April 26, 2024

Derivatives Cloud the Possible Fallout From a Greek Default

No one seems to be sure, in large part because the world of derivatives is so murky. But the possibility that some company out there may have insured billions of dollars of European debt has added a new tension to the sovereign default debate.

In years past, when financial crises in Argentina and Russia left those countries unable to make good on their government debts, they simply defaulted. But this time around, swaps and other sorts of contracts have become so common and so intertwined in the financial markets that there are fears among regulators and financial players about how a Greek default would play out among derivatives holders.

The looming uncertainties are whether these contracts — which insure against possibilities like a Greek default — are concentrated in the hands of a few companies, and if these companies will be able to pay out billions of dollars to cover losses during a default. If there were a single company standing behind many of these contracts, that company would be akin to the American International Group of the euro crisis. The American insurer needed a $182 billion federal bailout during the financial crisis because it had insured the performance of mortgage bonds through derivatives and could not pay on all of them.

Even regulators seem unsure of whether a Greek default would reveal such concentrated risk in the hands of just a few companies. Spokeswomen for the central banks of both Europe and the United States would not say whether their researchers had studied holdings of such contracts among nonbank entities like insurance companies and hedge funds.

Asked about derivatives tied to Europe at a Wednesday press conference, Ben S. Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, said that the direct exposure is small but that “a disorderly default in one of those countries would no doubt roil financial markets globally. It would have a big impact on credit spreads, on stock prices and so on. And so in that respect I think the effects in the United States would be quite significant.”

Derivatives traders and analysts are debating just how much money is involved in these contracts and what sort of threat they pose to markets in Europe and the United States. On the one hand, just over $5 billion is tied up in credit-default swap contracts that will pay out if Greece defaults, according to Markit, a financial data firm based in London. That is less than 1 percent the size of Greece’s economy, but that is a conservative calculation that counts protections banks have in place offsetting their positions, and is called the net exposure.

The less conservative figure, the gross exposure, is $78.7 billion for Greece, according to Markit. And there are many other types of contracts, like about $44 billion in other guarantees tied to Greece, according to the Bank of International Settlements. The gross exposure of the five most financially pressed European Union countries — Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain — is about $616 billion. And the broader figure on all derivatives from those countries is unknown.

The pervasiveness of these opaque contracts has complicated negotiations for European officials, and it underscores calls for more transparency in the derivatives market.

The uncertainty, financial analysts say, has led European officials to push for a “voluntary” Greek bond financing solution that may sidestep a default, rather than the forced deals of other eras. “There’s not any clarity here because people don’t know,” said Christopher Whalen, editor of The Institutional Risk Analyst. “This is why the Europeans came up with this ridiculous deal, because they don’t know what’s out there. They are afraid of a default. The industry is still refusing to provide the disclosure needed to understand this. They’re holding us hostage. The Street doesn’t want you to see what they’ve written.”

Regulators are aware of this problem. Financial reform packages on both sides of the Atlantic mandated many changes to the derivatives market, and regulators around the globe are drafting new rules for these contracts that are meant to add transparency as well as security. But they are far from finished and could take years to put into effect.

Darrell Duffie, a professor who has studied derivatives at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, said that he was concerned that regulators may not have adequately studied what contagion might occur among swaps holders, in the case of a Greek default.

Regulators, he said, “have access to everything they need to have. Whether they’ve collected all the information and analyzed it is different question. I worry because many of those leaders have said there’s no way we’re going to let Greece default. Does that mean they haven’t had conversations about what happens if Greece defaults? Is their commitment so severe that they haven’t had real discussions about it in the backrooms?”

Regulators aren’t saying much. When asked what data the Federal Reserve had collected on American financial companies and their swaps tied to European debt, Barbara Hagenbaugh, a spokeswoman, referred to a speech made by Mr. Bernanke in May in which he did not mention derivatives tied to Greece. At the Wednesday press conference, Mr. Bernanke said that commonly cited data on derivatives do not take into account the offsetting positions banks have on their Greek exposures. And with those positions, he said, even if there is a Greek default, “the effects are very small.”

At the European Central Bank, Eszter Miltenyi, a spokeswoman, said: “This is much too sensitive I think for us to have a conversation on this.”

