April 24, 2024

DealBook: Singapore Company Sues a Vocal Critic

Muddy Waters Research and its founder, Carson C. Block, are known for taking negative stances on Chinese companies. They are being sued by Olam International of Singapore over a recent report.Peter DaSilva for The New York TimesMuddy Waters Research and its founder, Carson C. Block, are known for taking negative stances on Chinese companies. They are being sued by Olam International of Singapore over a recent report.

HONG KONG — Carson C. Block made a name for himself and his company, Muddy Waters Research, by betting big against the shares of Chinese companies that were listed in North America. Now he is setting his sights on Singapore.

On Wednesday, Muddy Waters published a scathing letter on its Web site saying that Olam International, an agricultural commodities company partly owned by the Singaporean sovereign wealth fund Temasek Holdings, was “at risk of collapsing” because of its debt load and other factors. The letter echoed similar comments Mr. Block made on Monday at a forum in London.

Olam responded on Wednesday, saying it had filed a lawsuit against Muddy Waters and Mr. Block in Singapore’s high court regarding the comments made in London. The suit involves charges of libel, slander or malicious falsehoods, a spokeswoman for Olam said. She added that the company was seeking damages but gave no details.

Olam’s chief executive, Sunny Verghese, hosted a conference call with investors and the news media, saying the company was one of the most-shorted stocks in Singapore and accusing Muddy Waters of “spreading these baseless assertions and trying to spook the market so that they can profit from their short position.”

Olam International

Muddy Waters, based in Hong Kong and the United States, is best known for publishing highly critical reports on Chinese companies and profiting from its research by betting against their stocks.

Last year, Muddy Waters published a critical report on the Sino-Forest Corporation, a Chinese forestry company listed in Toronto. The stock dropped precipitously, creating huge losses for investors, including funds managed by the hedge fund billionaire John Paulson. Sino-Forest ultimately filed for bankruptcy.

After Mr. Block’s London comments, Olam’s shares fell 7.5 percent in Singapore on Tuesday once trading resumed after a temporary halt requested by the company. The stock recovered on Wednesday, rising 5.3 percent and closing at 1.695 Singapore dollars a share, or $1.38.

The rebound came despite the most recent Muddy Waters letter, which called Olam’s response to Mr. Block’s comments “extraordinary.”

“Companies that attack criticism the way Olam does fail to understand that raising money from the public is a privilege,” said the letter, addressed to Mr. Verghese and Olam’s directors. “Because Olam has received significant investment from the government of Singapore, Olam’s mismanagement of the public trust is that much less forgivable.”

Olam did not issue a direct response to the letter on Wednesday. In his comments on Tuesday, Mr. Verghese said Mr. Block had joined representatives of a hedge fund in a visit to Olam’s offices this month. He was dressed in a T-shirt, jeans and a baseball cap and gave a false name, according to Olam. It was only this week that Olam realized the visitor had been Mr. Block, Mr. Verghese said, after seeing photos of him on the Muddy Waters Web site.

In its letter, Muddy Waters called Olam’s trading halt and conference call a “frantic response,” saying the Singapore company also “evidenced a bizarre fixation on baseball caps.”

Before filing the legal action on Wednesday, Mr. Verghese said that Olam was trying to determine whether it had a case against Muddy Waters.

“The losses incurred by shareholders would more than justify the legal costs of pursuing this,” he said. “There are definitely disconcerting factors we have observed here in terms of some kind of manipulation.”

Short-selling is not as common in Singapore as it is in markets in the United States and in Europe, but Olam’s shares have experienced relatively heavy short-selling volumes recently. Since May, the percentage of the company’s shares on loan — an indication of short-selling activity — has more than doubled. According to data from the financial information services company Markit, 13.4 percent of Olam’s Singapore-traded shares are on loan, representing about four-fifths of all shares available to be borrowed.

Article source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/muddy-waters-turns-its-focus-on-singapore/?partner=rss&emc=rss

China’s Treasury Holdings Make U.S. Woes Its Own

As the United States’ biggest foreign creditor — holding an estimated $1.5 trillion in American government debt — China has been a vocal critic of what it considers Washington’s politicized profligacy.

“We hope that the U.S. government adopts responsible policies and measures to guarantee the interests of investors,” Hong Lei, a foreign ministry spokesman, said at a news conference late last week.

Beijing might prefer to respond by starting to dump some of its American debt. But in this financial version of the cold war, analysts say, both sides fear mutually assured destruction.

One reason the United States would want to avoid defaulting on its debt is that such a move could alienate China, which is a steady purchaser of Treasury bonds. Beijing, meanwhile, already has too much invested in American debt to do much more but continue to buy, hold and grumble.

It is the ultimate “too big to fail” global relationship, said Andy Rothman, an analyst in Shanghai for the investment bank CLSA.

If Beijing even hinted that it might try to sell part of its American debt, “other countries might sell their dollar assets,” Mr. Rothman said, noting that this would drive down the value of China’s holdings. “It would be financial suicide for China.”

China got into this situation, experts say, by indulging its own economic interests. To bolster what has become the world’s largest export economy, China has focused on policies that encourage domestic savings and hold down the value of its currency. The result: huge trade and current-account surpluses. China has accumulated more than $3 trillion in foreign currency reserves, far more than any other nation.

Most of those reserves are held in dollars, and recycled back to the United States through investments in Treasury bonds and other dollar-denominated securities — even stocks. And while some of China’s foreign exchange reserves are plowed into European and Japanese debt, those bond markets are not big or liquid enough to absorb the bulk of China’s ever-larger foreign holdings.

Beijing has tried to diversify its foreign exchange portfolio by creating a sovereign wealth fund that can invest some of the reserves overseas. The government has also encouraged Chinese companies to expand overseas and to acquire mines and natural resources to fuel China’s hungry economy. But because China has too much foreign money for any other outlet to absorb, the vast majority of its fast-growing reserves continue to be destined for the United States bond market.

“China has no choice but to keep buying,” said Zhang Ming, an expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a Beijing research group. “After all, U.S. Treasury bonds are still the largest and most liquid investment product in the world.”

All of which has helped enable America’s own fiscally dubious habits.

The United States’ huge deficits — not only in government spending, but in trade and savings as well — have weakened its economy and strangled consumption. Many economists say that would poison the long-term prospects for the dollar, if it were not still the world’s reserve currency and most reliable safe haven.

Helping maintain that role for the dollar are the staggering debt problems that Europe and Japan are struggling with. With global investors like China having few good options besides United States Treasuries, Washington, despite its current debt-ceiling debacle, can continue to hold down interest rates and wallow in cheap borrowing.

Beijing in recent years has frequently fretted aloud about Washington’s monetary policies. In 2009, shortly after the global financial crisis broke out, China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, said his country was “worried” about the safety of its huge cache of United States Treasury holdings. Last year Chinese policy advisers criticized the Federal Reserve for undermining the value of holdings by “printing too much money” with its so-called quantitative easing policies.

But even now, despite Beijing’s scolding about the debt impasse in Washington, China’s options may be limited.

”There’s really nothing different they can do,” said Eswar S. Prasad, a Cornell economics professor and former head of the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “Even if China felt the United States was going off a cliff, there’s no other place for them to put their money.”

Over the long run, many economists say the structural imbalances on both sides of the Chinese-American debt symbiosis could be disastrous. Already, for example, many say that those dynamics helped create the global financial crisis by artificially creating the low interest rates that let housing prices reach bubble-bursting levels.

Xu Yan contributed research.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=dc6378ba81f7c2274b027e78022f45cc