December 22, 2024

Economic View: Austerity Won’t Work if the Roof Is Leaking

I RECENTLY spent a week in Berlin, where the entire city seemed under construction. In every direction, cranes and other heavy equipment dominated the landscape. Although many projects are in the private sector, innumerable others — including bridge and highway repairs, new subway stations and other infrastructure work — are financed by taxpayers.

But wait. Hasn’t Germany been one of the most outspoken advocates of fiscal austerity after the financial crisis? Yes, and that’s not a contradiction. Fiscally responsible businesses routinely borrow to invest, and so, until recently, did most governments.

Lately, however, fears about growing public debt have caused wholesale cuts in American public investment. The Germans, of course, yield to no one in their distaste for indebtedness. But they also understand the distinction between consumption and investment. By borrowing, they’ve made investments whose future benefits will far outweigh repayment costs. There’s nothing foolhardy about that.

The German experience suggests how we might move past our own stalled debate about economic stimulus policy. In the aftermath of the economic crisis, the policy discussion began with economists in broad agreement that unemployment remained high because total spending was too low. Keynesian stimulus proponents argued that temporary tax cuts and additional government spending would bolster hiring. Austerity advocates countered that additional government spending would merely displace private spending and that we already had too much debt in any event. And the debate has languished there.

A preponderance of evidence suggests that Keynes was right. But as the German experience illustrates, progress is possible without settling that question. The Germans are investing in infrastructure not to provide short-term economic stimulus, but because those investments promise high returns. Yet their undeniable side effect has been to bolster employment substantially in the short run.

Not all German public investments have met expectations. Berlin’s new consolidated airport, for example, has suffered multiple delays and cost overruns, and parts of the city’s recently constructed central rail station are to have major repairs. But private investment projects suffer occasional setbacks, too, and no one argues that businesses should stop investing on that account.

The Germans didn’t become bogged down in debate over stimulus policy, and they didn’t explicitly portray their infrastructure push as stimulus. But that didn’t hamper their strategy’s remarkable effectiveness at putting people to work. The unemployment rate in Germany, at 5.3 percent and falling, is now substantially lower than in the United States, where it ticked up to 7.6 percent last month. (By contrast, in March 2007, before the financial crisis, the rate in Germany was 9.2 percent, about five percentage points higher than in the United States.)

A prudent investment is one whose future returns exceed its costs — including interest cost if the money is borrowed. Opportunities meeting that standard abound in the infrastructure domain. According to the American Society of Civil Engineers, the nation has a backlog of some $3.6 trillion in overdue infrastructure maintenance. No one in Congress seriously proposes that we just abandon our crumbling roads and bridges, and everyone agrees that the repair cost will grow sharply the longer we wait.

The case for accelerated infrastructure investment becomes more compelling with our economy still in the doldrums. That’s because many of the needed workers and machines are now idle. If we wait, we’ll need to bid them away from other tasks. Also because of the sluggish economy, the materials required for the work are now relatively cheap. If we wait, they will become more expensive. And long-term interest rates for the money to pay for the work continue to hover near record lows. They, too, will be higher if we wait.

Austerity advocates object that more deficit spending now will burden our grandchildren with crushing debt. That might be true if the proposal were to build bigger houses and stage more lavish parties with borrowed money — as Americans, in fact, were doing in the first half of the last decade. But the objection makes no sense when applied to long-overdue infrastructure repairs. A failure to undertake that spending will gratuitously burden our grandchildren.

In 2009, austerity proponents argued against stimulus, predicting that the economy would recover quickly and spontaneously. It didn’t. Later, they said we tried stimulus and it didn’t work. But in the face of a projected $2 trillion shortfall in the spending needed for full employment, Congress enacted a stimulus bill totaling only $787 billion, spread over three years. And much of that injection was offset by cuts in state and local government spending.

Now austerity backers urge — preposterously — that infrastructure repairs be postponed until government budgets are in balance. But would they also tell an indebted family to postpone fixing a leaky roof until it paid off all its debts? Not only would the repair grow more costly with the delay, but the water damage would mount in the interim. Families should pay off debts, yes, but not in ways that actually increase their indebtedness in the longer term. The logic is the same for infrastructure.

Austerity advocates, who have been wrong at virtually every turn, are unlikely to change their minds about stimulus policy. But with continued slow growth in the outlook, it’s time to reframe the debate. Our best available option, by far, is to rebuild our tattered infrastructure at fire-sale prices. If the austerity crowd disagrees, it should explain why in plain English.

