November 22, 2024

Economic View: The Egalitarian Tradition of Economics

Economic analysis is itself value-free, but in practice it encourages a cosmopolitan interest in natural equality. Many economic models, of course, assume that all individuals are motivated by rational self-interest or some variant thereof; even the so-called behavioral theories tweak only the fringes of a basically common, rational understanding of people. The crucial implication is this: If you treat all individuals as fundamentally the same in your theoretical constructs, it would be odd to insist that the law should suddenly start treating them differently.

At least since the 19th century, the interest of economists in personal liberty can be easily documented. In 1829, all 15 economists who held seats in the British Parliament voted to allow Roman Catholics as members. In 1858, the 13 economists in Parliament voted unanimously to extend full civil rights to Jews. (While both measures were approved, they were controversial among many non-economist members.) For many years leading up to the various abolitions of slavery, economists were generally critics of slavery and advocates of people’s natural equality, as documented by David M. Levy, professor of economics at George Mason University, and Sandra J. Peart, dean of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond, in “The ‘Vanity of the Philosopher’: From Equality to Hierarchy in Post-Classical Economics.”

Professors Levy and Peart coined the phrase “analytical egalitarianism” to describe the underpinnings of this tradition. For example, Adam Smith cited birth and fortune, as opposed to intrinsically different capabilities, as the primary reasons for differences in social rank. And the classical economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill promoted equal legal and institutional rights for women long before such views were fashionable. Their utilitarian moral theories placed individuals on a par in the social calculus by asking about the greatest good for the greatest number.

Bentham and Mill didn’t support personal liberty in every instance — Mill was a proud imperialist when it came to India, and Bentham’s idea for a Panopticon prison was a model of state-sponsored surveillance. But they prepared the way for dissecting the prevailing defenses of hierarchy and injustice.

More recently, a tradition from University of Chicago economists asserts that deep down, all human beings have the same desires, even though they may face different circumstances and incentives. Gary Becker, the Nobel laureate who is one of the founders of this approach, used the economic method to lay bare the selfish motives behind racial and ethnic discrimination. And the recent Republican amicus brief endorsing gay marriage carried the signatures of two renowned economists, Harvey S. Rosen of Princeton and N. Gregory Mankiw of Harvard. (Mr. Mankiw is a regular contributor to this column.)

Often, economists spend their energies squabbling with one another, but arguably the more important contrast is between our broadly liberal economic worldview and the various alternatives — common around the globe — that postulate natural hierarchies of religion, ethnicity, caste and gender, often enforced by law and strict custom. Economists too often forget that we are part of this broader battle of ideas, and that we are winning some enduring victories.

So where will a cosmopolitan perspective take us today?

One enormous issue is international migration. A distressingly large portion of the debate in many countries analyzes the effects of higher immigration on domestic citizens alone and seeks to restrict immigration to protect a national culture or existing economic interests. The obvious but too-often-underemphasized reality is that immigration is a significant gain for most people who move to a new country.

Michael Clemens, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, quantified these gains in a 2011 paper, “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?” He found that unrestricted immigration could create tens of trillions of dollars in economic value, as captured by the migrants themselves in the form of higher wages in their new countries and by those who hire the migrants or consume the products of their labor. For a profession concerned with precision, it is remarkable how infrequently we economists talk about those rather large numbers.

Truly open borders might prove unworkable, especially in countries with welfare states, and kill the goose laying the proverbial golden eggs; in this regard Mr. Clemens’s analysis may require some modification. Still, we should be obsessing over how many of those trillions can actually be realized.

IN any case, there is an overriding moral issue. Imagine that it is your professional duty to report a cost-benefit analysis of liberalizing immigration policy. You wouldn’t dream of producing a study that counted “men only” or “whites only,” at least not without specific, clearly stated reasons for dividing the data.

So why report cost-benefit results only for United States citizens or residents, as is sometimes done in analyses of both international trade and migration? The nation-state is a good practical institution, but it does not provide the final moral delineation of which people count and which do not. So commentators on trade and immigration should stress the cosmopolitan perspective, knowing that the practical imperatives of the nation-state will not be underrepresented in the ensuing debate.

Economics evolved as a more moral and more egalitarian approach to policy than prevailed in its surrounding milieu. Let’s cherish and extend that heritage. The real contributions of economics to human welfare might turn out to be very different from what most people — even most economists — expect.

