December 21, 2024

Cardinals Discuss ‘Hopes and Expectations’ of New Pope

On Wednesday, however, under pressure from their fellow cardinals, the Americans canceled their news briefing and shut down all communication with the news media to address a different problem: rampant leaks to the Italian news media in the delicate period of meetings ahead of the conclave, expected to begin next week.

But the tensions over how to address the news media — with American-style forthrightness or the ancient and more indirect ways of Italy — reflected a deeper culture clash between the Vatican as a global church, whose faithful often expect direct answers, and an Italian institution where secrecy is the rule but leaks often the norm.

That tension is certain to be on the minds of the cardinals as they gather to select the future leader of the Roman Catholic Church.

The cardinals swore an oath of secrecy before the meetings, prohibiting them from discussing their contents. But some cardinals have nevertheless spoken to news outlets from their home countries, including Brazil, Germany and France, sometimes sending what could be interpreted as direct messages to fellow cardinals.

Although the Americans had been the soul of discretion, careful not to violate their vows of secrecy while trying to explain their thoughts on the selection process, their strategy of taking direct questions — including about the sex abuse crisis — seemed to some Vatican observers to veer over the line into a subtle campaign for the papacy.

In the weeks since Pope Benedict XVI’s resignation and retirement, the Vatican has repeatedly said that cardinals selecting the next pope should not be swayed by statements in the news media. The Vatican Secretariat of State even compared news reports to the pressures exerted by foreign crowns to influence conclaves in past centuries.

In a terse statement on Wednesday, Sister Mary Ann Walsh, the spokeswoman for the American bishops, said, “The U.S. cardinals are committed to transparency and have been pleased to share a process-related overview of their work with members of the media and with the public.” They did so, she said, while still ensuring the confidentiality of the General Congregations, in which cardinals assess one another and discuss what they believe the church needs.

“Due to concerns over accounts being reported in the Italian press, which breached confidentiality, the College of Cardinals has agreed not to give interviews,” she added.

Those accounts in the Italian news media included tales of disagreement over the slow pace of the proceedings, and the potential advantage of non-Italian candidates for pope. Some also reported that individual cardinals advanced proposals to make it easier for branches of the Vatican to communicate better.

The leaks revealed a uniquely Italian combination of hierarchy and anarchy, in which cardinals sworn to secrecy — or perhaps their aides — leak juicy gossip and convey messages through their favorite local reporters. Vatican watchers say that approach helped lead to the scandal of leaked documents that contributed to Benedict’s decision to resign, leaving the job to someone younger and stronger.

The Vatican spokesman, the Rev. Federico Lombardi, said Wednesday that it was not up to the Vatican to tell the cardinals how to handle the news media, adding that the tradition of the conclave “is also a tradition of reserve to protect the liberty” of each cardinal so he can make his decision freely.

At his daily Vatican briefings, Father Lombardi, an amiable Jesuit with a nervous cough, often combines painstaking attention to liturgical detail with general evasion of thornier questions. Journalists have also been shown silent and surreal video images of the silver, wok-shaped urns in which cardinals will cast their ballots for pope. In the video, a mysterious hand opens the urn, a move more reminsicent of the Home Shopping Network than C-Span.

Daniel J. Wakin contributed reporting.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/world/europe/roman-catholic-cardinals-discuss-hopes-and-expectations-of-new-pope.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

At Olympus, Scandal and Rising Calls for a Purge

The company’s stock fell 29 percent on Tuesday, and 20 percent more in early trading on Wednesday in Japan, to hit a new low. Shareholders said they were worried that the company could be delisted from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which could threaten access to financing. Since mid-October, the company’s market value has plunged by 70 percent.

Southeastern Asset Management, the American owner of the second-biggest stake in Olympus, also demanded an extraordinary meeting of shareholders to call for a clean sweep of the board of directors and the firing of top executives.

External investigations of the company’s handling of the merger payments and losses are under way in Japan and in the United States, where the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Securities and Exchange Commission are looking at the fees, according to people briefed on the matter. With broad investigations still open, it was likely that not just investors, but suppliers and customers, would reconsider doing business with Olympus.

The crisis at Olympus, which has a multibillion-dollar global business making digital cameras and medical equipment, began in mid-October, when the board fired the British chief executive and president, Michael C. Woodford.

The company’s chairman, Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, blamed a culture clash, but Mr. Woodford, a 30-year Olympus employee, said he was fired after trying to force an investigation into a series of acquisitions made before he was appointed chief in September.

Less than two weeks after Mr. Woodford was fired, Mr. Kikukawa resigned. On Tuesday, an outside committee appointed by Olympus concluded that more than $1 billion in merger payouts had been used to hide years of losses on investments, perhaps dating to the 1990s.

