about the risk of another banking crisis. Some of the people most influential in the regulation debate are sounding more conciliatory.

“We welcome these rules, we think they are important,” Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank and a member of the group that met in Basel, said this month. ‘‘We also welcome their gradual phasing in.’’

At least some banks have had a rebound in profits recently, including the United States institutions JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, whose chief executive, Lloyd Blankfein, is scheduled to take part in a panel at Davos on Friday about competitiveness.

European banks are still ailing, though, which threatens the fragile calm that has prevailed in financial markets. Whereas the euro zone debt crisis has fallen most heavily on countries in southern Europe like Spain, weakness in the banking system is a problem even in healthier countries like Germany.

Deutsche Bank, the largest bank in Germany, is profitable but faces official investigations in Germany and the United States, mostly related to its activities before the financial crisis. In December, police officers surrounded the bank’s headquarters in Frankfurt and seized documents as part of a tax-evasion inquiry that involves one of the bank’s co-chief executives, Jürgen Fitschen.

Other large banks like Commerzbank and several of the publicly owned landesbanks are still coping with bad investments they made before Lehman collapsed. Belgium, France and Austria also have troubled banks, even though they are not considered to be countries in crisis.

“The bottom line is that I don’t think the banking system is in good condition, and I don’t expect it to come back to good condition soon,” said Nicolas Véron, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a research institute in Brussels.

Mr. Véron said he did not have reservations about the decision in Basel to ease new regulations on liquid assets, noting that previously there were no rules on liquidity at all. ‘‘I think the big headline remains that liquidity regulations have been introduced,’’ Mr. Véron said. ‘‘When you look at what has happened in the crisis, that is a good thing.’’

But he sounded less optimistic that policy makers meeting in Davos or elsewhere were making progress on other important banking issues, like how to close down terminally ill banks at no cost to taxpayers.

“We have not had the systemwide restructuring process I believe is necessary to get back to sound conditions,” Mr. Véron said.

Article source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/a-year-later-pressure-on-banks-remains/?partner=rss&emc=rss

Bankers to Find Atmosphere a Bit More Congenial in Davos

FRANKFURT — Two years ago, Jamie Dimon, chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, told an audience in Davos that people should stop picking on bankers. Mr. Dimon is still waiting for his wish to come true.

Bankers, always a big presence at the World Economic Forum in the Swiss city of Davos, arrive this year under less regulatory pressure and with better profits than in past years. But they are still on the defensive.

Mr. Dimon, scheduled to appear on one of the first panels when the Davos forum opens Wednesday, is again embroiled in controversy. Last week JPMorgan’s board cut his pay for 2012 in half, to $11.5 million, holding him accountable for a multibillion dollar loss in derivatives trading.

International bankers are under fire from the law enforcement authorities as well, and one does not have to go far from Davos to find examples.

UBS, based in Zurich, agreed to pay a $1.5 billion fine to the global authorities after admitting this month that it had helped manipulate a key benchmark rate used to set mortgage and other interest rates. Wegelin, a private bank based in St. Gallen, Switzerland, shut down earlier this month after admitting it had helped wealthy Americans evade taxes. The bank, founded in 1741, was the oldest in Switzerland.

And at a news conference last week in Washington, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, lamented a “waning commitment” to tougher financial regulation and called upon the banking authorities to finish the job of fixing the world’s banks.

For all that, though, bankers may find the atmosphere in Davos a bit more congenial than in some recent years. Among the government overseers who will also be flocking to the Swiss town, there seems to be a growing feeling that the banks have taken enough bashing.

Earlier this month, for instance, an international conclave of central bankers and bank supervisors, meeting in Basel, Switzerland, relaxed new rules that were intended to ensure that banks would be able to survive an event like the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.

The rules, which are not binding but serve as a benchmark for national regulators, would require banks to maintain a 30-day supply of cash or liquid assets that are easy to convert into cash. But after the decision in Basel this month banks would have until 2019 to accumulate the additional cash and assets, instead of 2015. The regulators also broadened the kinds of assets that qualify, so that now they can include even some mortgage-backed securities—the same general class of security that was at the heart of the crisis.