On Wall Street, traders are debating whether the industry’s process for unwinding credit-default swaps would run smoothly if Greece defaulted. The process is tightly controlled by a small group of bankers who meet in an industry group called the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/business/global/23swaps.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Trichet Calls for E.U. Finance Ministry to Curb Future Euro Crises

“Would it be too bold, in the economic field, with a single market, a single currency and a single central bank, to envisage a ministry of finance of the Union?” Mr. Trichet said in Aachen, where he accepted a prize named for Charlemagne, the 9th century king who united much of Continental Europe.

Since last year Mr. Trichet has been urging European political leaders to make a “quantum leap” in the way that the euro area is governed, to avert grave crises like the one caused by Greek debt. Mr. Trichet has often expressed disappointment that leaders have not gone further.

Mr. Trichet said Thursday that the European finance ministry would not necessarily oversee a large budget, but would be responsible for monitoring national finances and intervening in extreme cases. The ministry would also monitor whether nations are pursuing the right policies to be competitive, and oversee the European financial sector.

Mr. Trichet acknowledged that creation of such an entity would require a change in the European Union treaty, and there would certainly be a lengthy debate before any such ministry could be created. National leaders are usually very reluctant to cede power to the European Union.

The proposal was unusually provocative for Mr. Trichet, who is acutely aware that his words can shake financial markets and tends to use the same carefully worded phrases whenever he speaks in public, which is often.

But as he enters the final months of his term as E.C.B. president, after several trying years as the euro area’s de facto crisis manager, Mr. Trichet appears to be pushing harder for permanent changes to the way the European Union operates.

In a speech that quoted thinkers ranging from Immanuel Kant to William Penn, Mr. Trichet said that countries in trouble should first receive financial support and help getting back on their feet.

“It is appropriate to give countries an opportunity to put the situation right themselves and to restore stability,” Mr. Trichet said, according to a text of his remarks. “Such assistance is in the interests of the euro area as a whole, as it prevents crises spreading in a way that could cause harm to other countries.”

“But if a country is still not delivering,” he added, “I think all would agree that the second stage has to be different.”

In that case, E.U. leaders should have more authority over the actions of other members, he said. For example, they might be given veto power over spending by a troubled country or its economic policies.

Mr. Trichet did not mention Greece by name, but his comments came amid increasing doubt that the country is making enough progress in selling state assets, making the economy more competitive, and taking other measures needed to get its debt under control.

The ratings agency Moody’s late Wednesday slashed its rating of Greek government debt once again, well below the level considered investment grade.

Current events, Mr. Trichet said, demonstrate that European countries “can experience crises caused entirely by the unsound economic policies of others.”

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/business/global/03euro.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Economix: Reflections on Warnings Unheeded

DESCRIPTION

FRANKFURT — Jamie Dimon, chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, famously said at Davos in January that he was tired of everybody always picking on banks. Good thing he wasn’t at the going-away event for Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, outgoing member of the executive board of the European Central Bank.

Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, who is stepping down from the European Central Bank.Michele Tantussi/Bloomberg NewsGertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, who is stepping down from the European Central Bank.

At a colloquium and dinner attended by leading European central bankers and economists, several prominent speakers expressed frustration bordering on anger with the way banks have resisted efforts to create a less accident-prone financial system.

Alexandre Lamfalussy, one of the architects of the euro, set the tone Wednesday when, during a panel discussion in Frankfurt, he recalled the condescending reaction way back in 2001 when a committee he oversaw warned — presciently, it turned out — about the danger of financial market contagion.

“The warning was met with polite silence,” said Mr. Lamfalussy, former president of the European Monetary Institute, which was the predecessor to the European Central Bank.

“There were even a few investment bankers who argued that we had displayed a regrettable ignorance of the self-regulatory capability of financial markets,” Mr. Lamfalussy said, adding dryly, “Well, let bygones be bygones.”

Policy makers now must do more to discourage “the crisis-breeding inclination of the financial industry,” Mr. Lamfalussy said.

His statements illustrated the frustration that some central bankers feel as they struggle to cope with the aftermath of the financial crisis, even as commercial banks report higher profits and award their executives big bonuses.

There was more criticism of bank behavior later on at a dinner in honor of Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell, whose eight-year term on the E.C.B. ends on May 31. Martin Hellwig, an economist and a director of the Max-Planck Institute, attacked bank industry lobbyists for trying to obstruct efforts last year to write new regulations. Bankers insisted that new rules would throttle lending, for example.