The company’s new president, Shuichi Takayama, acknowledged “inappropriate dealings,” but said that no money had flowed out of the company. Hisashi Mori, an executive vice president, had been fired over his involvement in the cover-up, and Hideo Yamada, the corporate auditor, offered his resignation, Mr. Takayama said. In an interview Tuesday, Mr. Woodford said that despite the public admission of mishandling, he was not feeling vindicated because Olympus was still being run by a board of insiders. Mr. Kikukawa and Mr. Mori — as well as Mr. Woodford himself — remain as directors.

“I feel very worried the company still has those individuals at the helm,” he said in a phone interview from London.

The American stakeholder calling for the extraordinary shareholder meeting, Southeastern Asset Management, also said Olympus still needed an overhaul.

Josh Shores, a senior analyst and principal for Southeastern, said Mr. Kikukawa “is definitely in the thick of it. If Kikukawa is still there, he is still exerting massive influence.”

Southeastern also suggested that it did not believe the entire story behind the hidden investment losses had surfaced, saying the company needed to explain the details “as soon as possible.”

Southeastern, which holds an approximately 5 percent stake in Olympus, is an investment firm based in Memphis. It has been managing funds invested in the company since 2004.

Olympus, which is based in Tokyo, had denied any wrongdoing over the deals, made from 2006 to 2008. The admission on Tuesday was a “change of gears” for investors, Mr. Shores said.

It was “something that could negatively impact the value of the medical business,” for example, where Olympus Medical has a 70 percent market share globally in flexible endoscopes, he said.

“This has been a question about what happened to some of that cash flow, and all of a sudden the core medical franchise is at risk of being negatively impacted,” he said. “You are at the point where damage is likely to be done.”

When asked whether he thought Olympus could survive the scandal, he said: “Keep in mind before all of this happened, the stock was 2,500 yen a share. We still thought it was cheap.” The only thing that needs to be changed, he said, is the people running it and an accounting of where the money went.

Mr. Woodford, too, said Olympus still had value. “It’s a good business. You can rebuild the company,” he said.

The developments cast a harsh light on Olympus’s auditors, which have signed off on financial statements that may now be suspect. The auditors, KPMG and Ernst Young ShinNihon, have not been accused of knowingly signing inaccurate statements.

KPMG was Olympus’s auditor for years until it had a falling out with management in 2009. A year earlier, KPMG had advised Olympus against awarding unusual fees to an obscure brokerage firm that advised on a deal. Cash payouts were preferable, the auditor said, but the financial adviser “strongly resisted the cash payment on the grounds that this will crystallize an immediate tax liability,” according to a document provided to The New York Times by Mr. Woodford.

A spokesman for the American arm of Ernst Young, which replaced KPMG in 2009, did not respond to a request for comment. For now, Olympus is still a client.

The payments in question involved $687 million in fees Olympus paid to an obscure financial adviser over its acquisition of the British medical equipment maker Gyrus in 2008. That fee amounted to roughly a third of the $2 billion acquisition price, a fee amount more than 30 times the norm.

Ben Protess contributed reporting.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/business/global/at-olympus-scandal-and-rising-calls-for-a-purge.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

DealBook: In Silicon Valley, a Culture Clash Sullies a Romance

Tony Avelar/Bloomberg News

Private equity has broken venture capital’s heart, and V.C. is not taking it well.

The romance ended when Silver Lake, the private equity firm, agreed to sell Skype to Microsoft. Silver Lake is estimated to be pocketing more than $4 billion from the sale.

This would normally be a joyous event for Skype’s employees as they too share the wealth. But it is nothing of the sort. The venture capital community appears to be up in arms about Silver Lake, a sentiment expressed in the extreme by the financial blogger Felix Salmon of Reuters, who branded the firm “evil.”

The reason: Silver Lake structured its options program for Skype so that, contrary to Silicon Valley convention, former Skype employees would not share in the windfall. The former employees will receive nothing.

Is the Valley right to be angry at Silver Lake? The answer lies in examining the two very different cultures of venture capital and private equity. While they are often lumped together, each has its own values and ways of doing things.

The controversy over Skype started in April when a former employee, Yee Lee, tried to exercise options he thought were worth more than $70,000. Skype informed Mr. Lee that its option plan allowed Skype to buy back the options at their initial price if he was no longer employed by the company. Since he was a former employee, Skype was going to exercise this right. Mr. Lee would receive nothing.

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Mr. Lee aired his surprise publicly on his blog. The gist of his complaint was that Skype’s terms were anything but the Silicon Valley norm. In the Valley, employees typically receive options that “cliff-vest” in one-year tranches over four years. This means that after each year, one-fourth of the options vest with the employee, but if the employee leaves the day before, the options are forfeit. This is the cliff. The convention in Silicon Valley is that once vested, options are kept by employees even if they leave.