Robert H. Frank is an economics professor at the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/business/austerity-wont-work-if-the-roof-is-leaking.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Memo From Germany: Germany’s Success and Advice Anger European Partners

When Chancellor Angela Merkel on Monday described the debt crisis as Europe’s “most difficult hours since World War II,” she was describing something most Germans had only read about in newspapers or watched on television. The German economy once again surprised experts on Tuesday, growing an unexpectedly healthy 0.5 percent in the third quarter and 2.5 percent higher than the year before.

While there were ominous signs that Europe’s slowdown would also strike Germany, its biggest economy — particularly worrisome was a sharp drop in industrial production in September — the pain that euro zone partners have been feeling has yet to arrive here.

With German consumers spending freely, unemployment has reached the lowest level since German reunification more than two decades ago, and it continued falling in October. Tax receipts consistently beat government projections, to the point that Mrs. Merkel’s coalition even has plans to cut taxes by more than $8 billion.

And in a widely noted twist on the accounting surprises that helped cover up Greek debts, Germany recently found its own mistake in the spreadsheets: its obligations were $76 billion lower than previously thought.

Germany’s continued prosperity has helped fuel growing anger in countries like Greece and Spain against what is increasingly viewed as harsh German domination. More and more, Germany is cast in the role of the villain, whether by protesters in the streets of Athens or by exasperated politicians in the halls at the recent Group of 20 meeting in Cannes, France.

“The Germans often don’t sufficiently appreciate how wrenching the economic changes are that they’re prescribing,” said Philip Whyte, a senior research fellow at the Center for European Reform in London.

Germany, Mr. Whyte said, was trying to remake all of Europe after its competitive, export-driven economic model, without understanding the connection between its success and foreign indebtedness in countries like Greece, which for years used borrowed funds to purchase German goods.

“Not everyone can be like Germany,” Mr. Whyte said. “The world as a whole doesn’t trade with the moon.”

European partners have taken notice of the yawning divide between their struggles and Germany’s strength, and of the way German leaders have resisted aggressive measures by the European Central Bank that may have provided some relief, but may also invite what for Germans is the deep dread of inflation.

Greeks in particular have been outraged at demands for change dictated by Berlin that impinge on their sovereignty. Some Greek protesters have even carried blue European Union flags with yellow swastikas in the middle and compare the debt deals to the occupation of Greece during World War II.

The European crisis has often been likened to a morality play — sinful southerners, virtuous northerners — but at times in Germany it has taken the shape of Wagnerian opera, with Germany cast as the dragon guarding its hoard of gold.

Last week, Germany was awash with reports of a proposal floated at the Group of 20 meeting that might have allowed the International Monetary Fund to draw on German gold reserves to bolster Europe’s rescue fund.

The condemnation was swift and disproportionately harsh for a suggestion that was basically doomed from the start. “The German gold reserves must remain untouchable,” said Philipp Rösler, the economy minister and vice chancellor.

A cartoon in the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung showed three men trying to crack a bank safe marked “Bundesbank gold and foreign currency reserves,” a reference to the German central bank.

The masked man attacking the safe with a drill had the German abbreviation for the European Central Bank on his back, while the one placing the dynamite bore the letters for the International Monetary Fund. Holding a flashlight was the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy.

Leading politicians here defended the independence of the Bundesbank but also took the opportunity to call for Italy to sell off its own gold reserves, the fourth largest in the world after the United States, Germany and the International Monetary Fund.

“I am of the opinion that a country should do everything in its power to help itself,” said Gunther Krichbaum, chairman of the committee on European affairs in the German Parliament, who spoke in favor of Italy’s selling gold to help with its $2.6 trillion debt, “and in this regard Italy is far from exhausting its options.”

As the overall health of Germany’s economy and its fiscal position widen the rift with Europe’s poorer periphery, Germans have a ready response. They say that they already made the structural changes in work-force rules and pension reforms that they are now recommending for the slow-growth countries, and that, by the way, they actually pay their taxes. So if the laggards want Germany’s money, they have to play by German rules.

“We believe this success is because we have certain criteria around which we organize our economic policies, and these are the criteria we want other countries to comply with if they ask for our money,” said Tanja A. Börzel, a professor of European Union politics at the Free University in Berlin. “When you put national taxpayer money on the line, the people have a say, and that is if we have to eventually pay for the economic sins of others that they at least change their policies if we bail them out.”