“We just couldn’t believe how stupid many of the arguments being made were,” Mr. Hellwig said during a panel discussion, while guests dined on veal and asparagus.

Philipp M. Hildebrand, chairman of the governing board of the Swiss National Bank, used more diplomatic language, but also betrayed frustration with the banking industry.

He recalled how one prominent banker, whom he did not name, complained about especially tough requirements that the S.N.B. is imposing on Switzerland’s two big multinational banks, UBS and Credit Suisse.

“‘You are completely crazy. What are you doing in Switzerland?’” the banker said, according to Mr. Hildebrand. In fact, Mr. Hildebrand said, markets now rate Switzerland the least risky place in the world.

“Market indicators are telling us today that what we are trying to do today in Switzerland is not so crazy after all,” he said.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=30215ea857620e723e1c39bdba6812ef

Regulators Seek Ways to Determine Which Financial Firms Are Crucial

A panel of officials from the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury Department and the agencies overseeing banking and securities markets told members of the Senate Banking Committee that they would seek public comment on additional guidelines and gauges they are considering in deciding which companies will be included.

Regulators face a January 2012 deadline to put the heightened regulatory standards in place, but there has been some hope in the financial industry and Congress that decisions about what firms fall under the designation will come sooner. That would eliminate uncertainty over the breadth of the new rule’s embrace. Officials indicated that they hoped to release a package of proposed rules this summer.

The designation of systemically important financial institutions was included in the Dodd-Frank Act as a way of addressing the problem of companies being considered too big to fail. Companies deemed crucial to the stability of the broad financial system will be overseen by the Federal Reserve Board in addition to their usual regulators.

Bank holding companies with more than $50 billion in assets automatically fall under the designation. But it is expected that some insurance companies, hedge funds and other companies involved in financial and money markets might require an additional level of scrutiny to guard against threats to the banking system and financial markets.

“I think more details are necessary,” said Ben S. Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve. “I support providing more information to the public and getting public comment.”

Mr. Bernanke said that while he doubted regulators could “provide an exact mechanical formula that can be applied without judgment,” they could lay out objective criteria that they consider most important in making the designation.

But the decision also requires some subjective judgment, Mr. Bernanke added, indicating that the decisions would not be so cut and dried as to eliminate questions over why one company fit the bill and another did not.

Senator Patrick J. Toomey, a Republican from Pennsylvania, urged the regulators to leave their proposals on the subject open for public comment for at least 60 days, roughly double the comment period that regulators have been using for many of the rules being drawn up to carry out aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act.

While none of the regulators would commit to that, several said they supported the idea. Mary L. Schapiro, chairwoman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, said a “robust comment period” would help to clear up much of the uncertainty around the “systemically important” designation.

The Banking Committee also voted 12-10, along party lines, to send to the full Senate the nomination of Peter A. Diamond to the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System.

It was the third time Mr. Diamond had been approved by the Senate panel, but the nomination has yet to come to a vote in the Senate. The Senate adjourned last year without acting on the second nomination, and the first nomination was returned to the White House on a procedural objection.

Republicans on the Senate committee universally opposed Mr. Diamond, an M.I.T. professor and Nobel Prize winner, raising doubts about whether Democrats could gather the 60 votes necessary to bring the nomination to a vote on the floor of the Senate.

Senator Richard C. Shelby, a Republican from Alabama, said he still viewed Mr. Diamond as “an old-fashioned big government Keynesian” who was not a good person to join the Fed “at this point in our financial history.”

The Senate Banking Committee also approved several other nominations. David S. Cohen was approved as under secretary for terrorism and financial crimes in the Treasury Department on a 18-4 vote. A few senators of both parties objected to the nomination because, they said, they did not believe Mr. Cohen adequately indicated that he would support enforcement of economic sanctions against Iran.

Several other nominations were approved by the committee on a unanimous voice vote. They were: Daniel L. Glaser to be assistant secretary for terrorist financing at Treasury; Wanda Felton to be first vice president of the Export-Import Bank of the United States; and Sean Robert Mulvaney to be a director of the Export-Import Bank.