Mr. Lee, who has worked about 15 years in Silicon Valley, complained that he was never told that the Skype terms were different and that he didn’t notice the language in his option agreements that spelled this out. He wrote, “I’ve seen my share of legal documents for tech companies [but] these clauses were hidden as one-liners in otherwise pretty standard-looking documents.”

After his blog post came the fury. Dan Primack at Fortune wrote that it looked as if Mr. Lee “was almost intentionally tricked.” The compensation consultant Graef Crystal told Bloomberg Business Week that the move “invalidates the meaning of the word ‘vested.’ ”

Despite the complaints, Skype and Silver Lake have refused to budge even though it would cost only about a million dollars or so to make the problem go away. Brian O’Shaughnessy, a spokesman for Skype, summed up the attitude as “you’ve got to be in it to win it,” telling Bloomberg Business Week that “this individual chose to leave, therefore he doesn’t get that benefit.”

The easy lesson here is the need to carefully read contracts before you agree to them and hire a lawyer if you don’t understand them. The language Mr. Lee complains about was certainly legalese but heralded caution.

More than this, his failure is baffling. In the land of V.C., options are everything; they are what employees see as the real payout. Even if the language was hard to understand, Mr. Lee had plenty of incentive to make the effort.

His lapse is not unique and is symptomatic of a wider problem. In Silicon Valley even the most sophisticated people too often don’t read the documents. Look at the mess around Facebook’s founding. Before its initial public offering, Google issued a number of its options in violation of the federal securities laws. In Silicon Valley, law and contracts are often ignored as unimportant details that only stifle the entrepreneurial spirit.

Yet this doesn’t explain the fury. Why care so much over a few employees’ relatively unimportant loss?

The anger is attributable to the clash between the two worlds. Private equity firms buy companies, and through financial engineering and a dose of operational and management restructuring make investor profits.

There is a real debate over whether private equity firms even create value. It may be that private equity makes money by operating companies more efficiently, but some instead argue that private equity’s success is attributable to the ability to borrow heavily and reap value through leverage and tax deductions. Regardless, private equity is commonly viewed as the world of New York finance.

Venture capital is adamantly not about financial engineering. It is about ideas and creativity, where people build next-generation companies. Sure, venture capital firms are good at finance, but the community is really about creating value from the “new new thing,” as Michael Lewis put it.

As a result, they have different operational methods.

Anyone who watched private equity firms during the financial crisis would not be surprised to learn of Mr. Lee’s lament. During the financial crisis, private equity firms repeatedly walked on acquisitions without regard to their reputations. In private equity reputation matters, but money triumphs. The highest bidder for a company wins, even if the bidder is not well liked. And that is why Silver Lake is not paying the measly $1 million it would cost it to solve this problem and not look greedy. It isn’t worth it to the firm.

But in Silicon Valley, the community is not only smaller, the people work together again and again, and so trust and reputation are valued more highly. On his LinkedIn page, Mr. Lee alone lists more than 10 companies where he has worked. When you are going to see and work with the same people repeatedly over many years, $1 million is small change to buy their needed loyalty.

This all ties into the venture capital community’s better public image. No one talks of taxing venture capital billionaires they way they do about private equity barons. Venture capital is viewed as a creative industry, while the world considers private equity as finance, money men who do not create.

I don’t think this is true. Private equity firms do create value, albeit with a heavy assist from financial engineering. Mr. Lee himself marveled on his blog at the ultimately successful restructuring Silver Lake undertook at Skype.

The perception is otherwise. Imagine if Lawrence H. Summers had joined Blackstone or Carlyle instead of recently becoming an adviser to the venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz. He would be called a sellout akin to Peter Orszag, who left government service to become a vice chairman at Citigroup.

This brings us back to l’affaire Skype. Mr. Lee can be blamed, but instead it is Silver Lake that is vilified. The reason is that Silver Lake is not playing by venture capital rules.

Yet the private equity firm is being blamed for doing exactly what private equity firms do and what is expected of them. In this light, Silver Lake is not “evil. “ Silver Lake is not even acting illegally or immorally. If Mr. Lee had hired a lawyer for an hour, he would have learned of his dilemma.

Name-calling aside, this is all about all about what people think of the industries and venture capital’s innate fear of private equity methods. V.C. and P.E. just may not be right for each other.


Steven M. Davidoff, writing as The Deal Professor, is a commentator for DealBook on the world of mergers and acquisitions.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=2d7f52ee24d19645b825d3ff00602f4b