March 29, 2024

Fair Game: 5 Wisconsin School Districts and 3 Ill-Fated Securities

UNEARTHING the story of the financial crisis is like conducting an archaeological dig. New shards keep emerging from the dust.

Here’s an interesting find. The Securities and Exchange Commission has sued Stifel Financial, a regional brokerage firm in St. Louis, accusing it of fraud in connection with complex debt securities it recommended to five Wisconsin school districts in 2006. Rather than settle with the commission, as many firms do, Stifel is defending the matter.

The S.E.C. sued Stifel on Aug. 10 because the firm advised the school districts to buy the three ill-fated securities, which the regulator said were unsuitably risky for unsophisticated investors. David W. Noack, the firm’s sales representative, misled school district officials when he told them that the deals, involving corporate bonds and rated AA-minus, were nearly as safe as United States Treasuries, the S.E.C. said. The Wisconsin school districts lost tens of millions of dollars on a $200 million investment, most of which was borrowed.

Stifel earned $1.6 million in commissions. But it did not create the securities — and this is where the case gets murky and interesting. Royal Bank of Canada built the failed investments, using parameters set out by Stifel and secretly profiting on the deal, Stifel said. The S.E.C. has not sued the bank.

In a lawsuit against Royal Bank of Canada, Stifel points to internal bank documents indicating a $5.4 million profit on two of the Wisconsin deals. Stifel also maintains that Royal Bank of Canada hid these and the third deal’s profits and had undisclosed conflicts as the deals’ originator. As such, RBC failed to abide by the contract with the school districts requiring “complete expense and fee transparency and disclosure,” Stifel said.

Kevin Foster, a Royal Bank of Canada spokesman, called Stifel’s allegations meritless and said the firm was trying to deflect blame to others for its central role in the troubled investments. “We never misrepresented our estimated profit to Stifel or the districts,” Mr. Foster said in a statement. “Stifel’s math is flat-out wrong and based on erroneous assumptions. The transactions were not profitable to RBC.”

Stifel and a lawyer for Mr. Noack declined to comment.

Here’s a short history of the transactions. In 2005, the school districts faced $400 million in unfunded health care and other non-pension guarantees for retired workers. Mr. Noack had been financial adviser to the districts for decades; he suggested they borrow money and invest in securities rated AA-minus that would generate more in yield than they had to pay in interest.

This becomes maddeningly complex: The bank from which the school districts borrowed — Depfa, of Ireland — told Stifel that it preferred collateralized debt obligations as the securities against which it would lend money to the districts. Stifel asked for proposals from banks. Royal Bank of Canada won the assignment and began to construct synthetic collateralized debt obligations linked to about 100 corporate bonds. It worked with ACA Management and UBS to select the underlying portfolios.

Depfa lent the money to the districts on a “nonrecourse” basis, meaning that the districts would not have to repay the loan if the securities bought with the borrowed funds defaulted. This arrangement, Stifel argues, shows that Depfa, a sophisticated institution, believed that the investment was not high-risk. Under the deal’s terms, Depfa could seize the collateral if the security’s asset values fell to 95 cents on the dollar and did not return to $1.01 within 30 days.

It didn’t take long for the deals to go south, and for the school districts to lose their $37 million investment. Depfa seized the underlying collateral supporting its $163 million loan. Lawsuits began flying.

Once again, we see the same toxic ingredients that have appeared repeatedly in the aftermath of the crisis: collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, ruinous leverage, an overreliance on credit ratings, greed and extreme naïveté.

But the case raises questions about a largely unexplored part of the collateralized debt obligation mania — whether Wall Street firms putting together these deals knew how to game the ratings agency models and profited by selecting debt issues to suit their purposes.

If, for example, a firm was designing an instrument to be used to bet against the underlying collateral — Goldman Sachs’s famous Abacus deal was created so the hedge fund manager John Paulson could short risky mortgages — a firm could assign debt issues to the deal that carried overly optimistic or misplaced ratings. Later, when reality intervened and the ratings were cut, those betting against the underlying collateral would prosper.

Article source: http://feeds.nytimes.com/click.phdo?i=d21a0cca6fa01927a399175926c11d42

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