November 22, 2024

You’re the Boss: What Some Banks Don’t Want You to Know

Thinking Entrepreneur

Several weeks ago, the top small-business bankers at Wells Fargo agreed to take questions from You’re the Boss readers. For reasons that escape me, I’ve found that bankers are often reluctant to tell small-business owners precisely what they expect from borrowers, so I couldn’t resist contributing a few questions.

Hoping it might be useful to all small-business owners, I asked for specific guidelines that relate to the minimum requirements the bankers look for when considering a loan. I referred to the well known “Five Cs” of credit: character, cash flow, collateral, capital, and conditions. Basically, I asked the bankers to pretend that there were no public relations people or lawyers in the room and just tell us what they really want from us. For example, how do they define good character? Is it O.K. if you’ve been married four times? What if you don’t go to your son’s baseball games?

Somehow, the bankers managed not to answer any of my questions — although they did mention that it was a good idea to clean up your credit report. Gee, thanks! I can’t tell you that I understand the downside of giving owners some real insight into what banks are looking for. Maybe the bankers don’t want to take a chance on scaring anyone away, but it seems to me it could save us all a lot of time. And judging from the comments, I’m not sure they did themselves any favors. Because I think this is important information, I asked my own banker if he could shed some light on how his bank evaluates loans. He is Matt Sloan, from American Chartered Bank, a mid-sized bank that specializes in small-business lending and has locations around Chicago. Here are his thoughts:

Deciding whether to provide credit to a business can definitely be as much art as science, but there are some material factors to consider:

1. How much equity or net worth does the business have on its balance sheet? This is extremely important as we need to know what happens if the company has a rainy day or if our economy goes through another recession. Does the business have enough capital to survive if it loses a major client? On the same note, what is the overall leverage (debt to equity) of the company? Less than four to one? That’s fair. Three to one? That’s good. Two to one? Excellent. If a business makes $100,000 and the owners pull out $200,000 in distributions, then the company actually lost $100,000 from our perspective. (Believe me, we see this happen.)

2. What type of collateral is supporting the loan? I don’t see many banks providing unsecured loans in today’s climate so there have to be enough “eligible” receivables (90 days and under), “clean” inventory (sellable), equipment and/or recently appraised real estate to cover the loan amount.

3. Cash Flow. The years 2008 and 2009 were rough for many businesses, so if you were able to survive and rebound in 2010, more power to you. We analyze the past three years to understand trends, but we completely understand how difficult the economy has been. So, if a company has turned the corner and can show that its cash flow can support its debt payments at a multiple of 1.2 or 1.3 (meaning that it is taking in at least 20 percent more than the debt payment), the it is a good banking candidate.

4. Character. Do I want a new client who doesn’t return phone calls and doesn’t treat me or my team with respect? No. I want to work with solid, ethical people who are looking to build long lasting relationships. End of story. It’s better for both sides.

5. Conditions are a tricky topic because a good company can perform well in a bad economy (and vice versa). So, let’s leave that one alone.

I hope this clears up some of the confusion surrounding the crazy banking environment we live in.

Thank you, Matt. I will add one more thing. I found American Chartered Bank through my accountant. He knows which banks are lending, what they are like to work with and what they are looking for. And he has a relationship with the banks that the banks don’t want to mess up. If your accountant can’t help you, and you need to borrow money, it might be time to consider finding a new accountant. If you are looking to borrow money, you probably need an accountant who does more than your tax return.

Jay Goltz owns five small businesses in Chicago.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=8e9ac9c8ec91ef70c0300cc50b9f2650

Fed Help Kept Banks Afloat, Until It Didn’t

The loans through the so-called discount window transformed a little-used program for banks that run low on cash into a source of long-term financing for troubled institutions, some of which borrowed regularly from the Fed for more than a year.

The central bank took little risk in making the loans, protecting itself by demanding large amounts of collateral. But propping up failing banks can increase the eventual cleanup costs for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation because it keeps struggling banks afloat, allowing them to get even deeper in debt. It also can clog the arteries of the financial system, tying up money in banks that are no longer making new loans.

County Bank, the largest bank in Merced County, California, took a $4.8 million loan from the discount window in March 2008 after announcing the first annual loss in its 30-year history, news that prompted depositors to withdraw $52 million.