Many analysts see the decision as a gift to the banking industry, which had insisted that planned new regulations will force them to curtail lending. Bank stocks in Europe rose after the decision.

“Most bankers I talked to breathed a huge sigh of relief,” said Cornelius Hurley, a professor at the Boston University School of Law and former counsel to the U.S. Federal Reserve board of governors.

Gavan Nolan, a credit analyst at Markit, a data provider in London, agreed that changes in the rules “went further than many had presumed, and in a direction that seems to favor the banks.” Still, in a note to clients he added, “the effects shouldn’t be overstated.” The rules “will still make it more difficult to make money, in comparison to the previous era.”

The discussions at Davos may offer clues about whether the Basel decisions foreshadow other concessions..

There is a risk that efforts to rein in financial risk could lose momentum as the Lehman trauma fades, Mr. Hurley said.

“We said to ourselves back in 2008, a crisis is a terrible thing to waste,” he said. “It seems the farther away we get the evidence is that we are wasting it.”

The World Economic Forum tends to be a place for talk rather than action, but it is one of the few events that reliably brings central bankers, regulators, economists, legislators and bankers under one snow-laden roof.

The discussions sometimes have been contentious, as in 2010 when U.S. policy makers like Representative Barney Frank met behind closed doors with top bankers including Brian T. Moynihan, then the chief executive of Bank of America.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/business/global/21iht-davosbanks21.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Today’s Economist: Simon Johnson: The Legacy of Timothy Geithner

Timothy F. Geithner, who is stepping down as Treasury secretary, with President Obama at the White House last week.Larry Downing/Reuters Timothy F. Geithner, who is stepping down as Treasury secretary, with President Obama at the White House last week.DESCRIPTION

Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You.”

“Too big to fail is too big to continue. The megabanks have too much power in Washington and too much weight within the financial system.” Who said this and when?

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

The answer is Peggy Noonan, the prominent conservative commentator, writing recently in The Wall Street Journal.

As Timothy F. Geithner prepares to leave the Treasury Department, most assessments focus on how his policies affected the economy. But his lasting legacy may be more political, contributing to the creation of an issue that can now be seized either by the right or the left. What should be done about the too-big-to-fail category of financial institutions?

Mr. Geithner came to Treasury in the middle of a severe financial crisis, a set of problems that he helped to create and then worked hard to prevent from worsening. As president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, starting in 2003, he watched over – and failed to defuse – the buildup of systemic risk. In fact, the New York Fed was relatively on the side of allowing large, seemingly sophisticated financial institutions to fund themselves with more debt relative to their thin levels of equity.

This was a major conceptual mistake for which there still has not been a full accounting. In fact, blank denial continues to be the reaction from the relevant officials.

Mr. Geithner was also in the hot seat as more explicit government support for large financial institutions began in earnest in early 2008. The New York Fed brokered the sale of failing Bear Stearns to relatively healthy JPMorgan Chase, with the Fed providing substantial downside insurance to JPMorgan, against potential losses from assets they were acquiring.

Mr. Geithner also acquiesced to Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, allowing him to remain on the board of the New York Fed even as his bank was suddenly the recipient of very large additional subsidies (the insurance for his acquisition of Bear Stearns). This was the beginning of a deeper public realization that there had come to be too little distance between some parts of the Federal Reserve and the big banks.

For some senior officials within the Federal Reserve System, the appearance of this potential conflict of interest was a cause for grave concern. Unfortunately, their concerns were ignored by the New York Fed and by leadership at the Board of Governors in Washington. The result has been damage to the Fed’s reputation and an unnecessary slip toward undermining its political independence.

From March 2008, when Bear Stearns almost failed, through September 2008, very little was done to reduce the level of risk in the financial system. Again, Mr. Geithner must bear some responsibility.

In fall 2008, Mr. Geithner worked closely with Henry Paulson – Treasury secretary at the time – in an attempt to prevent the problems at Lehman Brothers from spreading. They were unsuccessful, in fairly spectacular fashion. The failure to anticipate the difficulties at American International Group must stand out as one of the biggest lapses ever of financial intelligence – again, a responsibility in part of the New York Fed (although surely other government officials share some blame).

