November 22, 2024

Mine Deal Puts New Scrutiny on China’s State Industries

The Zhongshe mine and two others, in Shanxi Province in northern China, are at the center of unusually public accusations of mismanagement and corruption afflicting one of the nation’s flagship state conglomerates, China Resources. Critics say that the $1.6 billion purchase was vastly overpriced and illegal and that large sums may have been squandered or, as some are claiming, improperly diverted.

Leaked documents about the deal, and a court case in Hong Kong, have shed an unusually harsh light on the usually secretive workings of a major state-owned company. The disputed deal raises a stark question: Are China’s economy and resources held hostage by privileged state corporations and their executives, who can use influence and gain access to easy credit in ways that undermine long-term growth?

The dispute has become a chief exhibit in a debate in China about the wisdom of investing so much of the nation’s money in state-owned companies, especially when China’s economy has slowed. For the Communist Party leadership, the case distills concerns about the grip that state-owned conglomerates exert.

The problems for China Resources began in 2010, when its affiliates as well as a partner state company agreed to pay 9.9 billion renminbi ($1.6 billion) for the three coal mines and related assets, according to documents submitted to a Hong Kong court. The seller was a businessman, Zhang Xinming, a man with a reputation as a swashbuckling gambler, who also gained a 20 percent stake in the new joint venture.

The deal appeared to give China Resources a foothold in the coal industry here in Shanxi, the hub of China’s coal industry for more than a century and close to the energy-hungry cities and factories on the coast. But the company’s monthly business operations statements show that since the mines changed hands in 2010, the mines have not produced any coal.

“Legally speaking, this was a totally abnormal transaction,” said Chen Ruojian, a lawyer with the Duan Duan law firm in Beijing. Mr. Chen is helping to represent the minority shareholders in Hong Kong, where the subsidiary behind the deal, China Resources Power Holdings, is listed on the stock exchange.

“It’s impossible to understand why they’d do this — pay so much for mines with expired exploration licenses,” he said. “State-owned companies have all sorts of problems, but we think it’s rare to have something as stark as China Resources.”

Political unease over the case grew after two Chinese journalists made accusations of corruption about the deal, and one singled out Song Lin, the chairman of the parent conglomerate, China Resources.

The Web site of People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s newspaper, has reported that the party’s discipline unit has received an accusation of corruption against Mr. Song and other senior executives at China Resources and is processing the complaint. Mr. Song has not been detained or charged with any wrongdoing, judging from the reports on the company’s Web site of his various public appearances. China Resources has denied wrongdoing and has hinted it might take legal action against Chinese journalists who have raised corruption accusations.

China Resources “is a major global player,” said David Zweig, a specialist in Chinese natural resource companies at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. If the claims about the coal mines are proved true, he added, “it would show that these companies can be ripped off or tricked. It doesn’t bode well for the globalization or professionalization of these companies.”

China Resources traces its roots to the days of Mao Zedong’s revolution, when it was established in 1938 in Hong Kong to raise money and buy military supplies to support Communist forces.

By 2012 it was China’s 18th-largest state-owned industrial company by sales, with revenue of $52 billion. Its wide-ranging products include medicine and beer, coal and real estate. Its chairman, Mr. Song, holds the same government rank as a vice minister.

The controversy over the coal deal has made China Resources a lightning rod for criticism of all state-owned enterprises, which produce about two-fifths of the nation’s economic output.

Keith Bradsher reported from Zhongshe, China, and Chris Buckley from Hong Kong.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/business/global/mine-deal-puts-new-scrutiny-on-chinas-state-industries.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Naming Culprits in the Financial Crisis

The 650-page report, “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse,” was released Wednesday by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, whose co-chairmen are Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat, and Tom Coburn, a Republican of Oklahoma. The result of two years’ work, the report focuses on an array of institutions with central roles in the mortgage crisis: Washington Mutual, an aggressive mortgage lender that collapsed in 2008; the Office of Thrift Supervision, a regulator; the credit ratings agencies Standard Poor’s and Moody’s Investors Service; and the investment banks Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank.

“The report pulls back the curtain on shoddy, risky, deceptive practices on the part of a lot of major financial institutions,” Mr. Levin said in an interview. “The overwhelming evidence is that those institutions deceived their clients and deceived the public, and they were aided and abetted by deferential regulators and credit ratings agencies who had conflicts of interest.”

The bipartisan report includes 19 recommendations for changes to regulatory and industry practices. These include creating strong conflict-of-interest policies at the nation’s banks and requiring that banks hold higher reserves against risky mortgages. The report also asks federal regulators to examine its findings for violations of laws.

The report adds significant new evidence to previously disclosed material showing that a wide swath of the financial industry chose profits over propriety during the mortgage lending spree. It also casts a harsh light on what the report calls regulatory failures, which helped deepen the crisis.

Singled out for criticism is the Office of Thrift Supervision, which oversaw some of the nation’s most aggressive lenders, including Countrywide Financial, IndyMac and Washington Mutual, whose chief executive was Kerry Killinger. Noting that the agency’s officials viewed the institutions it regulated as “constituents,” the report said that the office relied on bank executives to correct identified problems and was reluctant to interfere with “even unsound lending and securitization practices” at Washington Mutual.

The report describes how two risk managers at the bank were marginalized by its executives. One of them told the committee that executives began providing the regulator with outdated loss estimates as the mortgage crisis widened. After the risk manager told regulators that the estimates it had received were dated, Mr. Killinger fired him.

From 2004 to 2008, for example, the regulatory office identified more than 500 serious deficiencies at Washington Mutual, yet did not force the bank to improve its lending operations, according to the report. And when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the bank’s backup regulator, moved to downgrade the bank’s safety and soundness rating in September 2008, John M. Reich, the director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, wrote an angry e-mail to a colleague. Referring to Sheila Bair, the F.D.I.C. chairwoman, he wrote: “I cannot believe the continuing audacity of this woman.” Washington Mutual failed two weeks later.

The office was abolished last year, and its operations were folded into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Mr. Reich declined to comment. A lawyer for Mr. Killinger did not respond to a request for comment.

The report was produced by the same Senate committee that conducted an 11-hour hearing last April with Goldman executives and employees of its mortgage unit, who testified about their trading and securities underwriting practices.

At the hearing, some lawmakers questioned Goldman’s assertion that it had not bet against the mortgage market as real estate prices collapsed. And on Wednesday, Senator Levin pointed out that his committee had found 3,400 places in Goldman documents where its officials used the phrase “net short,” a reference to negative bets.

“Why would Goldman deny what was so obvious, that they were engaged in a huge short in the year 2007?” Senator Levin asked in a press briefing Wednesday morning. “Because they gained at the expense of their clients and they used abusive practices to do it.”

The report uncovered a new aspect of Goldman’s mortgage activity during 2007. That year, as Goldman tried to build its bet against housing, the report says, it drove down the cost of shorting the mortgage market by squeezing those who had made negative bets. Goldman tried to put on the squeeze, the report noted, so that it could add to its negative bets more cheaply and protect itself against the housing collapse.

Because Goldman was a large dealer in the marketplace, it had the power to drive prices in a certain direction. The report quotes from the self-evaluation of Deeb Salem, a mortgage trader, who wrote: “We began to encourage this squeeze, with plans of getting very short again.” He added, “This strategy seemed do-able and brilliant.”

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14crisis.html?partner=rss&emc=rss