April 20, 2024

Smartphones and Tablets Outsell PCs at Lenovo

That milestone, which the company announced Thursday, underlines the growing influence of Chinese companies like Lenovo in the shift from desktop to mobile computing. Now even Lenovo, which acquired the IBM PC business in 2005 and sells ThinkPad notebooks, is remaking itself for a post-PC era.

Lenovo said its sales of smartphones had more than doubled in the three months that ended June 30, to 11.4 million. The company also sold 1.5 million tablet computers.

Executives said Lenovo had benefited from a structural shift in the smartphone business, where the high end, dominated by Apple and Samsung Electronics, is showing signs of saturation. Meanwhile, sales of less expensive handsets made by Lenovo and other Chinese companies, like Huawei and ZTE, are growing more rapidly. “The recent change in the market favors Lenovo and our business model,” Yang Yuanqing, chief executive of Lenovo, said in a conference call with analysts. “The market is shifting from the premium part to the mainstream. It is shifting from the mature markets to the emerging markets.”

Lenovo was the fourth-largest maker of smartphones worldwide in the second quarter, according to IDC, a research firm, with a market share of 4.7 percent, up from 3.1 percent a year earlier.

The company’s smartphone business relies heavily on China, which accounts for about 80 percent of sales, but Lenovo is trying to expand its global presence.

On Thursday, Lenovo executives declined to comment on speculation about a possible bid for BlackBerry, which has put itself up for sale. But Lenovo made it clear that it did not plan to rely on internal, or “organic,” growth alone.

“Given its solid financial position, the group will continue to actively look for inorganic growth opportunities which will supplement its organic growth strategy to accelerate future expansion,” Lenovo said in its latest quarterly earnings report.

Analysts say acquisitions might be one way for Lenovo to address some of the shortcomings of its smartphone arm, including the low prices that its devices fetch — an average of less than $100 in China, while devices like Apple’s iPhone 5 and Samsung’s Galaxy S4 cost more than $700 in that country.

Because of the low prices, Lenovo’s smartphone and tablet arm generated only 14 percent of the company’s revenue in the most recent quarter. The company remains heavily reliant on its PC division for sales and earnings, even though that business is shrinking.

Lenovo has managed the decline better than some of its rivals. Its shipments of computers slipped 1.4 percent in the second quarter, to 12.6 million, compared with a decline of 11 percent in the overall market, according to IDC. As a result, Lenovo overtook Hewlett-Packard and become the world’s largest PC maker in the period. That helped Lenovo post a 23 percent increase in net income, to $174 million, for its financial first quarter, which ended in June. The results were above analysts’ expectations.

Despite the solid performance of the PC division, company executives have taken to calling Lenovo a “PC-plus” company. Mr. Yang stuck with a previous forecast that the company would sell 50 million smartphones and 10 million tablets in the current quarter. But he acknowledged that Lenovo still had work to do in getting out the message about its mobile devices in markets beyond China.

“We still need to invest in the branding, we still need to invest in the channel and network building,” he said.

In China, Lenovo’s mobile business is growing rapidly. Canalys, a research firm, said it had shipped 10.8 million smartphones there in the second quarter, second only to Samsung, with 15.5 million. That is a strong base from which to develop new phones for other price-conscious developing markets, analysts say.

“The whole dynamic favors Lenovo a lot,” said Jenny Lai, an analyst at HSBC. “If you are No. 2 in the largest market in the world, your suppliers will come to you.”

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/business/global/smartphones-and-tablets-outsell-pcs-at-lenovo.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

News Analysis: In Japan, a Growth Strategy With Echoes of the Past

TOKYO — Digital medical records. Special economic zones. Structural reforms.

The core ideas behind Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s much-publicized growth strategy are stirring a nagging sense of déjà vu.

They should. The plan, which is set to be approved later this week, borrows liberally from a string of previous government initiatives that similarly promised to bolster the economy, including his own. And economists and investors are increasingly worried that the latest initiative will have the same effect as the past ones — that is to say, little at all.

“Every prime minister in recent memory has introduced an economic growth strategy, each not much better than the other,” said Akihiko Suzuki, chief economist at Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting, the research arm of the large Japanese bank.

“Expectations rise, but are quickly dashed,” Mr. Suzuki said. “It’s foolish to expect something different this time.”

The first two arrows of Mr. Abe’s economic push — a sizable dose of monetary and fiscal stimulus — initially impressed investors, sending the stock market soaring as much as 80 percent in six months. But some of that enthusiasm has evaporated, since Mr. Abe outlined the third piece, the core growth strategy. In recent weeks, the Nikkei has been in a steady slide.

Some investors worry that the prime minister’s plans are not much different than the largely ineffective attempts made by his predecessors, including Mr. Abe during his previous stint in 2006 and 2007.

Take Mr. Abe’s idea to help create a cutting-edge industry by digitizing Japan’s wealth of medical data, ripe for mining by technology companies. A similar policy was featured in Mr. Abe’s accelerated growth program, drawn up in mid-2007, during his previous term in office.