As the problems escalated, Mr. Geithner came to stand for providing large amounts of unconditional support for very big banks – including Citigroup, where Robert Rubin, his mentor, had overseen the dubious hiring of a chief executive and more general mismanagement of risk. (While a director of Citigroup, Mr. Rubin denied responsibility for what went wrong.)

Rather than moving to change management, directors or anything about the big banks’ practices, Mr. Geithner favored more financial assistance – both from the budget (through various versions of the Troubled Asset Relief Program), from the Federal Reserve (through various kinds of cheap loans) and from all other available means, including insurance for private debt issues provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

In official discussions, Mr. Geithner consistently stood for more support with weaker (or no) conditions. (See “Bull by the Horns,” by Sheila Bair, former chairwoman of the F.D.I.C., for the most credible account of what happened.)

Mr. Geithner’s appointment as Treasury secretary in January 2009 allowed him to continue to scale up these efforts.

In retrospect, what helped stem the panic was the joint statement of Feb. 23, 2009, issued by the Treasury, the F.D.I.C., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Reserve, that included this statement of principle:

The U.S. government stands firmly behind the banking system during this period of financial strain to ensure it will be able to perform its key function of providing credit to households and businesses. The government will ensure that banks have the capital and liquidity they need to provide the credit necessary to restore economic growth. Moreover, we reiterate our determination to preserve the viability of systemically important financial institutions so that they are able to meet their commitments.

Mr. Geithner is often given credit for pushing bank stress tests in spring 2009 as a way to back up this statement, so officials could assess the extent to which particular financial institutions needed more loss-absorbing equity. But such stress tests are standard practice in any financial crisis.

Much less standard is unconditional government support for troubled banks. Usually such banks are “cleaned up” as a condition of official assistance, either by being forced to make management changes or being forced to deal with their bad assets. (This was the approach favored by Ms. Bair when she was at the F.D.I.C.; her book lays out realistic alternatives that were on the table at critical moments. The idea that there was no alternative to Mr. Geithner’s approach simply does not hold water.)

Any fiscally solvent government can stand behind its banks, but providing such guarantees is a recipe for repeated trouble. When Mr. Geithner was at Treasury in the 1990s and Mr. Rubin was Treasury secretary, the advice conveyed to troubled Asian countries – both directly and through American influence at the International Monetary Fund – was quite different: clean up the banks and rein in the powerful people who overborrowed and brought the corporate sector to the brink of financial meltdown.

In Mr. Geithner’s view of the world, the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation fixed the problem of too-big-to-fail banks. Outside of Treasury, it’s hard to find informed observers who share this position. Both Daniel Tarullo (the lead Fed governor for financial regulation) and William Dudley (the current president of the New York Fed) said in recent speeches that the problems of distorted incentives associated with too big to fail were unfortunately alive and well.

Ironically, despite the fact that the Obama administration failed to rein in the megabanks and allowed them to become larger and arguably more powerful, this has not helped the Republicans in electoral terms.

As Ms. Noonan puts it bluntly: “People think the G.O.P. is for the bankers. The G.O.P. should upend this assumption.”

This is a significant opportunity for anyone with clear thinking on the right – someone looking for a Teddy Roosevelt trustbusting or Nixon-goes-to-China moment. Again, Ms. Noonan gets it right: “In this case good policy is good politics. If you are a conservative you’re supposed to be for just treatment of the individual over the demands of concentrated elites.”

Recall that some grass roots conservatives are already there: House Republicans initially voted down TARP, the former presidential candidate Jon Huntsman’s plan to end too big to fail received widespread applause from many Republicans and a number of influential commentators, including George Will and Ms. Noonan, have advocated ending too big to fail.

This would play well in the Republican presidential primaries – and even better in the general election. Watch PBS “Frontline” on Jan. 22 for an articulate presentation of why serious potential financial crimes were not prosecuted during the first Obama administration, and think about how to turn these facts into political messages.

A smart candidate could even mobilize plenty of financial-sector support in favor of breaking up or otherwise restricting the too-big-to-fail financial entities. The megabanks have very few genuine friends.

The lasting legacy of Timothy Geithner is to create the perfect electoral issue for Republicans. Will they seize it?

Article source: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/the-legacy-of-timothy-geithner/?partner=rss&emc=rss