April 19, 2024

High & Low Finance: Europe Must Choose a Currency Union or a Financial Union

European leaders seem to be willing to accept that reality. But persuading publics may be far more difficult.

After more than a year of claiming that Greece could be bailed out without significant costs either for lenders or the rest of Europe, European leaders pledged on Thursday to pump in large amounts of money to try to revive the Greek economy while delaying repayment and reducing interest rates on existing loans.

It appears that the deal will mean solvent European nations will have to write some very large checks. Lenders will suffer losses, and some banks may need more bailouts, which Europe will pay for through a collective fund that will be authorized to borrow money backed by European states individually and collectively.

That fund, called the European Financial Stability Facility, will also take over lending to Greece, at rates close to what the facility is forced to pay when it borrows money.

Other parts of the communiqué issued by the European leaders after their summit meeting in Brussels promise there will be more central control over national budgets and tax policies.

Call it the federalization of Europe.

Unlike in the first Greek bailout, in spring 2010, the European leaders now accept that the Continent has a responsibility not just to prevent collapse but to get the Greek economy moving again.

In effect, the new decisions recognize that a strategy that might have been called “prosperity through austerity” was a hopeless failure. While there is little doubt that Greek profligacy was an important cause of the mess it is in, a combination of reducing government spending and seeking to raise tax collections was never going to produce a recovery that would make it possible for Greece to pay its debts.

Over the 12 months ending in March, the Greek economy shrank by 5.5 percent, while unemployment, at 12.2 percent when the country was first bailed out, rose to 15 percent.

“We call for a comprehensive strategy for growth and investment in Greece,” said the statement. While it removed a reference to “a European ‘Marshall Plan’ ” that was in a preliminary version of the statement leaked earlier Thursday, it promised that the rest of Europe would “work with the Greek authorities on competiveness and growth, job creation and training.”

Pouring money in will not, in and of itself, make Greek industries competitive again and enable the nation to flourish. In fact, it was money pouring in for most of the past decade that helped to create the problem. Then investors were willing to lend money to Greece for basically the same rate they charged Germany, on the theory that a common currency should mean common interest rates. Those savings — Greece’s effective borrowing rate was cut by more than half from 1998 to 2005 — enabled the government to spend more and tax less than it otherwise would have been forced to do.

That was not what advocates of the euro forecast when it was being created more than a decade ago. Then the theory was that countries would enact reforms — in labor markets, fiscal policies and even work habits — to become more like Germany. They would do that because a failure to do so would result in a country losing competitiveness as its costs rose more rapidly than those of Germany while the prices it could charge could not do so, since both countries used the same currency.

Now, Europe claims it will change, but there is obviously some resistance to detailed commitments. The leaked draft included a promise to “introduce legally binding national fiscal frameworks” by the end of 2012. The final communiqué took out the words “legally binding.”

The countries previously promised not to run large budget deficits, but they all did when the world went into recession. This time, though, we are assured they really mean it.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=ab662cb147211621e5bc97395953e9d9

Economix: What Is Capital?

The European bank stress test results are out, and we are told that all but eight — or is it nine? — banks passed.

FLOYD NORRIS

FLOYD NORRIS

Notions on high and low finance.

There is a lot of talk about how stressful the tests really were. Are they not treating sovereign debt as being as risky as markets now believe it to be? That is interesting, but may not be very enlightening. We can take for granted that most or maybe all banks in any country would be in trouble if that country defaulted on its debts. It appears that we now will know more than ever before about the specific exposures of each bank.

You can check out the numbers for any particular bank here.

The tests covered 91 banks, but the European Banking Authority, which conducted the exercise, is releasing results for just 90 of them. The other one is Helaba, a German bank owned by two states. It told the agency that it could not release its results. (There is an interesting commentary on power. The bank can order the European agency to keep its opinion quiet.)

Helaba Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen, to use the full name, has posted its own stress tests results, which show it is in fine condition.

The dispute is over what counts as capital. Helaba is outraged that the E.B.A. will not count “hardened silent participations” as core capital. And what is that? As near as I can tell, it amounts to promises by the two states that own the bank that the states will put up more money if needed.

Spanish banks that failed also are complaining about the definition of capital. They want “generic provisions” to count. Apparently that is reserves put aside to cover losses not yet identified.

In each case, previous stress tests counted the disputed capital.

The fact that these arguments are going on does provide some evidence that the stress tests are more credible than previous ones. They also remind us that one of the games that banks have played in the past — often with support from bank regulators — has been to count some pretty dubious things as capital. When the crisis hit, a lot of that “capital” turned out to not be of much use.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=030a7c2f11dff1f594d96bb04a14241d

Markets Losing Faith in Portugal

While all three countries will benefit in the short term from the loans coming from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, their ability to continue to raise affordable short-term funds from international investors is considered crucial. Interest costs have soared for Greece and Ireland as many investors expect the tough austerity measures included in their rescue packages will actually deepen the countries’ economic slumps and make it even harder for them to balance their budgets and repay their debts.

Portugal’s ability to secure more relaxed deficit targets from the I.M.F. — 5.9 percent of gross domestic product this year as opposed to an earlier promise from Lisbon of 4.6 percent, and 4.5 percent in 2012 compared with an earlier pledge of 3 percent — suggests that concerns are building in Washington and Brussels that too much austerity could have a detrimental effect.

Greece, for example, has had an extremely difficult time meeting the deficit targets mandated by the I.M.F. as its economic downturn has deepened. Despite a small export boomlet, Ireland, meanwhile, has seen little sign of a recovery in domestic demand. Portugal’s economy is expected to contract this year and next, which would be one of the longest recessions in Europe. Hampered by an uncompetitive export sector, its return to growth will most likely be long and slow as interest rates in Europe are poised to rise.