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: May 12, 2011

An earlier version of this article incorrectly included one name among the nominees approved by the Senate Banking Committee. The committee did not vote on Timothy G. Massad’s appointment to the post of assistant secretary for financial stability at Treasury.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=5e01ca789ec8659e58d77d97e3febc97

Finance Ministers Discuss Next Step for Greece

After the private gathering, the prime minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, who heads the group of euro-area finance ministers, said that Greece’s financial assistance program “does need a further adjustment” and that it would be discussed at the group’s next meeting on May 16.

Mr. Juncker told reporters that E.U. officials are “excluding the restructuring option which is discussed heavily in certain quarters of the financial markets,” according to Bloomberg News.

France, Germany, Italy and Spain were represented at the meeting in Luxembourg, which also included the president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, and Olli Rehn, the European commissioner for economic and monetary affairs, Mr. Juncker said.

A spokesman for the Greek finance ministry did not respond to questions about the nature of the talks.

But after an evening of intense speculation, Athens confirmed in a statement that its finance minister, George Papaconstantinou, attended the meeting and discussed the country’s economic predicament. “The minister was invited to exchange views” including economic developments in Greece, the statement said, denying an online report by Germany’s Spiegel that Greece might leave the euro zone. That report caused a sharp drop in the euro, which fell to $1.4337 in New York from $1.4530 late Thursday.

“It is clear that during this meeting it was never discussed or posed as an issue whether Greece would remain in the euro zone,” the statement said, according to Reuters.

That Mr. Papaconstantinou traveled to Luxembourg for these discussions suggests that Greece may finally be prepared to concede what analysts have been arguing for more than a year: that Greece’s debt, which is expected to exceed 150 percent of gross domestic product in the coming years, is unsustainable.

So far, Greek and European officials have said consistently that a debt restructuring that would cause bondholders to suffer a haircut, or a loss on their holdings, was out of the question. But that stance may not preclude a softer option in which bondholders might be persuaded to exchange their shorter maturity debt for securities with longer maturities and perhaps even a lower interest rate.

The majority of the bondholders are French, German and Greek banks, as well as the European Central Bank.

Referred to as a reprofiling, this softer approach was used successfully in Uruguay in 2003 and for weeks now has been a hot topic for discussion among policy makers in Europe as well as economists and analysts at investment banks.

A reprofiling would allow bondholders to avoid the stark losses they would face under a restructuring and would also give breathing space to Greece to generate enough cash to begin paying its debts.

Detractors say that such a solution, while appropriate for Uruguay, which suffered from a liquidity crisis, does not go far enough in the case of Greece, which is confronting a different problem, namely its huge debt burden.

Top policy makers at the E.C.B. are convinced that a Greek default would quickly undermine confidence elsewhere in the euro area and raise borrowing cost for other countries like Portugal and Ireland. It is also not clear what Greece would gain from such a move because its banks would fail and it would be years before the country could borrow internationally again.

Asked about default speculation at a news conference on Thursday, Mr. Trichet, the E.C.B. president, said, “It is not in the cards.”

The meeting in Luxembourg, made up of just a few ministers and senior officials, prompted some annoyance among the euro zone nations not invited.

Without the status of a formal meeting, the gathering could not make any decisions, but smaller euro zone nations are sensitive about suggestions that the bigger nations are effectively deciding policy.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=e440f684bb50f73754536c03ac759bae

Economix: What Happens if the Debt Ceiling Isn’t Raised

April 25, 2011

The Honorable Timothy Geithner
Secretary
Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20220

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As Chairman of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee, I am writing to express my concerns regarding the urgent need to increase the statutory debt limit. A considerable degree of uncertainty already exists among market participants given the severe and long-lasting impact that even a technical default would have on the U.S. economy.

Any delay in making an interest or principal payment by Treasury even for a very short period of time would put the U.S. Treasury and overall financial markets in uncharted territory, and could trigger another catastrophic financial crisis. It is impossible to know the full impact of such a crisis on overall economic growth and on Treasury’s financing costs. However, the lessons from the recent crisis suggest that several damaging consequences will likely result, ultimately raising Treasury’s long-term funding costs and increasing the burden on the American taxpayer. These consequences stem from five developments that could likely occur if Treasury were to default on its obligations as a result of a failure to raise the debt limit in a timely manner.

