That is happening more and more often as companies avail themselves of the right to “go dark” because they do not have very many public shareholders. They no longer have to file financial information with the Securities and Exchange Commission, but the securities are still publicly traded.
These days, such investors seem to have few friends. Congress is much more interested in making it easier for companies — or “job creators” in the current jargon — than it is in protecting unfortunate investors. The so-called JOBS Act, enacted last year with widespread bipartisan support, included a provision making it much easier for small banks to go dark, and hundreds have done so.
Going dark, it should be noted, is not the same thing as going private. When that happens, securities are purchased from the public investors. They may not like being forced out, but they are out.
Not so when a company goes dark. The investors are in, but they may or may not be told what is going on. Companies that go dark sometimes make audited financial statements public, and sometimes they do not.
There is no better example of the perils of going dark — as well as proof that “preferred” can be a misnomer when it comes to stock — than the former Equity Inns, an owner of hotels, whose common shares were acquired by Goldman Sachs in 2007.
Although the common shares went away, preferred shares remained — or actually, new issues of preferreds replaced old ones. What has happened since then “smells like insider trading,” says James J. Angel, a finance professor at Georgetown University and an investor in the preferred stock. Goldman says that is nonsense.
While Goldman acquired the common stock, for $23 a share, or $1.9 billion, it did not acquire the $146 million of preferred shares in public hands. Those shares were in par values of $25 and had been sold primarily to individual investors interested in collecting a reasonably safe income stream. One series paid 8.75 percent a year, and the other 9 percent.
Before the takeover, those shares had been trading above par, and Goldman could have called them at par value. Instead, it took the preferred shares into the dark. The company assured the S.E.C. that there were fewer than 300 shareholders of record for each series of preferred, giving the company the right to go dark. The securities continued to trade over the counter in what Wall Street calls the “gray market.”
Goldman soon halted the dividend payments, and the share prices fell to as little as a penny.
How was the company doing? The financial statements were confidential, but Goldman did agree to let preferred shareholders see them — for a fee — as long as they signed confidentiality agreements that would prevent them from sharing the statements with anyone else, including prospective buyers of the shares.
Someone has, however, violated that confidentiality agreement. After I began calling around for this column, a set of financial statements arrived in an envelope with no return address. Assuming they are accurate, they show that over the three years through 2012, the company had net losses of $315 million on revenue of $1.2 billion. But most of those losses came from $251 million in depreciation. Operating cash flow was a positive $174 million. Told of some of the numbers in the statement, a Goldman spokeswoman did not dispute them.
Those numbers, however, are for the entire company. The preferred shares seem to have an interest in only 1 percent of the assets. If Goldman could find a way to put the 1 percent owner in bankruptcy, while keeping the other 99 percent out, it might be able to largely eliminate the preferred.
Even that might not be necessary. Goldman was also the lender in the deal, and perhaps it could restructure the debt in ways that would essentially give the debt holders — Goldman, that is — the ability to get everything, leaving the preferred shareholders with nothing.
Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/business/securities-rules-can-leave-investors-in-the-dark.html?partner=rss&emc=rss