By the fall of 2008, the bank was borrowing regularly from the Fed, taking more than two dozen loans in amounts that peaked above $60 million. It continued borrowing until the day it failed, taking a final loan for $55 million on Friday, Feb. 6, 2009.

Thomas Hawker, the former chief executive, said that the loans helped keep the bank in business, providing needed cash as deposits dwindled. But he said that it was clear in retrospect that County Bank was dead on its feet the whole time, thanks to its once-lucrative focus on financing construction of new homes in the Central Valley of California.

“I think in most cases it is a lifeline that kind of provides a bridge to survival,” said Mr. Hawker, who left the bank in 2008. “In the case here, Merced County was ground zero for everything that could possibly have gone wrong with the economy.”

The discount window is a basic feature of the central bank’s original design, intended to mitigate bank runs and other cash squeezes. But access to it historically has been limited to healthy banks with short-term problems.

Those limits moved from custom to law in 1991, when Congress formally restricted the Fed’s ability to help failing banks. A Congressional investigation found that more than 300 banks that failed between 1985 and 1991 owed money to the Fed at the time of their failure. Critics said the Fed’s lending had increased the cost of those failures.

The central bank was chastened for a generation but in 2007, facing a new banking crisis, the Fed once again started to broaden access to the discount window. It reduced the cost of borrowing and started offering loans for longer terms of up to 30 days.

More than one thousand banks have taken advantage. A review of federal data, including records the Fed released last week, shows that at least 111 of those banks subsequently failed. Eight owed the Fed money on the day they failed, including Washington Mutual, the largest failed bank in American history.

The Fed has said that it complied fully with the law in all of its emergency loans, and that its actions, including lending from the discount window, were intended to limit the impact of the crisis.

Charles Calomiris, a finance professor at Columbia University who has studied discount window lending during previous crises, said the Fed had not released enough information for the public to determine whether some of the recipients were propped up inappropriately and should have been allowed to fail more quickly.

“Do we know whether the Fed did that? No, we don’t,” he said. “But the Fed has become more politicized than at any point in its history, and I do worry very much that a lot of Fed discount window lending may just be part of a political calculation.”

In some cases the Fed’s lending had clear benefits, whether or not the loans meant going beyond the mandate.

The F.D.I.C. almost always seizes banks on Friday evenings, so the new owners have two days before reopening. In some cases the Fed kept banks alive until the next Friday. The Bank of Clark County in Vancouver, Wash., took its first discount window loan on Monday, Jan. 12, 2009. It borrowed $8 million Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, then $14 million on Thursday and Friday. Then the F.D.I.C. closed its doors.

In other cases, the Fed stopped lending to banks as the extent of their financial problems became clear. Alton Gilbert, a former official at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis who wrote a widely cited study of the Fed’s discount window lending in the 1980s, said that few banks failed with Fed loans on their books during the recent crisis. The central bank often suspended lending several months before they failed.

Still, some experts said additional scrutiny was warranted for a subset of banks that received sustained support even though they faced clear problems.

The most frequent visitors at the window were three subsidiaries of FBOP, a bank holding company based in Oak Park, Ill.

Park National Bank in Chicago borrowed regularly from April 2008 until the day of its failure in October 2009, taking 129 loans in amounts that peaked at $345 million — the longest period of sustained support for any bank that failed during the crisis. Park used some of the money to finance the acquisition of assets from other banks, expanding its own balance sheet and potentially increasing the cost of its eventual failure. Bloomberg News first reported the details of the Fed’s discount window lending to the company.

Two other failed banks owned by FBOP also took more than 100 loans from the discount window, California National Bank of Los Angeles and Pacific National Bank of San Francisco, although both stopped borrowing several months before failing.

Marvin Goodfriend, a professor of economics at Carnegie Mellon University, said that such lending placed the Fed in the inappropriate position of deciding the fate of individual banks, choices that he said should be made by elected officials.

“What I think is the lesson from this is that the Congress needs to clarify the boundaries of independent Fed credit policy,” Professor Goodfriend said. “There should be a mechanism so that the Fed doesn’t have to make these decisions on behalf of taxpayers.”

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=122c240d24b3b1ae41033639b7978983