First, foreign investors, who hold nearly half of outstanding Treasury debt, could reduce their purchases of Treasuries on a permanent basis, and potentially even sell some of their existing holdings. A worrisome precedent is the sharp decline in foreign sponsorship of [government-sponsored enterprise, or G.S.E.] debt since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under conservatorship. Despite assurances from Treasury officials regarding the U.S. commitment to these institutions, foreign sponsorship has yet to return to pre-conservatorship levels. If foreigners began curtailing their investment in Treasuries as a result of a default, Treasury rates, and thus Treasury’s borrowing costs, would undoubtedly rise. A sustained 50 basis point increase in Treasury rates would eventually cost U.S. taxpayers an additional $75 billion each year.

Second, a default by the U.S. Treasury, or even an extended delay in raising the debt ceiling, could lead to a downgrade of the U.S. sovereign credit rating. Indeed, Standard and Poor’s decision to change the U.S. ratings outlook from stable to negative this week indicates a one-in-three chance that Standard and Poor’s will downgrade the U.S. rating within the next two years. One reason cited for the change in the outlook is a material risk that U.S. policymakers might not reach an agreement on how to address medium- and long-term budgetary challenges. It is possible that a default, or even a delay in acting on the debt ceiling, will be perceived as an increased indication of the political inability to forge a compromise on essential long-term fiscal reforms. The consequences of a ratings downgrade would be significant, with the potential for Treasury rates to rise by a full percentage point for each one-notch downgrade.

Third, the financial crisis you warned of in your April 4th Letter to Congress could trigger a run on money market funds, as was the case in September 2008 after the Lehman failure. In the event of a Treasury default, I think it is likely that at least one fund would be forced to halt redemptions or conceivably “break the buck.” Since money fund investors are primarily focused on overnight liquidity, even a single fund halting redemptions would likely cause a broader run on money funds. Such a run would spark a severe crisis, disrupting markets and ultimately necessitating the same kind of backstops that Treasury and the Federal Reserve initiated in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. Such further increases in Treasury’s off-balance-sheet commitments are likely to be viewed negatively by investors and ratings agencies, which will potentially put further downgrade pressure on U.S. sovereign ratings.

Fourth, a Treasury default could severely disrupt the $4 trillion Treasury financing market, which could sharply raise borrowing rates for some market participants and possibly lead to another acute deleveraging event. Because Treasuries have historically been viewed as the world’s safest asset, they are the most widely-used collateral in the world and underpin large parts of the financing markets. A default could trigger a wave of margin calls and a widening of haircuts on collateral, which in turn could lead to deleveraging and a sharp drop in lending.

Fifth, the rise in borrowing costs and contraction of credit that would occur as a result of this deleveraging event would have damaging consequences for the still-fragile recovery of our economy. In 2008, placing the GSEs in conservatorship combined with a tightening of credit standards caused mortgage spreads to widen by 1.5 percent, ultimately raising mortgage rates for consumers. A similar rise in mortgage and Treasury rates would adversely impact economic growth, potentially pushing the U.S. economy back into recession.

Finally, I would emphasize that because the long-term risks from a default are so large, a prolonged delay in raising the debt ceiling may negatively impact markets well before a default actually occurs. This is because investors will likely undertake risk-management actions in preparation for a potential default. For example, borrowers who rely on short-term funding markets, including the GSEs, may attempt to pre-fund themselves or hold excess liquidity through July, distorting money market rates. Additional effects could include large auction concessions, especially if Treasury were forced to delay auctions for cash management purposes. I would also expect to see weaker demand for Treasury securities as uncertainty increases on whether the debt limit will be raised. Both of these effects would negatively impact Treasury’s borrowing costs.

Given the magnitude of the adverse consequences a default would have on Treasury borrowing costs and the health of the broader economy, action is urgently needed to increase the statutory debt limit. Swift action would also help ease the existing uncertainty in financial markets that could begin translating into real market impacts well before Treasury exhausts extraordinary actions at its disposal to postpone a default. Notwithstanding your significant efforts to date, your continued attention to this important issue is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Matthew E. Zames
Chairman
Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=2dbc825e750db9a442af1ce0e4be0162

Bucks: Friday Reading: Feeding Your Family From a Dumpster

April 08

For Those Still Wary of the Stock Market

Paul Sullivan, in his Wealth Matters column, goes back to analysts who made predictions about the financial markets in January and finds they still expect growth.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=2078e5fce543bdfd9c6c7f95b7442726