But after Mr. Abe resigned in September 2007, doctors started to grumble over the burdens of digitization. Many clinics run by older physicians eventually won exemption from the plan, along with others who found it difficult to work with digital technology. It is unclear whether the digital push this time will be more comprehensive or how much new business it may generate.

Mr. Abe also wants to create special economic zones that would relax some aspects of nationwide regulation in an effort to woo foreign investors. In part, the prime minister is pushing for more flexible medical services to cater to expatriates and more leeway for companies in emerging fields to hire and fire staff.

Mr. Abe’s mentor, the former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, tried much the same tack in the early 2000s. His reforms led to the creation of almost 1,000 special zones for structural reform, which relaxed things like the paperwork required by foreign researchers, standardized school curriculums, and licenses to home-brew sake, or Japanese rice wine.

The opposition Democratic Party introduced similar zones during its three-year stint in power, which ended in late 2012 with the victory of Mr. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party. But the long-term impact of such efforts has been limited.

Sweeping economic goals and strategies have become an almost annual rite for Japan’s successive prime ministers.

Before Mr. Abe’s growth strategy came three policy initiatives from the Democratic Party: Yukio Hatoyama’s New Growth Strategy of 2010; Naoto Kan’s Scenario to Bring Back a Lively Japan of 2011; and Yoshihiko Noda’s Japan Revival Strategy of 2012. Those initiatives did little to brighten Japan’s economic prospects.

Preceding those policies were Yasuo Fukuda’s Economic Growth Strategy of 2008 and Taro Aso’s Future Pioneering Strategy of 2009, which focused mainly on growing gross domestic product. But the Japanese economy suffered its most severe recession amid the global financial crisis, ending the Liberal Democratic Party’s half-century of almost uninterrupted rule.

Now, investors are worried that Mr. Abe’s growth strategy is merely more of the same, a situation that threatens to undermine confidence in the other facets of his program.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/13/business/global/in-japan-a-growth-strategy-with-echoes-of-the-past.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

BP Wins Legal Victory for Its Russian Joint Venture

LONDON — BP won the backing of a Siberian court Friday in its battle against $16 billion in compensation claims brought by a minority shareholder in TNK-BP, the oil giant’s Russian joint venture. It was an unexpectedly swift victory in a court system usually stacked against outsiders, and such cases can drag on for years.

The court in Tyumen rejected lawsuits brought by Andrei Prokhorov, who claimed that BP’s failed deal with Rosneft cost TNK-BP billions in profit. The court rejected the claim for lack of evidence and because Mr. Prokhorov had failed to get the necessary support of more than 1 percent of TNK-BP’s shareholders.

The ruling was a victory for BP in a country whose oil and natural gas accounts for about a quarter of the company’s output, but where it has faced repeated run-ins with its partners and the Kremlin. The recent claims were the basis for a raid by police commandos armed with assault rifles on BP’s offices in Moscow in August.

The timing had raised some eyebrows in the industry because it came a day after Exxon had agreed to take BP’s place in an exploration deal with Rosneft.

Jeremy Huck, president of BP Russia, said in a statement that the company was pleased with the decision.

“I also believe that today’s decision is a positive contribution to the investment climate in Russia,” he added.

BP had to abandon an agreement with Rosneft, a state controlled company, in May that would have given it access to lucrative exploration fields and would have included a share swap between the two companies. The deal fell apart because of challenges from BP’s billionaire partners in the TNK-BP joint venture.

BP had been eager to present a promising growth strategy to its investors after the disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico last year.

On Friday, the Siberian court rejected two claims by a group led by Mr. Prokhorov. One, worth about $3 billion, was against the TNK-BP board members Peter Anthony Charow and Richard Scott Sloan; the other, worth about $13 billion, was against BP itself.

“BP have consistently maintained that there is no merit in the lawsuits against them since there were in fact no damages in the form of lost profits,” the company said. It added that Rosneft did not consider TNK-BP as a possible member of the Rosneft partnership because it lacked the required competence.

Mr. Prokhorov, who owns a tiny percentage of the TNK-BP joint venture, plans to appeal the ruling, his attorneys said. He has 30 days to appeal, according to Russian law.

BP is still embroiled in a separate legal dispute with its Russian billionaire partners in TNK-BP about whether the Rosneft deal breached their shareholder agreement. The case is in arbitration in Sweden.

Western business partners of Alfa Group, one of the Russian owners of TNK-BP, have encountered a pattern of being sued by ostensibly independent minority shareholders in their joint ventures, often in Siberian courts. Telenor, the Norwegian cellphone company, spent years grappling with one such Siberian lawsuit that nearly wiped out its business in Russia.

The BP-Rosneft deal failed although Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin had backed it and a top aide presided over the signing, adding to the sense of mystery as to what is needed in Russia to secure an investment. Kremlin watchers suggested later that the faction that had backed the deal fell from favor shortly after the signing.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=14f444058bae785364afeeaf43eafe42