Under the three-year financial assistance package, 12 billion euros, or about $18 billion, will be channeled as new capital to Portuguese banks that have been shut out of the financial markets for more than a year because of investors’ concerns about Portugal and other suffering euro economies, according to a draft of the agreement published on the Web site of Expresso, a Portuguese magazine.

In return for the aid, Portugal has committed to the sale of state-owned assets aimed at raising 5.5 billion euros. It intends to sell shares before the end of the year in EDP, the energy company, and TAP, the flagship airline.

The aid program also foresees Portugal raising sales taxes on goods like cars and cigarettes, while cutting corporate tax exemptions and public subsidies to private companies. As part of an overhaul of labor legislation, severance payments will be reduced, while unemployment benefits are expected to end at 18 months rather than three years.

Among measures to cut the public sector wage bill, the government will reduce staffing of its central administration by 1 percent a year between 2012 and 2014, and by 2 percent for regional and local administrations. The reductions will take place by natural attrition.

Marie Diron, a senior economic adviser to Ernst Young, said the package was “surprisingly light on fiscal measures, probably reflecting the fact that Portugal already had significant plans in place and that further tightening measures would face decreasing returns.”

The draft agreement, however, did not specify the interest rate payable on the money lent to Portugal, making it difficult to assess a claim by Prime Minister José Sócrates late Tuesday that his government had negotiated “a good deal that defends Portugal,” as well as better terms for its bailout than those accepted last year by Greece and Ireland. The government is expected to confirm the terms Thursday.

The $115.5 billion rescue package, or 78 billion euros, was in line with estimates made last month by senior European officials of what Portugal would require. “The size of the package signals the determination of the E.U. authorities to ring-fence problems in the periphery, especially given the elevated market concerns about Greece and subsequent contagion risks that could arise from that,” analysts at Barclays Capital wrote in a research note Wednesday.

Mr. Sócrates resigned in March after Parliament refused to endorse his proposals for additional austerity measures. To break the political deadlock, Portugal is set to hold a general election June 5. Mr. Sócrates is leading a caretaker government in the meantime.

Some analysts, meanwhile, poured cold water on the favorable comparison drawn by Mr. Sócrates with bailout packages for other countries. With an election ahead, Mr. Sócrates is hoping to reap political benefit from negotiating a bailout, even as center-right opposition parties are blaming him for the problems that have forced Portugal to seek a rescue in the first place.

Mr. Sócrates “may have gone too fast in going public on the package, sidelining the opposition and spinning his role in the negotiations as a protector of his electoral base,” Gilles Moec, an analyst at Deutsche Bank, wrote in a research note Wednesday.

The caretaker government officially asked for assistance last month after failing to meet its 2010 deficit target and after a series of credit rating downgrades pushed Portugal’s borrowing costs to record highs. Those developments heightened concerns about the country’s ability to meet refinancing obligations.

Stephen Castle contributed reporting.

Article source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/business/global/05portugal.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Extra Tax Revenue to Delay Debt Crisis

The new estimate creates a significant grace period for Congress to consider an increase in the maximum amount that the government can borrow, a step that House Republicans say they will not take without an agreement to curb spending.

Federal borrowing is still likely to hit the legal limit on May 16, the Treasury said, so this week it will begin to take emergency steps to buy additional time under the cap. Those steps, plus the increase in tax receipts, which have reduced the need for borrowing, will delay a crisis by about a month — to August from July.

“While this updated estimate in theory gives Congress additional time to complete work on increasing the debt limit, I caution strongly against delaying action,” the Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, wrote Monday to lawmakers.

Mr. Geithner has warned repeatedly that failing to raise the ceiling would force the government to default on its debts and obligations. That, he wrote, “would have a catastrophic economic impact that would be felt by every American.”

Many Republicans have publicly agreed that Congress must raise the ceiling, although they insist that the White House must first agree to some form of meaningful spending limits. A vocal minority of members, however, have said that they are reluctant to raise the limit, and that Mr. Geithner and others ringing alarm bells have overstated the possible consequences of leaving the limit in place.

The debates have become a standard feature of Washington politics in the last two decades, cropping up when federal borrowing nears the limit while power is divided between the two parties. In 2006 and 2007, it was Democrats who inveighed against Republican arguments that debt increases were necessary.

In the past, Congress has always resolved its differences in time to avoid a debt crisis.

Vice President Joe Biden plans to convene White House staff and Congressional leaders Thursday to pursue an agreement on the terms of an increase. There is a growing consensus among Democrats that some restrictions on spending are reasonable and necessary to secure an agreement with Republicans.

To clear as much time as possible for that political process, the Treasury said on Monday that it would take the first in a series of emergency steps authorized by law this Friday. It will suspend a program under which it borrows money from state and local governments to help those governments meet legal obligations to invest in tax-exempt bonds.

The issuance of the State and Local Government Treasury securities, known as “slugs,” are largely a convenience for the governments. A senior Treasury official said the program’s suspension might not cost those governments any significant amount of money, but it would require them to find alternative investments.

The program has been suspended six times in the last two decades as the federal government bumped against the debt ceiling, most recently in 2007.

The Treasury said it would begin to take additional steps on May 16, including suspending programs under which the government borrows money from pension funds for federal employees and then pays interest to those funds. By law, the Treasury must make up for the lost interest payments once Congress raises the debt ceiling.

The ceiling is now set at $14.29 trillion. The government must constantly borrow more money because its commitments vastly exceed its revenue. The Treasury projected that the government would need to borrow $299 billion between April and June, and that it would hit the debt limit in early July.

It now projects that the government will need to borrow $142 billion during that period, thanks to the increase in tax revenue. That leaves enough room for the government to keep borrowing until August.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=a65bb497b5a25343bc3c2636977d30fb