Guntram B. Wolff, deputy director at Bruegel, a research group based in Brussels, said that as the focus in the debt crisis had shifted from tiny Greece to the much larger Italy, the need for domestic action versus international bailouts had risen. Mr. Wolff, who formerly worked at both the European Commission and the German Bundesbank, said that Berlin had played a more assertive role in the European crisis in part because the European Commission had not played as active a role as it could have, particularly over Italian indebtedness.

“The shift of power is clear,” Mr. Wolff said, “and you see that it is Berlin that has been gaining power.”

Stefan Pauly contributed reporting.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/world/europe/germanys-success-and-advice-anger-european-partners.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Business Briefing | EDUCATION: Enrollment Plunge for DeVry Sends Stock Lower

Opinion »

Why Aren’t Germans Protesting?

In Room for Debate, a discussion on how Europe’s debt will change life for German taxpayers.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=baa029a774744e338028da76cf95267d

High & Low Finance: Resentment Is Rising In Euro Zone

They are trying that in Europe these days. Germany has the gold and it sees no reason other countries should not do as the Germans say.

The prescription for the so-called peripheral countries of the euro zone is simple: Enact the reforms Germany thinks are needed. Cut spending. Take wage and benefit cuts. Reform your tax system to produce more revenue, which may mean raising tax rates or just forcing people to comply with existing laws. Require people to work longer and retire later. Follow austerity as far as the eye can see.

Do all those things, and the rest of Europe will provide grudging assistance.

To some with the gold, this is simply a morality play. “They had their fun,” a former European central banker told me a few weeks ago, speaking of the peripheral countries. A different official used the same words last week.

In each conversation, I was reminded that the creation of the euro led to interest rates declining sharply in peripheral countries and to economic booms. Those countries lost competitiveness in export markets because they tolerated inflation and did not hold the line on wages. Now, those who partied deserve the pain of hangovers.

It is probable that countries will follow the German prescription. From the perspective of a national government, the alternatives may seem worse.

But democracy can be messy. Will populations go along?

There are a couple of hints that they may not. One comes from Portugal, the other from Iceland, which is not in the euro zone but is in a mess.

In Portugal, the government is seeking a European bailout but seems not to have the authority to agree to one. The opposition has forced elections, which it is widely expected to win, but it won’t say what it will do. In the meantime, the situation is in limbo, which may force Europe to help out before it can get any enforceable promises of reform.

In Iceland, the issue is whether the population should pay for the sins of its banks. The banks had big operations in Britain and the Netherlands, and when they collapsed, the British and Dutch governments made good on the deposits. The government of Iceland promised to pay the money back.

The amount is $5.8 billion, 46 percent of Iceland’s gross domestic product in 2010. A similar bill sent to the United States would call for a payment of $6.8 trillion.

I’m not really clear on why Iceland should be responsible. No doubt its bank regulators performed abysmally. But where were the British and Dutch regulators when the banks were taking in deposits from their citizens?

For reasons good or bad, Iceland’s citizens appear to be reluctant to pick up the bill. Nearly 60 percent of voters turned down the agreement backed by their government, which called for Iceland to pay the money over 30 years beginning in 2016. Britain and the Netherlands now plan to ask something called the European Free Trade Association Surveillance Authority to order Iceland to pay.

Both the Irish and Greek governments embraced the required austerity to get European help, and electorates threw out those deemed responsible for the mess. But there are signs that the new governments are losing support, and there is no indication of early economic recovery. Portugal’s government fell precisely because the opposition would not sign off on the required austerity.

What would be happening without the euro?

Neither the boom nor the bust would have been as great in the peripheral countries. But when the bust did arrive, the currencies of those countries would have plunged in value. That would have made them poorer and unable to afford the imports they once bought. Prices, measured in local currencies, would have risen. In Ireland, where a property boom collapsed, that would have ameliorated the problems faced by homeowners who owe far more than their homes are worth. Exports would have gained competitiveness, stimulating some growth.

But of course there are no separate currencies. There is no provision for allowing a country to leave the euro zone. That idea was not even considered when it turned out that Greece had lied its way into the club. In retrospect, everyone might be better off if it had been kicked out.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=7d3ab28f8f38287a8b609b90c3f558b8