Tyler Cowen is a professor of economics at George Mason University.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/business/the-egalitarian-tradition-of-economics.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

DealBook: Former UBS Executives Are Grilled Over Libor

Marcel Rohner, former chief of UBS, leaving a parliamentary hearing in London on Thursday. I did the best I could, he told lawmakers.Tal Cohen/European Pressphoto AgencyMarcel Rohner, former chief of UBS, leaving a parliamentary hearing in London on Thursday. “I did the best I could,” he told lawmakers.

LONDON – Several former senior executives at UBS were labeled on Thursday as negligent and incompetent for failing to detect illegal activity that led the Swiss bank to pay a $1.5 billion fine to global regulators.

On the second day of hearings at the British Parliament related to the recent rate-rigging scandal, Marcel Rohner, the former chief executive of UBS, and a number of former heads of the firm’s investment bank were grilled over whether they were aware that around 40 people had altered major benchmark interest rates for financial gain.

The executives, who no longer work at the Swiss bank, denied any knowledge about the illegal activity, and said they had only found out about the investigations into the firm conducted by the United States Justice Department, the United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission and international authorities late last year.

“What we have heard are appalling mistakes that can only be described as gross negligence and incompetence,” Andrew Tyrie, a politician who leads Parliament’s commission on banking standards that is investigating wrongdoing at the firms operating in London. “The level of ignorance seems staggering to the point of incredulity.”

UBS agreed to pay the multibillion-dollar fine in late 2012 to settle allegations that some of its traders altered the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, and the euro interbank offered rate, or Euribor, to increase their own profits. The benchmark rates underpin trillions of dollars of financial products, including mortgages, worldwide.

Some UBS senior managers also tweaked the bank’s submissions to present the Swiss bank in a better financial position than it actually was, according to regulatory filings.

Libor Explained

Mr. Rohner, who led UBS from 2007 to 2009. a period when the bank wrote down around $50 billion of sophisticated credit products, said he was embarrassed and ashamed by the misconduct related to Libor.

“I did the best I could,” said Mr. Rohner, who appeared taken aback by the angry questions from the British politicians, who repeatedly called his actions incompetent and negligent.

The former UBS chief executive said the firm’s operations had become too complex before the financial crisis, which had made it difficult to keep track of potential illegal activity by some of its employees.

The parliamentary hearing focused on speculation at the beginning of the financial crisis that highlighted banks’ so-called low-balling of rates. The practice involved submitting lower rates used in setting Libor in an effort to portray the firms in strong financial health despite a severe cut in lending between global financial institutions.

Mr. Rohner and three former chiefs of UBS’s investment bank, Huw Jenkins, Alex-Wilmot-Sitwell and Jerker Johansson, all denied being aware of the rate submissions in 2007 and 2008, when the bank raised billions of dollars of new capital to shore up its own finances.

“I had the responsibility to actively seek out information about things that concerned me,” Mr. Johansson, who ran UBS’s investment bank from 2008 to 2009, told the British parliamentary hearing on Thursday. “I failed to recognize this Libor issue as being one of these issues.”

Yet British politicians refused to believe that senior executives at the Swiss bank did not know about the Libor submissions at a time when the financial markets had been focused on the short-term financing problems of the world’s largest banks.

“You are stretching belief to its limit to get us to believe that you were completely unaware,” Andrew Love, a British politician on the parliamentary committee, told the former UBS executives .

The hearing also questioned several current and former senior members of the Financial Services Authority, Britain’s financial regulator, over their actions that led to the multibillion-dollar fine against UBS, the largest financial penalty so far levied against a bank in the continuing Libor investigation.

Hector Sants, the British regulator’s former chief executive, who is set to join Barclays as head of compliance, said banks should be more proactive in detecting potential illegal behavior, and called for greater oversight of global banks that operate in London. Barclays agreed to a $450 million settlement with global authorities last year related to the Libor investigation.

British regulators said that only nine out of the 40 individuals involved in the UBS rate-rigging scandal had worked in the country’s financial services industry, and that authorities were continuing to investigate a number of firms and individuals connected to the rate-rigging scandal.

“This is not the end of the Libor story,” said Tracey McDermott, director of enforcement and financial crime at the Financial Services Authority.

Article source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/former-ubs-executives-are-grilled-over-libor/?partner=rss&emc=rss